ВЗАИМООТНОШЕНИЯ АЗЕРБАЙДЖАНА И ОДКБ В 1994-2011 ГГ
Полномасштабная война с Арменией из-за контроля над Нагорным Карабахом вынудила Азербайджан выдвинуть на первый план национально-государственного строительства вопросы военной безопасности. Ради укрепления боевого потенциала своих вооруженных сил и освобождения оккупированных частей своей территории Азербайджан начал планомерно сотрудничать с различными странами в военной области. Одновременно, военное и политическое руководство Азербайджана вынуждено было всегда держать в поле зрения взаимоотношения как с НАТО, так и с ОДКБ. При этом было очевидно, что взаимоотношения Азербайджана и ОДКБ, в отличие от взаимодействия Азербайджана и НАТО, развиваются с большим трудом. В статье освещены основные этапы взаимодействия Азербайджана и ОДКБ в 1994-2011 гг., рассмотрены факторы, препятствующие сближению АР и ОДКБ. ; After gaining its independence, Azerbaijan found itself engaged in the military conflict with Armenia caused by Nagorny Karabakh territory. About 20 % of Azerbaijani lands had been under the Armenian occupation by the spring of 1994. Several months earlier Azerbaijan, hoping Russian would help to settle the conflict, joined the CST. Moreover, joining the Organization Azerbaijan counted upon the aid the Organization could deliver the state in the sphere of military forces reforming and the opportunity to buy the modern army system from Russia. However, the foreign policy of then-Russian government regarding the South Caucasia tended to be one-dimensional and short-sided. Russia continued to support Armenia, building up Armenian armaments. As a result, hopes of Azerbaijan that "the justice would be restored" were scattered and the interest of Azerbaijan towards the CST faded. At the same time NATO started to expand its activity engaging post-Soviet republics in the sphere of its influence. Notably, in 1998 Russia was not against improving its military capacity using the money delivered from the west. Under these circumstances it was difficult for Moscow to persuade Baku that participation in the CST would meet national demands of Azerbaijan. Therefore, Azerbaijan gave up the attempts to gain real and not only declared cooperation with the CST and Russia and started to get closer to western states and other countries concerning the military construction. In April 1999 Azerbaijan, together with Georgia and Uzbekistan, denounced participation in the CST, which was undergoing the transformation into CSTO at that time. However, withdrawal from the organization didn't mean that Azerbaijan parted with this structure and with all its member-states. On the contrary, Baku started to build up the deepness of the dialogue in the military sphere with all CSTO member-states, with the exception of Armenia. Arranging mutually beneficial bilateral military-political cooperation with the CSTO member-states promoted the opinion articulated by Azerbaijani experts that the state may return to the CSTO. However, pro-Armenian statements of the CSTO officials made Azerbaijan leave the CSTO. And though it is clear that leaders of the CSTO member-states won't allow using military potential of the organization against Azerbaijan in case of hostilities renewal in Nagorny Karabakh, nevertheless, in May 2011 Baku joined the Non-Aligned Movement. For the majority it was a surprise, though Azerbaijani leader has recently repeatedly stated that the country was not going to enter any military bloc in the nearest future. But it's evident that the plexus of the relations with the CSTO made Azerbaijan act like this.
