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During the past half-century, states have established a large number of international trade institutions, both multilateral and regional in scope. The existing literature on this topic emphasizes that these agreements are chiefly designed to liberalize and increase the flow of overseas commerce. Yet such institutions have another function that has been largely ignored by researchers, namely, reducing volatility in trade policy and trade flows. Exposure to global markets increases the vulnerability of a country's output to terms of trade shocks. Governments seek to insulate their economies from such instability through membership in international trade institutions, particularly the World Trade Organization (WTO) and preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). We hypothesize that these institutions reduce the volatility of overseas commerce. We further hypothesize that, because market actors prefer price stability, trade institutions increase the volume of foreign commerce by reducing trade variability. This article conducts the first large-scale, multivariate statistical tests of these two hypotheses, using annual data on exports for all pairs of countries from 1951 through 2001. The tests provide strong support for our arguments. PTAs and the WTO regime significantly reduce export volatility. In so doing, these institutions also increase export levels.

The book critically investigates the local impact of international organizations beyond a Western rationale and aims to overcome Eurocentric patterns of analysis. Considering Asian and Western examples, the contributions originate from different disciplines and study areas and discuss a global approach, which has been a blind spot in scholarly research on international organizations until now. Using the 1930s as a historical reference, the contributions question role of international organizations during conflicts, war, and crises, gaining insights into their function as peacekeeping forces in the 21st century. While chapter one discusses the historicity of international organizations and the availability of sources, the second chapter deliberates on Eurocentrism and science policy, considering the converging of newly created epistemic communities and old diplomatic elites. Chapter 3 sheds light on international organizations as platforms, expanding the field of research from the diversity of organizations to the patterns of global governance. The final chapter turns to the question of how international organizations invented and introduced new fields of action, pointing to the antithetic role of standardization, the preservation of cultural heritage and the difficulties in reaching a non-Western approach.

In a response to my critics I further elaborate some of the concepts central to A Cultural Theory of International Relations. I explain why it is a cultural theory, as distinct from a theory of culture; the different levels of reason conceptualised by the Greeks and their utility in moving our thinking beyond the exclusive focus on instrumental rationality of modern social science; and Aristotle's concept of anger and its implications for the behaviour of the weak and the powerful. I justify my case selection and its Western bias, but defend the universality of my theory and its non-hegemonic application to the study of other cultures.