The Government of Jordan, the World Bank Group (WBG), and the international community are working towards a paradigm shift in their collective response to the refugee crisis - a holistic approach which stresses the continuum between the humanitarian response and the country's development agenda. In parallel, Jordan's implicit social contract by which the state provided citizens with jobs and heavily subsidized public services is evolving. strategic engagement, the WBG will adopt a two-pronged approach aimed at simultaneously addressing Jordan's immediate needs in view of the fluid and worsening regional situation while keeping a medium and long-term development commitment built on reforming the economy to create the right environment for inclusive, job-creating growth. The first pillar of the Country Partnership Framework (CPF) aims to foster the conditions for stronger private-sector-led growth and better employment opportunities for all.The second pillar of the CPF aims to improve the quality and equity of service delivery, including through private sector solutions.The CPF will implement the new Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Strategy at the country level.The CPF aligns with the Government's vision Jordan 2025, the Executive Development Plan 2016-2018 (EDP), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).The CPF's principles of engagement will be selectivity, flexibility, adaptability and partnership. The outlook for 2016 forecasts growth at three percent on account of a growing mining and quarrying sector, some energy investments, and base effect of the tourism and construction sectors, although some downside risks have begun to materialize in early 2016.
Last month, the Israeli military declared that it had taken "tactical control" of the Philadelphi corridor, the strategically important nine-mile-long and 300-foot-wide buffer zone between Gaza and Egypt. Israeli officials say that they took this action as part of an effort to decapitate Hamas roughly eight months into this war, claiming that the Palestinians have used this corridor to set up tunnels for funneling arms.But these tunnels have been used to bring all types of goods and services, not just weapons, into Gaza — even if authorities in Egypt, which has officially been imposing its own blockade on Gaza since 2007, have not been openly admitting so. These tunnels connecting Egypt and Gaza have given the Palestinians in the besieged enclave some sort of a lifeline. Now the blockade will be even tighter and Gaza's humanitarian disasters are only set to worsen."The direct control of the [Philadelphi corridor] by Israel means the complete encirclement of Gaza, which in prior years [the Israelis] left that one part of the borders to a joint Egyptian-Palestinian control. For Palestinians it denies them all hope of an Israel-free part of their borders," Nabeel Khoury, former deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, told RS."Israel's takeover will make it that much harder for humanitarian aid to get through. Israel's right wing is getting its desired goal here: Full encirclement of Palestinians and denial of all means of livelihood — in other words a step closer to driving out whoever is still alive once this war ends, if it ever does," added the former US diplomat.The situation in the Philadelphi corridor has potentially huge implications for the future Israel's cold peace with Egypt. Overall, the past eight months of warfare in Gaza have created difficult dilemmas for Egypt's government.Officials in Cairo have spent months sounding the alarm about the Israeli military's advance toward the Egypt-Gaza border, fearing that this war will drive Palestinians into Egyptian territory. At the same time, President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi's government has been seeking to avoid an escalation of tensions with Israel's government while simultaneously trying to keep a lid on growing anger among Egyptian citizens who are staunchly pro-Palestinian.In taking control of the Philadelphi corridor, Israel is violating the 1979 peace accord with Egypt, further complicating its already frosty relationship with Cairo. Egypt and Israel's peace accord permits each side to deploy a small military or border security presence in this demilitarized zone, yet only through a mutual agreement can the number of troops in the Philadelphi corridor to be adjusted. At the time of the peace accord's implementation in 1979, Israel had been occupying Gaza with troops on the ground since 1967. Those Israeli military forces as well as Israeli settlers didn't withdraw from the coastal enclave until 2005."An already icy relationship is heading for deep freeze," is how Patrick Theros, the former U.S. Ambassador to Qatar, described the state of Egyptian-Israeli affairs in an interview with RS. "Neither government has an interest in breaking the formal ties between the two countries. Internal pressures have mounted in Egypt and will only get worse. The current regime in Cairo has shown it can suppress demonstrations effectively, but there has to be a point where Sisi must do something to placate public opinion. I don't know when, where, or what. But it must come," added Theros.On May 24, two Egyptian soldiers died amid a clash between the Egyptian and Israeli militaries near the Egypt-Gaza border. Although both Cairo and Tel Aviv took quick steps to contain potential fallout from the deadly episode, the clash illustrated the fragility of Egyptian-Israeli relations amid this volatile period. As demonstrated by the reactions on social media, the Egyptian soldiers' deaths also led to increased rage among the Egyptian public.Egypt's weaknessesIsrael's control of the Philadelphi Corridor and, more broadly, the war in Gaza have put Egypt's government under much pressure from various sides. The overall situation has seemingly left the Sisi government feeling humiliated with its vulnerabilities increasingly exposed. Ultimately, with the Egyptian army heavily dependent on the U.S. for financial and military assistance and unable to credibly challenge the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), there is not much Egypt can do to counter Tel Aviv. Yet, with its own population increasingly angry, Sisi can't ignore domestic pressure at a time when other factors such as Egypt's deteriorated economy challenge his regime's stability and legitimacy."[The Gaza] crisis has highlighted Egypt's weak hand. It cannot threaten Israel with anything Israelis will take seriously without threatening U.S. ties and assistance. It cannot do the only thing the Israelis have demanded of Egypt: accepting the millions of Gazans Israel wants to expel from the Gaza Strip. Other than maintaining the status quo, Egypt has nothing to offer. It has connectivity with Hamas in Gaza, but the Israelis do not value that," Theros told RS.Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vows to continue this war until Hamas is defeated, which could extend the fighting into 2025. Yet prolonged warfare in Gaza and more Palestinian suffering in the enclave means that Egypt's leadership will face intensified pressure from its own population, especially if Palestinians in large number flee Gaza for the Sinai or if trigger-happy IDF troops kill more Egyptian soldiers. How these scenarios would impact the Camp David Accord remains an open question.What is clear, however, is that the government in Cairo wants this war in Gaza to end as soon as possible to relieve the Sisi regime of these pressures. This is why Egypt is working hard with Qatar to broker a lasting ceasefire. Unfortunately, Cairo and Doha's diplomatic efforts to bring this horrific war to an end have yet to prove successful. Until that outcome is achieved, Egypt's government will continue to remain extremely vulnerable and appear weak.
