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States regulate products. They may make access to their market, or favourable rates of taxation, conditional on compliance by products with rules that aim to protect safety, health, morality, the environment and so on. When these rules concern the physical composition of the product, regulating, for example, the ingredients in foodstuffs or the chemicals used in toys, or the recyclability of batteries,Cassis de Dijon, and its legislative and jurisprudential spawn, tell the European lawyer how to approach the resulting barriers to trade.

Scholars assessing Richard Nixon's contribution to the desegregation of Southern schools have often been unimpressed. His biographer Stephen Ambrose concedes that there was some White House contribution, but observes that "Nixon had to be hauled kicking and screaming into desegregation on a meaningful scale, and he did what he did not because it was right but because he had no choice." The political scientist Michael Genovese concurs, telling us that Nixon sought to "withdraw the federal government from its efforts at desegregation." A recent civil rights dictionary concludes that this was "the first successful presidential candidate to be opposed to civil rights enforcement," adding that "many of his tactics thwarted the furthering of school desegregation." The noted civil rights historian, William Chafe, meanwhile, contends that "Nixon repeatedly demonstrated his commitment to the politics of polarization"; "continued to embrace" southern evasions that "had been invalidated by the Supreme Court"; and used "the power of the presidency to delay, if not halt completely, federally imposed school desegregation." And Kevin O'Reilly, in an overview of presidential leadership on civil rights, finds the 37th president to have been essentially indistinguishable from the race-baiting George Wallace. Nixon resented the Alabamian, he reveals, because "he wanted the gutter all to himself." Considering a number of contenders, he concludes that "school desegregation emerged as the administration's most important and enduring (anti)civil rights crusade."

Rights of patients to seek medical treatment from foreign providers are creating a European market for healthcare services which will require regulation. Legislation on the basis of the internal market can address numerous issues of pricing, accessibility of services and access to markets, competition and state aids, as well as consolidating and clarifying patient rights. Potentially this amounts to a significant role for the Community in the regulation of national health care systems, whose legal context may come to resemble that of other network industries such as telecoms and energy. The legal, political and social implications of this de facto transfer of competence are large, which is why a cautious approach is justified. It may be wise to focus initial legislation primarily on patient rights. Such legislation makes minimal direct demands of national systems, but uses the patient as an agent, who by exercising his/ her rights forces those systems to adapt their behaviour and structure, and become more open. The familiar internal market pattern then recurs, whereby enforcement of individual rights results in liberalization and some degree of natural harmonization, after which market regulating legislation becomes a necessary and natural step and the transfer of power is complete.

This article looks at the law and policy issues surrounding the practice of charging uniform fees for higher education to home students and students coming from other EU Member States. It begins with the observation that within the EU such fees are heavily subsidised by governments and therefore amount to a financial benefit (or a disguised grant) to students. In the light of this, this article suggests that restricting that subsidy to students resident prior to their studies would be not only compatible with recent case law on non-discrimination but would also fit better with the underlying logic of free movement, which denies any right to benefits for non-economic recent migrants. Secondly, it looks at the policy, and finds that while equal fees have a number of very positive social effects, they also carry moral and economic risks. A better approach, less distorting of the market for higher education and more consistent with the wider EU approach to welfare migration, might be to require exportability of subsidies from the student's state of origin.

The caselaw has found healthcare systems firmly subject to Article 49, yet education systems not so. Both are important public services, and subsidised from the public purse, but in the cases decided they were organised differently. One was provided through a market-like mechanism, the other directly from the State. It is not the social importance of the service, nor the motives or character of the provider or recipient or payer that determines when Article 49 applies. It is the nature of these parties' behaviour. As States use market behaviour ever more in public services, we may therefore expect an expansion of the application of Article 49 to welfare. Many restrictions will be found, because of the essentially national nature of welfare, but many will be justified and irremovable by the Court. In the end only legislation can create cross-border markets for welfare.

During the mid-1960s, the governments of the United States and Canada each declared "war" on poverty. The former venture has received far greater scholarly attention, and for obvious reasons: its high-profile inception, the broader spirit of Great Society liberalism that it embodied, the profound crisis of American society and politics within which it soon became embroiled, the rapidity with which its prescriptions and hopes were extinguished. By comparison, the Canadian War on Poverty seems an unimportant venture, and one that lacks the stuff of which drama is made. It has, accordingly, been neglected by scholars on both sides of the 49th parallel.