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The police are often key actors in conflict processes, yet there is little research on their role in the production of political violence. Previous research provides us with a limited understanding of the part the police play in preventing or mitigating the onset or escalation of conflict, in patterns of repression and resistance during conflict, and in the durability of peace after conflicts are resolved. By unpacking the role of state security actors and asking how the state assigns tasks among them—as well as the consequences of these decisions—we generate new research paths for scholars of conflict and policing. We review existing research in the field, highlighting recent findings, including those from the articles in this special issue. We conclude by arguing that the fields of policing and conflict research have much to gain from each other and by discussing future directions for policing research in conflict studies.

This paper offers a typology of different forms of political violence, linking them in a continuum and in an interdependent field of forces. The forms identified are systemic violence, institutional violence, group violence, armed struggle, terrorism, and war. In the final section, after discussing how these types of violence influence one another, a strategy is suggested for their simultaneous reduction.

Elections are often violent affairs, casting doubt on the canonical claim that democracy makes societies more peaceful by creating nonviolent means to contest for power. We develop a formal argument to demonstrate that this conclusion is incorrect. Holding elections has a direct effect of increasing levels of violence close to the voting, as this is when electoral violence can influence political outcomes. Precisely for this reason, elections also have an indirect effect of decreasing levels of violence at all other times, as parties can wait for the election when their efforts are more likely to succeed. The direct and indirect effects generate a "political violence cycle" that peaks at the election. However, when the indirect effect is larger, politics would be more violent without elections. When elections also provide an effective nonviolent means to contest for power, they unambiguously make society more peaceful while still generating a political violence cycle.

Looking at contemporary issues such as drone warfare, state violence, gender and political violence, cyberterrorism, lone-wolf terrorism, and de-radicalization, this book draws on the expertise of members of the Terrorism and Political Violence Association network to provide readers with a fascinating introduction to the area

The global threat of Al Qaeda post 9/11 and ISIL, increased Sunni-Shia conflicts, and violence in the Middle East and Pakistan dominate headlines and challenge governments in the region and globally. Both Muslim extremists and some Western experts and observers speak of a clash of civilizations or a culture war in Muslim-West relations. Both the discourse and violence yet again raise questions about the relationship of Islam to violence and terrorism: is Islam a particularly violent religion? Critics cite Quranic passages, doctrines like jihad and events in Muslim history as strong indicators and proof that Islam is the primary driver of Muslim extremism and terrorism. What do the Quran and Islamic law have to say about violence, jihad and warfare? What are the primary drivers of terrorism in the name of Islam today? This article will address these questions in the context of development of global jihadist movements, in particular Al Qaeda and ISIL, their roots, causes, ideology and agenda.

Introduction -- Systemic violence -- Institutional violence -- Crowds and group violence -- Conspiracy and the contemplation of crime -- Armed struggle and civil war -- Random killing and martyrdom -- Chaotic murder -- Belligerence as sexual violence -- Numinous terror -- Violence and social change -- Conclusion.

AbstractNations with an abundance of natural resources suffer disproportionately from internal violence, especially civil wars. State reliance on external sources of rent revenue, or rentierism, can lead to violence for several reasons. This article examines three of the primary explanations for the association. A common explanation is that rebel groups are motivated to fight in pursuit of natural resource wealth. An alternative explanation is that grievances, at times resulting in violence, can manifest if rent revenue is used by the state to repress or ignore the citizenry. A third explanation notes that rentier states are structurally weak and therefore vulnerable to violent challenges because elites frequently use rent revenue for personal or political reasons, not national interest. This article also considers where this line of study might be headed, given recent developments. I suggest that future research on rentierism and violence should examine an array of rent revenue streams, not just natural resources. In addition, scholars should take note that resource industries are increasingly privatizing, which has important implications for the classification of rents and, more generally, the study of rentierism.

The last few years have witnessed an increase in democratic "backsliding" in the United States—a decline in the quality of democracy, typically accompanied by an influx of non-normative behavior, such as political violence. Despite the real consequences of support for violence, fairly little is known about such an extremist attitude outside studies of terrorism or aggression. Using a unique survey containing many psychological, political, and social characteristics, we find that perceived victimhood, authoritarianism, populism, and white identity are the most powerful predictors of support for violence, though military service, conspiratorial thinking, anxiety, and feelings of powerlessness are also related. These patterns suggest that subjective feelings about being unjustly victimized—irrespective of the truth of the matter—and the psychological baggage that accompanies such feelings lie at the heart of support for violence. We use these results to build a profile of characteristics that explain support for violence; the predictive validity of this profile is then tested by examining its relationship with support for the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot, with which it is strongly associated, even accounting for support for Donald Trump. Our findings have implications for the detection of extremist attitudes and our understanding of the non-partisan/ideological foundations of anti-social political behavior.

In recent years the conflict in Natal has been described as a low-intensity civil war while on the Reef (the PWV region) it has been called an undeclared war and there have even been references to `ethnic cleansing'. But in both cases it is more complex than any of these definitions since there are a number of different elements to the violence. This study shows how it is not simply a struggle between the forces opposing the undemocratic system as represented by apartheid and those governmental structures upholding the status quo. It goes further than that; it is not only a reflection of the changing political situation in South Africa but also stems from demographic and other social conditions (rapid urbanization, proliferation of squatter settlements and competition for resources).

Gender is not a ''security issue'', but it tells us a lot about how, why and when certain subjects are written as security concerns. Thirteen case studies on violent subjects, reason, and emotion demonstrate different ways in which we understand political violence, security, resistance, power, and agency, and how we make sense of gender.

"Forced Migration and Political Violence" published on by Oxford University Press.

The Institute for Women's Studies in the Arab World (IWSAW), along with theAssociation des Chercheuses Arabes (ACAF) organized a workshop on "Women andPolitical Violence"