Search results

Provides an analysis of President Bush's new national security strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado on August 2,1990, involving a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's 'base force.' If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return the bulk of U.S. ground and air forces to the continental U.S. where a significant number would be demobilized. In the event of a major war with the USSR, the U.S. would rely on active and reserve forces for a response to a major contingency and, if necessary, reconstitute additional military capability for a major war. The new strategy is based upon a revised Soviet threat and a new international security environment which allows us to assume two years warning of a major ground war in Europe ; Sponsored by the Director, Net Assessment and Competitive Strategies Office and Strategic Planning Branch, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; the Defense Policy Office, National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC; and the Defense Nuclear Agency HQ DNA/NASF, Alexandria, VA. ; http://archive.org/details/americapromisest00trit ; MIPR DDWAMQ0035, 90005. 90038 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Third-three synopses of major Soviet works on military strategy, doctrine, and the Soviet Navy. Each entry was prepared by students enrolled in NS 3450, Soviet Military Strategy, at the Naval Postgraduate School in the winter of 1989. Each entry is in chronological order within sections dealing with doctrine and strategy, specialized military subjects, the Soviet Navy, and comparative works. Comparative works analyze similar short monographs such as Whence the Threat to Peace over its revision of four issues. Reports are useful in understanding how Soviet Military/Naval thought had changed over the years. Keywords: Soviet military strategy, Soviet military doctrine, Soviet Navy. (R.h. ) ; Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Security of Defense, Washington, D. C. ; http://archive.org/details/studentreportsin90015trit ; MIPR NO.- DWAM 0035, DWAM 90005, DWAM 90038 ; NA ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

One page synopsis on thirty (30) journals which contain articles on maritime and/or joint strategic planning. Each entry was prepared by students taking NS3252 Joint and Maritime Strategic Planning at the Naval Postgraduate School in the Summer of 1989. Entries include the journal's name, publisher, frequency of publication, length of each issue, illustrations/photographs, number of articles/topics, special sections, book reviews, noteworthy features, journal quality and subscription information. Keywords: Maritime strategic planning, Joint strategic planning ; http://archive.org/details/reportonmaritime00trit ; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Surprise and the Single Scenarios' is the title of an article by Sir James Cable. The essence of his thesis is that the United Kingdom should not prepare its military with just one contingency in mind. Related theses have been debated for many years; should Soviet military strategy be based upon the doctrinal assumption of quick escalation to nuclear war? Should U.S. nuclear forces be procured with the requirement to survive a well executed surprise first strike? In considering these and related political-military questions, scenarios are often created to flesh out the concept being considered. For example, military planners in the USSR undoubtedly use alternating scenarios to consider possible courses that armed conflict could take in order that they might assess the impact of short or long time scales on nuclear/conventional interactions. Similarly, varying scenarios are used in the U.S. to demonstrate the impact of different threat assumptions on the amount and types of nuclear forces that the U.S. should buy that would 'guarantee' an acceptable level of retaliation. The major point to all this, and this report, is that in order to perform complex political military assessments, political scientists either explicitly or implicitly use operations analysis techniques, including simulations, gaming and scenarios ; http://archive.org/details/creativeuseofsce00trit ; NA