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Después de las movilizaciones masivas del 2000 al 2005 que llevaron a Evo Morales y su partido a la presidencia se esperaba una incorporación positiva de los sectores populares, campesinos e indígenas a la arena política. Este artículo analiza por qué en su segundo gobierno (2010-2014) esa expectativa cedió paso a una creciente conflictividad con importantes movimientos sociales que lo llevaron al poder. Argumenta que la priorización de políticas de Estado generó fuertes tensiones en la amplia y heterogénea coalición social surgida de las luchas antineoliberales. ; The mass mobilizations of the early 2000s that helped bring Evo Morales and his party to power raised expectations for the (re)incorporation of popular sectors, peasants, and indigenous peoples in the political arena. This article analyzes why in his second government (2010-2014) this expectation gave way to deepening conflict with movements that had helped him win the presidency. It argues that the inevitable setting of policy priorities generated strong tensions in the government's heterogeneous social coalition forged during antineoliberal mobilization.

The mass mobilizations of the early 2000s that helped bring Evo Morales and his party to power raised expectations for the (re)incorporation of popular sectors, peasants, and indigenous peoples in the political arena. This article analyzes why in his second government (2010-2014) this expectation gave way to deepening conflict with movements that had helped him win the presidency. It argues that the inevitable setting of policy priorities generated strong tensions in the government's heterogeneous social coalition forged during anti-neoliberal mobilization. ; Después de las movilizaciones masivas del 2000 al 2005 que llevaron a Evo Morales y su partido a la presidencia se esperaba una incorporación positiva de los sectores populares, campesinos e indígenas a la arena política. Este artículo analiza por qué en su segundo gobierno (2010-2014) esa expectativa cedió paso a una creciente conflictividad con importantes movimientos sociales que lo llevaron al poder. Argumenta que la priorización de políticas de Estado generó fuertes tensiones en la amplia y heterogénea coalición social surgida de las luchas antineoliberales.

AbstractFree-market reforms in the last quarter of the twentieth century weakened the point of production—labor unions—asthesource of effective nonparty political countermovement to liberal capitalism. Has another significant source of societal resistance arisen in association with the resurgence of market economics? Building on the work of Karl Polanyi, this article argues that circuits of exchange—the commodification of labor, land, and money—can be powerful sources of movement against contemporary forms of free-market capitalism. It draws on the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador to explore how Polanyi's exchange-based approach helps to elucidate three phenomena: the great variety of identities behind the myriad movements against free-market capitalism, the emergence of community as a powerful locus for organizing, and the proliferation of new forms of transgressive and highly disruptive direct action to reinforce the debilitated effectiveness of the strike.

The standard characterization of Latin America's import-substitution model of development and its "failure" overlooks two important issues. First, models of development do not spring forth full-blown with self-evident virtues or fatal flaws as politicized public policy analysts claim. They emerge over time as responses to international and domestic socioeconomic and political crises. They spring from attempts to restore economic growth and political order and are later formalized as models. In that sense, import-substitution industrialization had significant success for a number of decades. Secondly, given Latin America's situation of dependency, international economic crises before and after World War II and the characteristics of the world capitalist economy that emerged after the war had a significant impact on the rise and fall of import-substitution industrialization. However, there was considerable variation in the timing and sequencing of this impact and the extent to which these international factors affected the rise and fall of the model in Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil. Differences in domestic factors, such as state formation, party systems, and the social coalitions that supported and opposed import-substitution industrialization, account for that variation. Moreover, the decline of the model should be understood in terms of the degree of departure from industrial policy and inclusive social policy, not in terms of some intrinsic incapacity.