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AbstractAntimicrobial resistance (AMR) causes over 1.27 million deaths annually, making it one of today's most urgent health threats. Given its urgency, there are often calls for large‐scale global initiatives to address AMR. However, theories of collective action have yet to be applied to the problem in a systematic and holistic manner. Fuller engagement with collective action theory is necessary to avoid three risks, namely: mischaracterizing the kinds of challenges that AMR presents; over‐simplifying the problem by reducing it to a single type of collective action problem while ignoring others; and overstating the ability of collective action theory to formulate effective solutions. This article relies on the work of Elinor Ostrom to develop an analytical framework for collective action problems around public and common goods. When analyzed through this framework, we find that AMR poses at least nine distinct collective action problems. This more granular framing of AMR provides, in our view, a better basis to develop policy solutions to address this multifaceted challenge. We conclude with proposals for future research.

Research for this paper has been supported by the European Union under the 6th Framework programme (Contract No CIT1-CT-2004-506392). For more information about the Integrated Project "New Modes of Governance", co-ordinated by the European University Institute in Florence, please visit the project website at www.eu-newgov.org. ; How and to what effect do firms coordinate their actions in order to deal with the negative external effects of productive activity? Under which conditions do firm associations engage in environmental self-regulation and what kind of governance devices do they develop in order to tackle the specific regulatory challenges at stake? Is the 'shadow of hierarchy', the credible threat of legislation, executive intervention or court rulings, a necessary condition for associative action to emerge? Or is it only necessary if a redistributive problem is at stake? These are the questions discussed in this article. We will first develop the theoretical argument based on economic institutionalism, derive hypotheses and then submit the propositions to a first empirical assessment of associative self-regulation on waste recycling in the plastic and paper industry.

Why does party identification motivate citizens to participate in politics? From a theoretical standpoint, it is in a partisan's self-interest to free ride on the efforts of others. Yet, mere identification with a party is enough to motivate many people to overcome this structural hurdle. We theorize that, by virtue of aligning one's self with a party, individuals become more likely to react to their political environment with anger and enthusiasm rather than fear. Anger and enthusiasm are associated with approach and continuation of current behavior, while fear triggers behavior reconsideration. In short, party identification stimulates participation via anger and enthusiasm. On the other hand, fear produces thought but not much action. We find support for our model using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) and an original laboratory experiment. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract: This paper examines the Northern Prawn Fishery of Australia as an illustration of the consistent failures of systems of open ("market"?) access to common property goods. The dilemmas of collective action explain both why those occurred and substantially why subsequent regulatory intervention has not succeeded either in its stated objectives. It is argued, unfashionably, that the endemic nature of these collective action dilemmas in the fishery means that in 1987 the regulatory schema proposed by the government (the allocative coercion option?) would have provided superior outcomes to allocations based on self‐regulation by the industry.