The crash of the helicopter and resulting death of the Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi and the country's foreign minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian came at a tense time in EU-Iran relations. Tehran's support for the Russian war in Ukraine, domestic repression and support for Hamas, classified as a terrorist organization in the EU, have caused many EU leaders to perceive Iran as one of the bloc's top geopolitical adversaries.Despite that background, European leaders have expressed condolences and offered assistance in dealing with the aftermath of the accident. Reacting to the news of the crash, Charles Michel, the former prime minister of Belgium and currently the president of the European Council wrote on X that he and EU member states were "monitoring the situation closely." When the deaths of Raisi and Abdollahian, as well as others onboard, were confirmed, Michel expressed, in the name of the EU, "sincere condolences" and offered "thoughts to the families" of the deceased. EU high representative for foreign policy Josep Borrell expressed similar sentiments.Even before the deaths were confirmed, the EU, through its commissioner for crisis management, civil protection and humanitarian aid Janez Lenarcic announced that the bloc was activating, at the request of Iran, its emergency satellite mapping services in order to locate the crash site. The offer and hashtag that accompanied it — #EUSolidarity — were reposted by Borrell, but met with immediate backlash from other circles. Notably some members of the European Parliament took issue with what one — from a liberal bloc — construed as the Commission's support for the regime in Tehran and "mockery of the brave fighters for human rights in Iran." Another — from the Green faction — chimed in to demand that the "solidarity" is instead expressed through granting visas to "the human rights defenders and other victims of the regime" in Iran.Lenarcic's team countered that "facilitating a search and rescue operation is not an act of political support to any regime or establishment. It is simply an expression of the most basic humanity." The critics might have found it ironic that Iran would ask the EU for assistance, given the abysmal state of bilateral relations, but the Commission acted fully in compliance with the EU's own guidelines on humanitarian aid. There was no love lost for Ebrahim Raisi in Brussels, but, at a time when the EU's credibility is flagging due to its divisions and confusions on Gaza, such a clear case of consistency with its own declared values is something to build on — apart from a simple act of decency.And the EU would indeed need to rebuild its political capital in relations with Iran. It has important interests to pursue. For one, Germany and France, alongside the non-EU Britain, are signatories of the flailing nuclear agreement known as JCPOA. As Iran's nuclear program advances following President Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and President Biden's subsequent failure to revive it, concerns increase in Europe, as they do elsewhere, that Iran may be approaching the nuclear threshold status, and only a political decision away from an actual weaponization of its nuclear program.Tensions in the Middle East, where the EU launched earlier this year its maritime mission to protect the shipping routes in the Red Sea from the Iran-backed Houthi rebels is another major concern for the EU. And there are still EU citizens wrongfully kept in detention by Iran, such as the Swedish national and official from the Borrell-led European External Action Service Johan Floderus, on allegedly spurious charges of spying for Israel.Those who lambast EU officials like Michel, Borrell, and Lenarcic for supposedly failing to take a "tough line" against Tehran neglect to explain how these vital interests will be served in the absence of any diplomatic engagement with Iran. Following maximalist demands would be even more absurd at a time when the United States, Europe's primary security guarantor, is itself engaged in talks with Tehran, through intermediaries, on de-escalation of tensions in the Middle East and on the nuclear file. The EU, in fact, has an advantage over the U.S. in that it doesn't need to go through third parties to engage with Iran, since it already has direct channels of communications.The EU will have to tread carefully in the coming months leading up to the elections of the new president in Iran. Its core interests, as outlined above, remain unchanged whoever is in charge in Tehran. The EU is likely to concentrate on them, even if that would fall far short of the aspirations to see a democratic change in Iran. The possible elevation of the current deputy foreign minister and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani to the position of the foreign minister may cause some advances in reviving at least some form of a nuclear agreement. As to the presidential elections, the most likely course of action for the EU will be to wait and see and then deal with whoever emerges on the top, mindful of the fact that in the Islamic Republic president has limited room in setting foreign policy, with the final decisions to be taken by the Supreme Leader.One potential stress ahead for the EU could be a re-emergence of the nation-wide protests in the run-up to the elections. Should this be the case, there will likely be increased pressure on the EU policymakers from the MEPs, exiled activists and possibly some opposition figures from Iran itself to throw their lot with the protesters. Yet, however tempting it might be to do so, the EU should not act on an assumption that the downfall of the regime is around the corner. Protests are a regular occurrence in Iran, yet the regime has demonstrated a considerable resilience. The EU should, therefore, focus primarily on its own interests. In any case, it is up to the Iranians, not the EU, to determine the future form of governance of Iran.
This evaluation assesses the outcomes of World Bank Group's (WBG's) development support to the West Bank and Gaza for the period 2001-09. It covers the programs of the World Bank - International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The main objectives of the WBG program were broad, reflecting the extremely volatile political situation, characterized by frequent humanitarian and economic crises that required abrupt shifts in the Bank's strategy. The WB is both the main economic adviser to the Quartet on the Middle East and the administrator of large donor trust funds. The WBG made important contributions in identifying obstacles to development, estimating their costs, and promoting the search for reasonable compromises. The Bank Group program needs to recognize that the long-term development effectiveness of its support is heavily dependent on the Israeli-Palestinian political framework, as well as close alignment of its efforts with those of other donors. Other specific recommendations of this evaluation include: developing a medium-term strategy with a focused results framework; exploring opportunities for closer cooperation with Arab donors; helping the Palestinian Authority (PA) to develop a long-term strategy to reduce aid dependence; and identifying opportunities for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on different aspects of development.
