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First made available online in 2018 ; First made available online in 2018 ; History is unpredictable. 1992 was to crown eight years of hard labour of the Community institutions, with the completion of the internal market and the launching of the European Union. Instead, the Community has been caught in one of the most severe crises it has ever had to face. The rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish people and the narrow victory of the "yes" vote in the French referendum have shown that European integration was meeting with stronger resistence than expected at national level, while the monetary crisis of mid-September has cast a shadow on the prospects for monetary union. In this difficult situation, the subsidiarity concept appears as a cure for all the problems now faced by the Community. Today's political discourse is replete with references to the spirit an letter of subsidiarity. Encouraged by its recognition in the Maastricht Treaty, the Community institutions have engaged into a discussion on how such a principle could be given effect. The expectation seems to be that this will help the Community to steer a new course in the years to come. Yet there is still no clear understanding of the actual scope of the subsidiarity principle, nor of the ways in which it could be used by the Community institutions. The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on these two issues. Before examining the merits of the discussion, it is however useful to analyse the reasons that have led to the insertion of subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union.

This article reviews the evolution of subsidiarity as a constitutional principle within the case law of the European Court of Justice. It argues that, to date, discussion of subsidiarity as a judicial principle remains narrowly focused on its impact as a restraint on the Union legislature. In an effort to steer debate in another direction, this article revisits and supports arguments in favour of applying subsidiarity as a brake on the Court's own interpretative functions. Thereafter, it isolates the Court's interpretation of the Treaty free movement provisions as an empirical example to test this underdeveloped dimension of subsidiarity. Adapted from the source document.

Subsidiarity requires taking decisions at the level of government best placed to do so, but does not say what that level is. Rather, it gives a broad framework within which to have the debate. Implementing subsidiarity means (1) allocating roles appropriately between levels of government, (2) co-ordinating implementation of decisions, and (3) managing accountability and participation. Subsidiarity does not, however, tell us how to achieve these goals. It is therefore more about how a decision is made than about what the specific decision is. Europe, the United States and Australia have adopted varying solutions to these issues. New Zealand's ability to influence the trans-Tasman outcome is likely to be limited. The main implications for New Zealand are in designing trans-Tasman institutions and allocating responsibilities between central and local government.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Contributors -- 1. Defending dual federalism: A self-defeating act -- 2. Defending dual federalism: A bad idea, but not self-defeating -- 3. The puzzling persistence of dual federalism -- 4. Foot voting, federalism, and political freedom -- 5. Federalism and subsidiarity: perspectives from u.s. constitutional law -- 6. Subsidiarity, the judicial role, and the warren court's contribution to the revival of state government -- 7. Competing conceptions of subsidiarity -- 8. Subsidiarity and robustness: building the adaptive efficiency of federal systems -- 9. Cities and federalism -- 10. Cities, subsidiarity, and federalism -- 11. The constitutional entrenchment of federalism -- 12. Federalism(s)' forms and norms: contesting rights, de-essentializing jurisdictional divides, and temporizing accommodations -- Index

Table of Contents; Acknowledgments; Foreword; Introduction; Part 1: Subsidiarity in Context; Chapter One; Chapter Two; Chapter Three; Chapter Four; Part 2: Humanitarian Subsidiarity; Chapter Five; Chapter Six; Chapter Seven; Chapter Eight; Chapter Nine; Chapter Ten; Chapter Eleven; Chapter Twelve; Chapter Thirteen; Chapter Fourteen; Conclusion; Bibliography

The post-Maastricht world of the European Union is only about two years old. Within that new world, however, few concepts are as important, and yet as elusive or unsettled, as the doctrine of subsidiarity. On the other hand, the European Community has for many years evidenced concern over human rights. The purpose of this essay is to consider the implications of the concept of subsidiarity for human rights law and enforcement within the European Community and the European Union.