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Hate speech prosecution of politicians is a common phenomenon in established democracies. Examples of politicians tried for hate speech include Nick Griffin in Britain and Jean-Marie Le Pen in France. Does hate speech prosecution of politicians affect the electoral support for their party? This is an important question, as the parties involved typically are controversial, often accused of stirring up political cynicism or political violence. The relevant literature has largely ignored this question, however. In this article, we use data from a representative sample of Dutch voters interviewed before and re-interviewed after the unexpected court decision to prosecute MP Geert Wilders. We demonstrate empirically that the decision substantially enhanced his party's appeal. This resulted in an immediate increase in support for the party by one to five percentage points among those who are moderately in favour of the assimilation of ethnic minorities into Dutch culture. In addition, the evidence suggests that the decision contributed to the party's subsequent electoral lift-off. Our findings call for investigations into the electoral effects of legal proceedings against political actors in democratic systems worldwide.

The Italian party system largely collapsed in the early 1990s, providing us with a natural experimental situation in which voters were confronted with new parties -- indeed, with an entirely new party system. How did they react? This paper develops a number of expectations on the basis of existing theory and tests these expectations using a dataset consisting of election studies conducted in Italy between 1985 and 2008. We find that a new party system causes confusion as to where parties stand in left-right terms, making it difficult for voters to make their choices on the basis of ideological cues. The confusion is greatest among older voters -- those already set in their habits of voting, but only the very oldest cohorts (containing voters over 60 years old) are significantly debilitated. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

In recent decades, ordinary European Union (EU) citizens have been able to express their opinion on the course of the European project on several occasions. Judging from electoral outcomes, there is quite some Euroscepticism among them. What motivations underlie the Eurosceptic vote? Using an extended and comprehensive multidimensional measure of EU attitudes, we investigate which specific attitudes and issue positions were conducive to Eurosceptic voting in the 2009 European Parliament elections. Based on a voter survey in 21 countries, we conclude that concerns about the EU's 'democratic deficit', low perceived utility of the EU for the country, negative affection towards the EU, opposition to EU integration, and an absence of EU identity enhance anti-EU voting. In addition, these effects depend on the dispersion of party positions concerning EU matters, so that the more the parties diverge on EU matters, the stronger the effect becomes of each of the five EU dimensions mentioned on party choice. We conclude by setting these findings in perspective and discussing their implications for the future of the European project.

Political tolerance—the willingness to extend civil rights to political antagonists—is a key democratic norm. We argue that because voters with populist attitudes have an ambiguous relationship with democracy and keep a narrow definition of the people, they are more likely to be politically intolerant. We study the Netherlands, a less likely case to find political intolerance. Using data from a representative household panel survey ( n = 1999), we investigate the extent to which populist attitudes translate into general intolerant attitudes and specific intolerance toward political antagonists. Our analyses show that voters with stronger populist attitudes are less supportive of democratic norms, more intolerant of opposing views online, and of specific political opponents. However, they are not explicitly intolerant by limiting individual civil rights or supporting intolerant measures toward political antagonists. These findings show that even in a system engrained with compromise, populist citizens show signs of political intolerance.

The idea that journalists make use of framing is widespread. However, systematic studies of the role of frame sponsors—that is, nonmedia actors who advocate a certain frame package—in influencing the patterns in frame package use by journalists are limited. Which characteristics make frame sponsors successful in frame building, and why? In this study, we propose a new way of understanding the relationship between journalists and frame sponsors, by studying to what extent high authority and having a strong stake in an issue are important predictors of frame coverage, and whether a bidirectional relationship between frame sponsors and journalists can be discerned in frame building. We examine the two court cases against Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), for alleged hate speech (2009–2020). Based on a content analysis of media input, such as statements, social media posts, and press releases ( N = 220) of relevant frame sponsors as well as news stories about the court cases ( N = 691), we demonstrate that there is a reciprocal relationship between frame sponsors and journalists in frame building. Frame sponsors influence journalists in the use of frame packages, but framing in news reports also stimulates frame sponsors to communicate similar frame packages in the future. Actors with high levels of authority and a strong stake in the issue are more successful in getting their preferred frame packages across. By acknowledging the bidirectional relationship and expanding knowledge on who benefits most from this relationship, this study advances literature on frame building.