This article substantiates the idea that in modern conditions in repelling armed aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the effectiveness of hostilities depends mainly on the organization and improvement of military and social work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Also, it depends on the creation of favorable social and legal conditions, comprehensive satisfaction staffing needs. Therefore, the article first considers the issues of modern understanding of the essence and tasks of military and social work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AF). The main system elements are revealed - the subjects of HRV in the context of their formation in the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, objects, directions, and measures for implementing the tasks. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of the main problems in the history of forming the legal framework of military and social work. Further in the article, an attempt is made to reveal the current problems of formation, organization, and implementation of HRV in the territorial centers of staffing and social support. After all, the authors' problems have not yet been studied and require independent research. Based on the study of NATO experience, it is established that the new approaches of military and social work organization and implementation in these centers should be based on the principle of identifying the most socially disadvantaged categories of persons. Furthermore, to provide them with appropriate targeted assistance in cooperation with public authorities. It was also established that to increase the efficiency of the HRC tasks listed in the article, particularly in these centers, it is necessary to more actively and persistently implement the System of Officials on Moral and Psychological Influence on Personnel in the Field of Military and Social Activities. Staff - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, the fundamental document that should be the basis of a promising HRV system is the already developed draft Strategy for the development of social work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2035. The authors conclude that the topic development requires constant analysis and consideration of the growing role factors of the social factor in ensuring a high level of combat and mobilization readiness. Moreover, troops' (forces) moral and psychological condition in performing tasks in the Joint Forces operation is necessary. The presence of acute social problems in military personnel and the need to implement NATO standards in troops' (forces) social sphere of life. ; У даній статті обґрунтовується ідея про те, що в сучасних умовах при відсічі збройній агресії на сході України ефективність бойової діяльності у визначальній мірі залежить від організації та вдосконалення військово-соціальної роботи у ЗС України, тобто від створення сприятливих соціальних та правових умов діяльності, всебічного задоволення потреб особового складу. Тому в статті спочатку розглядаються питання щодо сучасного розуміння сутності та завдань організації військово-соціальної роботи у ЗС України (далі – ВСР). Розкриті основні елементи її системи – суб'єкти ВСР в контексті їх становлення при розбудові ЗС України, об'єкти, напрями та заходи реалізації покладених завдань. Значна увага приділена аналізу основних проблем в історії становлення нормативно-правової бази військово-соціальної роботи. Далі в статті зроблена спроба розкрити актуальні проблеми становлення, організації та здійснення ВСР в територіальних центрах комплектування та соціальної підтримки. Адже показані авторами там проблеми поки що не вивчені і вимагають окремих досліджень. На основі вивчення досвіду країн НАТО встановлено, що в основу нових підходів організації та здійснення військово-соціальної роботи у вказаних центрах має бути покладено принцип виявлення найбільш соціально вражених категорій осіб та надання їм у взаємодії з органами державної влади, місцевого самоврядування відповідної адресної допомоги. Також встановлено, що з метою підвищення ефективності реалізації перерахованих в статті завдань ВСР, зокрема у означених центрах необхідно більш активно та наполегливо впроваджувати Систему роботи посадових осіб щодо морально-психологічного впливу на особовий склад за напрямом військово-соціальної діяльності, яка вже затверджена рішенням начальника Генерального штабу – Головнокомандувачем ЗС України. Водночас фундаментальним документом, який доцільно покласти в основу перспективної системи ВСР є вже розроблений проект Стратегії розвитку соціальної роботи у Збройних Силах України до 2035 року. Автори приходить до висновку, що розробка означеної теми вимагає постійного аналізу та врахування факторів зростання ролі соціального чинника в забезпеченні високого рівня бойової та мобілізаційної готовності, морально-психологічного стану особового складу військ (сил) при виконанні завдань в операції Об'єднаних сил; наявність гострих соціальних проблем у військового персоналу та необхідність впровадження стандартів НАТО в соціальну сферу життєдіяльності військ (сил).
This article substantiates the idea that in modern conditions in repelling armed aggression in Eastern Ukraine, the effectiveness of hostilities depends mainly on the organization and improvement of military and social work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Also, it depends on the creation of favorable social and legal conditions, comprehensive satisfaction staffing needs. Therefore, the article first considers the issues of modern understanding of the essence and tasks of military and social work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AF). The main system elements are revealed - the subjects of HRV in the context of their formation in the development of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, objects, directions, and measures for implementing the tasks. Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of the main problems in the history of forming the legal framework of military and social work. Further in the article, an attempt is made to reveal the current problems of formation, organization, and implementation of HRV in the territorial centers of staffing and social support. After all, the authors' problems have not yet been studied and require independent research. Based on the study of NATO experience, it is established that the new approaches of military and social work organization and implementation in these centers should be based on the principle of identifying the most socially disadvantaged categories of persons. Furthermore, to provide them with appropriate targeted assistance in cooperation with public authorities. It was also established that to increase the efficiency of the HRC tasks listed in the article, particularly in these centers, it is necessary to more actively and persistently implement the System of Officials on Moral and Psychological Influence on Personnel in the Field of Military and Social Activities. Staff - Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. At the same time, the fundamental document that should be the basis of a promising HRV system is the already developed draft Strategy for the development of social work in the Armed Forces of Ukraine until 2035. The authors conclude that the topic development requires constant analysis and consideration of the growing role factors of the social factor in ensuring a high level of combat and mobilization readiness. Moreover, troops' (forces) moral and psychological condition in performing tasks in the Joint Forces operation is necessary. The presence of acute social problems in military personnel and the need to implement NATO standards in troops' (forces) social sphere of life. ; У даній статті обґрунтовується ідея про те, що в сучасних умовах при відсічі збройній агресії на сході України ефективність бойової діяльності у визначальній мірі залежить від організації та вдосконалення військово-соціальної роботи у ЗС України, тобто від створення сприятливих соціальних та правових умов діяльності, всебічного задоволення потреб особового складу. Тому в статті спочатку розглядаються питання щодо сучасного розуміння сутності та завдань організації військово-соціальної роботи у ЗС України (далі – ВСР). Розкриті основні елементи її системи – суб'єкти ВСР в контексті їх становлення при розбудові ЗС України, об'єкти, напрями та заходи реалізації покладених завдань. Значна увага приділена аналізу основних проблем в історії становлення нормативно-правової бази військово-соціальної роботи. Далі в статті зроблена спроба розкрити актуальні проблеми становлення, організації та здійснення ВСР в територіальних центрах комплектування та соціальної підтримки. Адже показані авторами там проблеми поки що не вивчені і вимагають окремих досліджень. На основі вивчення досвіду країн НАТО встановлено, що в основу нових підходів організації та здійснення військово-соціальної роботи у вказаних центрах має бути покладено принцип виявлення найбільш соціально вражених категорій осіб та надання їм у взаємодії з органами державної влади, місцевого самоврядування відповідної адресної допомоги. Також встановлено, що з метою підвищення ефективності реалізації перерахованих в статті завдань ВСР, зокрема у означених центрах необхідно більш активно та наполегливо впроваджувати Систему роботи посадових осіб щодо морально-психологічного впливу на особовий склад за напрямом військово-соціальної діяльності, яка вже затверджена рішенням начальника Генерального штабу – Головнокомандувачем ЗС України. Водночас фундаментальним документом, який доцільно покласти в основу перспективної системи ВСР є вже розроблений проект Стратегії розвитку соціальної роботи у Збройних Силах України до 2035 року. Автори приходить до висновку, що розробка означеної теми вимагає постійного аналізу та врахування факторів зростання ролі соціального чинника в забезпеченні високого рівня бойової та мобілізаційної готовності, морально-психологічного стану особового складу військ (сил) при виконанні завдань в операції Об'єднаних сил; наявність гострих соціальних проблем у військового персоналу та необхідність впровадження стандартів НАТО в соціальну сферу життєдіяльності військ (сил).
