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How do nation-states' political institutions affect the relations between states? This article addresses that question by testing the predictions of different theories linking political institutions to war outcomes. Specifically, rent-seeking and regime legitimacy theories predict that all democratic belligerents are more likely to win wars because they fight more effectively. Alternatively, other theories focusing on the domestic political vulnerability of leaders and the marketplace of ideas predict that democracies are likely to be more careful about choosing when to start war. This would mean that only democratic initiators are more likely to win. Analyzing all interstate wars from 1816 to 1982 with a multivariate probit model, we find that democratic initiators are significantly more likely to win wars; democratic targets are also more likely to win, though the relationship is not as strong. We also find empirical support for several control variables, including strategy, terrain, and capability. (American Political Science Review / FUB)

Examines plans for NATO expansion, potential power and dangers of a Russia-China alliance, objections and rebuttals to admitting Russia to NATO, and Chinese reaction to it.

Toward a better understanding of theories of international conflict -- Comparative hypothesis testing and some limits to knowledge -- Choosing and testing the arguments : the practice and pitfalls of comparative hypothesis testing -- Arguments and operational measures -- Findings -- Assessing a model's reliability across space and time

AbstractPolicy-makers and the electorate assume political executives' life experiences affect their policy choices once in office. Recent international relations work on leaders focuses almost entirely on how political institutions shape leaders' choices rather than on leaders' personal attributes and how they influence policy choices. This article focuses the analytic lens on leaders and their personal backgrounds. We theorize that the prior military background of a leader is an important life experience with direct relevance for how leaders evaluate the utility of using military force. We test several propositions employing a new data set, building on Archigos, that encompasses the life background characteristics of more than 2,500 heads of state from 1875 to 2004. The results show that the leaders most likely to initiate militarized disputes and wars are those with prior military service but no combat experience, as well as former rebels.

We reexamine the fit of Bennett and Stam's 1996 model of war duration, correcting errors in the reported estimates of prediction accuracy.We discuss how to assess fit in the absence of standard or widely accepted measures of fit in duration models. We introduce a proportional reduction in error measure for duration models and report new estimates of model fit from the Bennett and Stam model.The model does significantly reduce prediction error relative to a naïve model.