The article covers one of the problematic aspects of US-Soviet relations in the first post-war years - the issue of «the controversial refugees», appeared due to non-recognition by the United States of Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and the conduct of forced repatriation by the USSR. American diplomacy during the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt adhered to the «non-recognition policy», concluded in the Stimson Doctrine (January 7, 1932) and the Welles Declaration (July 23, 1940). However, declared foreign policy acts did not lead to a decrease of the level of official relations with the aggressor state. At the same time, the official Washington did not consider the Balts as citizens of the USSR and retained the diplomatic missions of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the United States. Under the administration of President Harry Truman, the course of non-recognition of the «voluntary entry of the three Baltic republics into the USSR» continued.It was researched that after the end of the Second World War, refugees and displaced persons from the Baltic-occupied Soviet Union were located in Austria, Italy, France and Switzerland. The large contingent was within the limits of the American occupation zone in Germany, the vast majority were immigrants from Lithuania. The attention was paid to the factors that led to the mass exodus of Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians from 1943 to 1944. It is outlined the special place of American diaspora civic organizations in collecting of financial assistance and coordination of their activities with the US State Department. It is also defined the role of representatives of the Catholic and Protestant national churches.The researched paper contains an analysis of correspondence between the leaders of the American diplomatic missions of Lithuania (Povilas Žadeikis), Latvia (Alfrēds Bīlmanis) and Estonia (Johannes Kaiv) with the US Department of State. Baltic diplomats constantly emphasized the need to confront the Soviet propaganda machine with regard to the denial of the «voluntary Sovietization of the Baltic» and the practice of sweeping accusation of refugees in «betrayal» and «cooperation with the Germans». In turn, they pointed to the need to extend the jurisdiction and mandate of international organizations on Baltic refugees, to determine their legal status and to prevent their recognition as the Soviet citizens in some European countries.The article deals with the documental potential of the diplomatic correspondence of the US foreign policy department. Attention is drawn to the analysis of this issue in the research works of foreign historians.During the first post-war years in matter of refugees' problem and displaced persons, it was found that American diplomacy was in search of consensus between humanitarian reasons for ensuring human rights to asylum and the fulfillment of allied obligations in course of the activities of Soviet repatriation missions. However, «Baltic refugees» were a separate category, which Americans tried not to extradite from their occupied territory to the USSR cause of their non-recognition policy of Soviet annexation of Baltic states.
Цель. Тема социальной и политической ролей религиозных структур на протяжении последних лет является весьма актуальной среди ученых ввиду высокого влияния духовных организаций на общественность. Для российских исследователей особый интерес в этом отношении вызывает Русская православная церковь как институт тесно связанный с государством. Другой важной проблемой современной науки являются российско-американские отношения и история взаимодействия двух государств. Данная статья посвящена истории распространения русского православия на территории США в период существования Российской империи и включает анализ специфики социальной и политической ролей, которая сложилась у православной епархии на новой земле.Методология. Исследование основано на анализе открытых источников и демографических данных с использованием историко-генетического, сравнительно-исторического методов.Результаты. В ходе проведённого исследования установлено, что деятельность Русской православной церкви на Аляске в период 1794–1867 гг. состояла, преимущественно, из просветительно-образовательной работы, оказания гуманитарной помощи населению и контроля за общественно-политической обстановкой. Передача территории Аляски от России к США привела к территориальному расширению епархии, изменению её статуса и функций. Теперь церковь, помимо миссионерской и просветительно-образовательной деятельности, сосредоточилась на адаптации мигрантов к жизни в новой стране и оказании им финансовой помощи. Также работа епархии в США могла оказывать незначительное влияние на дипломатические связи России с Австро-Венгрией и Грецией.Область применения результатов. Результаты работы могут быть использованы для дальнейших исследований социальной и политической ролей Русской православной церкви, российско-американского религиозного взаимодействия и изучения международной деятельности церкви. ; Purpose. The social and political role of religious institutions has been an important topic among researchers due to high impact of religious organizations on a society. Russian Orthodox Church as an institution closely related to State is significant for Russian researchers. Another important topic is Russian-American relations and the history of interactions between two states. This paper is dedicated to history of spreading of Russian Orthodoxy across USA during the period of Russian Empire. It includes an analysis of Orthodox diocese's social and political role in new lands.Methodology. The research is based on the analysis of open sources and demographic data within historical-genetic, comparative-historical methods.Results. The research revealed that the activity of Russian Orthodox Church in Alaska during the 1794–1867 has mainly consisted of enlightenment and educational services, humanitarian aid and control of socio-political situation. The transfer of Alaska from Russia to USA had led to territorial expansion of diocese and change in its status and functions. Thus, apart from missionary, it had focused on financial aid and immigrant assistance for new arrivals. Also the activity of Russian Orthodox diocese in USA could have a minor influence on diplomatic relations of Russia with Austro-Hungarian Empire and Greece.Scope of application of the results. Results could be used for further researches of social and political role of Russian Orthodox Church, Russian-American religious relations and Church's international affairs.
Economic globalization has become a controversial phenomenon of civilization culture. Actuality of its study is explained that it is practically a scalene and multidimensional theoretical construction. The problem concerns the defiition of direct cultural and historical development, such as talking about his ways regress or progress or innovation brings destruction in human relations.The purpose of the article is fiding out of volume of maintenance of ascending concepts: «humanism culture» and «economic globalization». In the analysis of recent researches and publications marked integrative research, «counter» intentions of economists and philosophers in research of globalization phenomena. Scientists-economists are trying to rethink the theoretical dogmas of economic science and philosophical-humanitarian discipline includes a tool purely economic analysis of the practical methods of management. Methodological approaches to local researchers of economic globalization do not differ from the existing West. The main differences between them touch understanding of its directions and consequences. The problems of political leadership are violated in the era of the World Economic Space. At the same time the problems of cultural mutual relations come into question between people.In basic results research is accented attention on the fact that the questions of economic globalization require world philosophical and ideological interpretation. Regardless of social scales of application humanism as an ideological principle becomes everyday claimed. Humanity is excited for its prospects. For the estimation the level of globalization in 2002 at an assistance of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and with the participation of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology under the direction of Axel Drehe, professor of Economics University by Ruphert-Carls in Germany, was founded the Index of Globalization (KOF). This index is combined by economic, political and social criteria of life of society and allows to estimate the scale of integration of individual countries into world processes. In this project the index of cultural integration is veiled social criteria. In western style of thought the culture and the society is identifid in measurements of dimensions and quality of life.In conclusions specifid, that modern realities of economic globalization has not suffiiently identifid with the content of philosophical tools. They need to form a new ideological paradigm with bringing in of complex methodological and praxeological factors ; Экономическая глобализация стала противоречивым феноменом цивилизационной культуры, а потому выясняется объем содержания восходящих понятий «гуманистическая культура» и «экономическая глобализация». Современные реалии экономической глобализации еще не достаточно идентифицируются с содержанием философского инструментария. Они требуют формирования новой мировоззренческой парадигмы с привлечением комплекса методологических и праксеологических факторов. ; Економічна глобалізація стала суперечливим феноменом цивілізаційної культури, а тому з'ясовується обсяг змісту висхідних понять «гуманістична культура» і «економічна глобалізація». Сучасні реалії економічної глобалізації ще не достатньо ідентифікуються із змістом філософського інструментарію. Вони потребують формування нової світоглядної парадигми із залученням комплексу методологічних та праксеологічних чинників
Home teaching is the unique contribution of services to blind persons to the general professional set of disciplines. The home teacher is a teacher of the skills needed by blind persons to function in a seeing world. He is a counselor, personal and professional, needed by blind persons to give information and assistance in developing attitudes to cope with that seeing world. He helps the community to understand its blind persons, teaches it how to assist them and to use them as responsible, contributing citizens. Its three main functions, therefore, are teaching, social rehabilitation, and public relations. The teacher, then, is a necessary part of a rehabilitation team and is the advance agent of the agency for the blind and its services. The visually handicapped person who has a demonstrated interest in other visually handicapped persons, who is trained as a teacher and rehabilitation worker who speaks and writes well, who has ordinary handcraft skills, who has a spirit and willingness to serve, has the basic qualifications needed to do this important job. Let us stop trying to cover the waterfront with the home teacher and then condemning him for not having reached the professional level which our jack-of-all-trades concept has made impossible. He is a teaching counselor, not a mechanic, carpenter, seamstress, cook, cosmetician and heaven knows what else. Let him teach the skills needed by blind people to "see" —braille, the use of Talking Books, typewriting, simple crafts, and to take responsibility for filling his everyday living needs. If more skill is needed than these, let him use community volunteers or let the agency develop funds to pay for skilled services needed. If homemaking skills are needed by the blind housewife let her get these in a rehabilitation center; and, if this is not possible, let the agency pay a community person with these skills to work under the direction of the home teacher. If the service of a skilled craftsman is needed let the home teacher be free to locate the service and make it available to the client through the rehabilitation counselor. The same approach can be applied to teaching academic subjects, or obtaining highly skilled casework services. If we limit the home teacher to these tasks, insist on their being performed and pay salaries consistent with the responsibilities and the techniques we are asking, the home teacher will be able to compete with other disciplines and be a real asset to the agency. But our brief survey would not be complete without reference to that intangible quality known as the spirit of service which comes only from a sincere humanitarian desire to work with and serve other human beings in a natural, direct, give-and-take, though professional human relationship.
The nutrition cluster is a very important entity to coordinate actions during emergencies. It is important that the nutrition cluster know in advance which institutions work where and what kind of inputs are pre-positioned. Risk management plans need to be ready at the local level in advance of emergencies. Although emergencies occur every year in Guatemala, the emergency response often fails to incorporate the management of malnutrition among its priority actions. Community programs, like AIN-C (a community- based child care program - atencion integral a la ninez comunitaria), can be an efficient mechanism to protect young children's nutrition and provide an important channel for the government or other assistance agencies to funnel support to communities in need during a period of crisis or emergency. This is because community workers know the families and those who are most vulnerable; they are willing to be called upon to help their community; and they can provide educational support to families to ensure rapid recovery among young children. Community-based growth promotion programs such as AIN-C can be strengthened and scaled up, and they are a good investment, in the aftermath of an emergency or during a time of economic crisis, to swiftly deliver services to affected families. Community agents can carry important information to the community and can distribute food, nutrition and health supplements such as micronutrient powders and oral rehydration salts for young children, as well as hygiene and water purification products. Community kitchens are an efficient approach to reduce hunger among the poor during times of high economic stress. They provide a social safety net and can have a nutrition effect when carefully planned. Community kitchens adjust to the labor market and general economic conditions; hence targeting of the poor and most in need through community kitchens is self-selective. The kitchens can expand and shrink as participants continually assess the trade-off between unpaid work in exchange for free or inexpensive meals and the pursuit of opportunities in the labor market.
Despite the International Court of Justice's order that ruled "plausible" genocide in Gaza, some governments continue to support Israel with weapons while simultaneously disrupting aid to the trapped Gazan population. These actions amount to an abrogation of the duty to prevent genocide under both international law and within national jurisdictions. When a genocide is underway, the international community has a moral and legal imperative to act. This is enshrined in the Genocide Convention, but it is also an obligation erga omnes, binding all states. Sadly, history teaches us that states are sometimes complicit in assisting regimes that commit genocide and atrocity crimes. This complicity comes in many forms: the provision of weapons, financial support, and diplomatic cover that shields perpetrators from accountability. The International Court of Justice´s (ICJ) interim order on 26 January 2024 in the case brought by South Africa against Israel on the charge of violating the Genocide Convention is binding on Israel first and foremost. However, just as the same Court affirmed twenty-years earlier in an Advisory Opinion, violations by one state carry obligations for all state signatories to prevent and not be complicit in atrocity crimes. This includes the Crime of genocide, according to the Convention. In other words, even non-signatories to the Genocide Convention have that obligation, also thanks to peremptory principles to prevent genocide. For this reason, third parties must take note of the ICJ´s order or risk facing accusations of complicity in genocide particularly if they supply Israel with the material means to carry out its military operations, as Nicaragua is arguing in its separate case against Germany.In its comprehensive written arguments, South Africa has accused Israel of contravening the Genocide Convention, highlighting attacks on medics, hospitals, and ambulances, all of which are prohibited under International Humanitarian Law, but which have acquired an even graver character as comprising genocidal acts, accompanied by genocidal intention. South Africa's lawyers were careful to contextualize Israel´s aggression on Gaza as the latest in a long history of subjugation that the Palestinians have endured under military occupation. In its order, issued two weeks after the hearings, the Court found there was plausibility in the charge of genocide and issued six urgent provisional measures that Israel must comply with. In their essence, the measures require the prevention of acts of genocide that fall under Article II of the Convention as well as the provision of urgently needed services and humanitarian assistance.Far from preventing further deaths in Gaza, Israel's bombardments since the ICJ order have killed a further 7,200 Palestinians. Between 7 October 2023 and 17 March 2024 a total of 13,000 children were killed and, as of 17 March 2024, one third of infants suffer from acute malnutrition, according to UNICEF's Executive Director, Catherine Russell. The WHO and the FAO say that hunger has reached levels that require large scale intervention to prevent imminent famine. Amnesty International decried that Israel "failed to take even the bare minimum steps to comply" with the ICJ ruling. Human Rights Watch revealed that the number of aid trucks entering Gaza after the ICJ ruling dropped by more than a third, as Israel has denied their entry at crossings and inspection points.European countries have responded in different ways to the initial bombshell order by the ICJ. Spain and Ireland formally requested that the EU revise its Association Agreement with Israel - which while falling short of sanctions would send a strong signal to Israel that its conduct has consequences. Other countries, including the US, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Italy and Switzerland either paused or halted their aid to UNRWA – the main provider of basic necessities and services in Gaza. By reducing this life-saving aid, the risk of starvation and death from injuries sustained during the ongoing bombardment inevitably rises. The pretext for pulling back funding had been Israel's conspicuous claim on 27 January, the day after the ICJ's order, that a handful of UNRWA employees had been implicated in the 7 October attacks on Israel. Aside from doubts as to whether Israel's claims about 12 UNRWA employees have any merit, the notion of stopping aid to an organization with 13,000 Gaza employees, based on the alleged conduct of a few individuals – all of whom are either dead, missing or dismissed from their jobs, betray the deeply political motives behind de-funding UNRWA. Indeed, the same countries that were quick to halt aid also provide material and diplomatic support to Israel.Governments that take actions which worsen an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza ought to be mindful of the lesser-known implications of the Genocide Convention – those of the obligation to prevent genocide and the obligation to not be complicit in it. States that continue to provide arms to Israel are failing to prevent the commission of genocidal acts by making deadly weapons available during the military onslaught. As argued by the ICJ in its judgement on the Bosnia v. Serbia case in 2007, responsibility to prevent genocide is "incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power" (para 430). In that ruling, the Court found that the Former Republic of Yugoslavia had provided financial support to the Republic of Srpska (para. 338), whose army was responsible for the killing of thousands of Bosniak Muslims. Therefore, states that provide financial support or indeed military support to Israel, are leaving themselves open to litigation on the same grounds. This is further supported by Article 16 of the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts which outlines how states that help in the commission of a wrongful act are internationally responsible. Moreover, in the context of the South Africa v. Israel case at the ICJ, those states that have terminated or paused their commitments to UNRWA at a time of imminent famine may be directly violating the order to ensure humanitarian and medical assistance to Gazans. They may therefore be not only morally, but also legally, complicit in genocide under Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention.Several cases in this vein have already been filed in national courts. In the United States, which has sent tens of thousands of bombs and munitions to Israel after the 7 October attack, Palestinians and NGOs brought a federal lawsuit against President Biden, Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin, for their "failure to prevent and complicity in the Israeli government's unfolding genocide" in Gaza. Although the court dismissed the case on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction on issues of foreign policy, it was remarkable that the presiding judge, Jeffrey S. White, found Israel to be plausibly engaging in genocide. Encouraged by this finding, the plaintiffs appealed the claim that the court lacks jurisdiction over the case.On 23 February, a similar case was brought to a federal court against German politicians, including Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, and Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, for their role in "aiding and abetting" genocide through weapons exports to Israel. This paralleled the case brought by Nicaragua. Three Dutch NGOs sued the Netherlands alleging that the state's export of arms to Israel was illegal. The plaintiffs won that case on Appeal, and on 12 February the Court ordered the Netherlands to cease the export and transfer of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel; however, the Netherlands has been exploring ways to legally evade the terms of the Court order. NGOs have also launched a lawsuit in Denmark against the Danish National Police and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stop their arms exports to Israel.Complicity in genocide can hurt states on several levels, including through damage to their reputations and the loss of influence in international fora. A decline in moral standing can wither governments' domestic legitimacy with voters. This in turn can lead to social unrest and political instability. A recent poll showed a growing divide between European citizens and their governments when it came to support for Israel.Sustained street protests and mobilization on social media are a concrete indicator of public discontent. Considering the upcoming European elections, EU states would do well to carefully examine their unconditional political, military and financial support for Israel, not only to limit their exposure to state accountability and individual criminal responsibility, but also on ethical grounds, and to acknowledge growing public revulsion at what is happening in Gaza.Keywords: Israel, Gaza, justice, genocide, South Africa, ICJ, International Law, Humanitarian Law, UNRWA, 7 OctoberAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.
Despite the International Court of Justice's order that ruled "plausible" genocide in Gaza, some governments continue to support Israel with weapons while simultaneously disrupting aid to the trapped Gazan population. These actions amount to an abrogation of the duty to prevent genocide under both international law and within national jurisdictions. When a genocide is underway, the international community has a moral and legal imperative to act. This is enshrined in the Genocide Convention, but it is also an obligation erga omnes, binding all states. Sadly, history teaches us that states are sometimes complicit in assisting regimes that commit genocide and atrocity crimes. This complicity comes in many forms: the provision of weapons, financial support, and diplomatic cover that shields perpetrators from accountability. The International Court of Justice´s (ICJ) interim order on 26 January 2024 in the case brought by South Africa against Israel on the charge of violating the Genocide Convention is binding on Israel first and foremost. However, just as the same Court affirmed twenty-years earlier in an Advisory Opinion, violations by one state carry obligations for all state signatories to prevent and not be complicit in atrocity crimes. This includes the Crime of genocide, according to the Convention. In other words, even non-signatories to the Genocide Convention have that obligation, also thanks to peremptory principles to prevent genocide. For this reason, third parties must take note of the ICJ´s order or risk facing accusations of complicity in genocide particularly if they supply Israel with the material means to carry out its military operations, as Nicaragua is arguing in its separate case against Germany.In its comprehensive written arguments, South Africa has accused Israel of contravening the Genocide Convention, highlighting attacks on medics, hospitals, and ambulances, all of which are prohibited under International Humanitarian Law, but which have acquired an even graver character as comprising genocidal acts, accompanied by genocidal intention. South Africa's lawyers were careful to contextualize Israel´s aggression on Gaza as the latest in a long history of subjugation that the Palestinians have endured under military occupation. In its order, issued two weeks after the hearings, the Court found there was plausibility in the charge of genocide and issued six urgent provisional measures that Israel must comply with. In their essence, the measures require the prevention of acts of genocide that fall under Article II of the Convention as well as the provision of urgently needed services and humanitarian assistance.Far from preventing further deaths in Gaza, Israel's bombardments since the ICJ order have killed a further 7,200 Palestinians. Between 7 October 2023 and 17 March 2024 a total of 13,000 children were killed and, as of 17 March 2024, one third of infants suffer from acute malnutrition, according to UNICEF's Executive Director, Catherine Russell. The WHO and the FAO say that hunger has reached levels that require large scale intervention to prevent imminent famine. Amnesty International decried that Israel "failed to take even the bare minimum steps to comply" with the ICJ ruling. Human Rights Watch revealed that the number of aid trucks entering Gaza after the ICJ ruling dropped by more than a third, as Israel has denied their entry at crossings and inspection points.European countries have responded in different ways to the initial bombshell order by the ICJ. Spain and Ireland formally requested that the EU revise its Association Agreement with Israel - which while falling short of sanctions would send a strong signal to Israel that its conduct has consequences. Other countries, including the US, Canada, the UK, the Netherlands, Finland, Germany, Italy and Switzerland either paused or halted their aid to UNRWA – the main provider of basic necessities and services in Gaza. By reducing this life-saving aid, the risk of starvation and death from injuries sustained during the ongoing bombardment inevitably rises. The pretext for pulling back funding had been Israel's conspicuous claim on 27 January, the day after the ICJ's order, that a handful of UNRWA employees had been implicated in the 7 October attacks on Israel. Aside from doubts as to whether Israel's claims about 12 UNRWA employees have any merit, the notion of stopping aid to an organization with 13,000 Gaza employees, based on the alleged conduct of a few individuals – all of whom are either dead, missing or dismissed from their jobs, betray the deeply political motives behind de-funding UNRWA. Indeed, the same countries that were quick to halt aid also provide material and diplomatic support to Israel.Governments that take actions which worsen an already catastrophic humanitarian situation in Gaza ought to be mindful of the lesser-known implications of the Genocide Convention – those of the obligation to prevent genocide and the obligation to not be complicit in it. States that continue to provide arms to Israel are failing to prevent the commission of genocidal acts by making deadly weapons available during the military onslaught. As argued by the ICJ in its judgement on the Bosnia v. Serbia case in 2007, responsibility to prevent genocide is "incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power" (para 430). In that ruling, the Court found that the Former Republic of Yugoslavia had provided financial support to the Republic of Srpska (para. 338), whose army was responsible for the killing of thousands of Bosniak Muslims. Therefore, states that provide financial support or indeed military support to Israel, are leaving themselves open to litigation on the same grounds. This is further supported by Article 16 of the 2001 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts which outlines how states that help in the commission of a wrongful act are internationally responsible. Moreover, in the context of the South Africa v. Israel case at the ICJ, those states that have terminated or paused their commitments to UNRWA at a time of imminent famine may be directly violating the order to ensure humanitarian and medical assistance to Gazans. They may therefore be not only morally, but also legally, complicit in genocide under Article III(e) of the Genocide Convention.Several cases in this vein have already been filed in national courts. In the United States, which has sent tens of thousands of bombs and munitions to Israel after the 7 October attack, Palestinians and NGOs brought a federal lawsuit against President Biden, Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, and Secretary of Defence, Lloyd Austin, for their "failure to prevent and complicity in the Israeli government's unfolding genocide" in Gaza. Although the court dismissed the case on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction on issues of foreign policy, it was remarkable that the presiding judge, Jeffrey S. White, found Israel to be plausibly engaging in genocide. Encouraged by this finding, the plaintiffs appealed the claim that the court lacks jurisdiction over the case.On 23 February, a similar case was brought to a federal court against German politicians, including Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, and Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, for their role in "aiding and abetting" genocide through weapons exports to Israel. This paralleled the case brought by Nicaragua. Three Dutch NGOs sued the Netherlands alleging that the state's export of arms to Israel was illegal. The plaintiffs won that case on Appeal, and on 12 February the Court ordered the Netherlands to cease the export and transfer of F-35 fighter jet parts to Israel; however, the Netherlands has been exploring ways to legally evade the terms of the Court order. NGOs have also launched a lawsuit in Denmark against the Danish National Police and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to stop their arms exports to Israel.Complicity in genocide can hurt states on several levels, including through damage to their reputations and the loss of influence in international fora. A decline in moral standing can wither governments' domestic legitimacy with voters. This in turn can lead to social unrest and political instability. A recent poll showed a growing divide between European citizens and their governments when it came to support for Israel.Sustained street protests and mobilization on social media are a concrete indicator of public discontent. Considering the upcoming European elections, EU states would do well to carefully examine their unconditional political, military and financial support for Israel, not only to limit their exposure to state accountability and individual criminal responsibility, but also on ethical grounds, and to acknowledge growing public revulsion at what is happening in Gaza.Keywords: Israel, Gaza, justice, genocide, South Africa, ICJ, International Law, Humanitarian Law, UNRWA, 7 OctoberAll the publications express the opinions of their individual authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of CIDOB as an institution.
The achievement of environmentally sustainable development (ESD) is a global challenge, essential to poverty reduction and raising living standards of rural poor worldwide. ESD requires integration of environmental management and conservation issues into development planning and policy. For Timor-Leste (TL), the world's newest nation, the challenge to achieve ESD is particularly difficult following a long history of colonialism and foreign occupation, characterized by oppression, violence, poverty and environmental degradation. TL faces a range of daunting social and economic development challenges with a budget of less than US$74 million, while simultaneously facing declining donor interest and shortfalls. Many developing counties in this situation operate on the premise of "development first, mitigation and treatment later", resulting in unsustainable development and environmental degradation. The Government of TimorLeste (GoTL) has stated its desire to avoid such an approach, enshrining environmental protection and sustainability in its Constitution, highlighting ESD in its development goals and committing to a policy of responsible and environmentally sustainable development. Yet, an assessment of the environmental institutional and legislative frameworks and development policies during the UNT AET period and since independence in 2002 tells a different story. Given the urgency of immediate humanitarian and socio-economic needs and the focus on reconstruction, it is perhaps understandable that social and economic outcomes were prioritized during the UNT AET period. However, the lack of attention to environment issues resulted in failure to incorporate ESD principles into development policy, ill-designed environmental management policies and further environmental degradation. With the shift from reconstruction to long-term development, it is essential that environment issues are incorporated into development policy. Despite GoTL's best efforts to include ESD principles into the National Development Plan (NDP) and Sector Investment Plans (SIPs), many of its environmental policies and management practices are not implemented in practice. The institutional framework is severely restricted by lack of funding, capacity and technical knowledge. The legislative framework remains in draft, meaning Indonesian and UNT AET laws remain in effect, which has implications for local ownership and enforcement. Although NGOs play an important role in environmental awareness and protection in TL, they are also only in their nascent stages. The dire need for development, combined with a lack of understanding of long term environmental effects and a lack of economic alternatives, have meant that environmental protection and management have largely been neglected. TL's environment is already in a precarious state. The following problems, needs and priorities have been identified: deforestation and land degradation requires urgent reforestation, watershed management, adoption of more environmentally friendly agricultural practices and firewood/alternative energy research; environmental baseline data is required on the status of biodiversity and fish stocks to ensure effective protection and management policies; improved watershed and water management practices to improve water quality, and to prevent erosion and the silting up of already scarce water resources; natural resources management systems at the community level; solid waste and sewerage facilities are required; environmental policies and legislation incorporating cultural practices are needed; improvement in capacity and technical knowledge of environment institutions; critical environmental impact assessments (EIAs) must be undertaken for all proposed infrastructure and investment projects; raising of environmental awareness; and increased funding for environmental institutions and programs. Further environmental degradation in TL will exacerbate poverty as land becomes less productive for food, water becomes scarce and contaminated, child mortality increases and landslides destroy homes. This situation warrants immediate and urgent action. Australia has a particular responsibility to assist TL in meeting this challenge, given our historical neglect for our neighbour, our status as OECD member, and our joint interest in the Timor Sea. However, a review of the relationships between Australia and TL demonstrates there are very few programs aimed at environment issues. Overwhelmingly, interviewees commented the Australian government is not doing near enough to assist TL in achieving ESD. Environment is not a priority area and has not received adequate attention under AusAID' s bilateral aid program, although a number of the programs outlined in this paper have indirect environmental benefits. Environment is a cross-cutting issue, requiring environmental impacts are considered in the design of all activities. Doubts remain regarding the extent to which environmental concerns are genuinely considered. At the State government level there are a number of important initiatives being implemented. Yet, it is the successes and achievements of the environmental activities of Australian NGOs, universities and community groups which are really contributing to the achievement ofESD in TL. Despite severe restrictions in funding, these activities represent a refreshing reminder of what can be achieved at the grass roots level. But there is still much to be done. A number of recommendations have been made to ensure that Australia continues to work towards meeting our responsibility to assist TL in the challenge to achieve ESD. Many of these recommendations could be integrated into existing AusAID rural development, governance and water sanitation programs. • To conclude the Timor Sea dispute in a timely and equitable manner; • Provide assistance for the management of petroleum revenue and resources; • Capacity building and promotion of good governance within environment institutions; • Assistance for environmental awareness programs; • Funding for UNDP and GoTL environmental programs, in particular the firewood survey and integrated solid waste treatment programs; • Assistance in exploration of alternative energy sources and independent review of environmental impacts of large infrastructure and investment projects; • Reforestation and watershed management; • Water testing and raising awareness of environmental health issues; • Further funding and support for Australian NGOs, universities and community programs; • Strengthening AusAID project EIAs.
The State Department announced that it has lifted its ban on the use of American weapons by the notorious Azov Brigade in Ukraine, an ultra-nationalist outfit widely described as "neo-fascist," even "neo-Nazi."The group was initially formed in 2014 as a volunteer militia to fight against Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists in the eastern Donbas region, and later incorporated into the National Guard of Ukraine, under the purview of the Interior Ministry. "After thorough review, Ukraine's 12th Special Forces Azov Brigade passed Leahy vetting as carried out by the U.S. Department of State," according to a statement by the Department which referred to the "Leahy Law" that restricts American military assistance to "units of foreign security forces where there is credible information implicating that unit in the commission of gross violations of human rights."The ban was first put in place in a federal 2018 omnibus government spending package, citing that it was an ultranationalist outfit that openly invited neo-Nazis into its ranks. In addition, both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have reported on "credible allegations" of "torture and other egregious abuses" by Azov and other volunteer units. U.N. human rights officials have also accused the group of humanitarian violations. "White supremacy and neo-Nazism are unacceptable and have no place in our world," said Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) in 2018 when the ban was first imposed. "I am very pleased that the recently passed omnibus prevents the U.S. from providing arms and training assistance to the neo-Nazi Azov Battalion fighting in Ukraine."Azov's links to and associations with far-right and quasi-fascist individuals and Nazi symbols has been well documented in Western media. The original founder of the paramilitary group, Andriy Biletsky, wrote that "the historic mission of our nation in this critical moment is to lead the White Races of the world in a final crusade for their survival. A crusade against the Semite-led Untermenschen." It was reported in 2014 that while Azov may represent one of the "most potent and reliable" military forces in Ukraine, they "also pose the most serious threat to the Ukrainian government, and perhaps even the state." Soon after being elected president in 2019, President Zelensky had attempted to follow through on his campaign promise of pursuing a peace policy with Russia. However, when seeking to encourage Ukrainian forces to agree to a plan of mutual disengagement on the front lines and to remove illegal arms from a small frontline town, Zelensky came face to face with the reality of the willingness of Azov-aligned forces to resist the demands of Kyiv. Biletsky at the time threatened Zelensky, saying that thousands more fighters would head to the town of Zolote if the president sought to evict those currently there. Since Russia's 2022 invasion, however, the Azov Brigade has undertaken a makeover of its external image as Moscow sought to play up their disconcerting past. Naturally, this latest move by the State Department has been celebrated by Azov and met with rebuke in Moscow. However, this development also signals that the situation on Ukrainian front lines has become so acute that even a ban on an armed unit with ties to human rights violations and neo-Nazism is now being revoked. Of course it cannot be denied that Azov has long-since demonstrated itself as one of the most capable fighting forces Ukraine has. Its ultimately unsuccessful, yet heroic defense of the Azovstal plant in Mariupol in 2022 contributed to a rise in their national prestige and helped garner the group a measure of approval from many in Ukrainian society who did not originally sympathize with the ultra-nationalist camp. In addition, the adoption by President Zelensky and the Ukrainian government of ethnic nationalist language has helped legitimize Azov and its discourse. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Europe continue to "release the reins" so as to allow the Ukrainians to throw everything they have at the Russians. Unfortunately, while such steps have yet to alter the fundamental realities on the battlefield, they do show a willingness in Washington to directly support the types of armed groups that many Americans are otherwise conditioned to recoil from.Alas, any future Ukrainian government that feels compelled to reach a compromise peace with Russia may well likely face armed protests by Azov and other such groups that could pose a real risk to the Ukrainian state, as happened in 2014.
