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The article aims to explore the attitudes of employees toward the Protected Disclosures Act (2000) in providing protection to whistleblowers in South Africa. It seeks to examine the extent to which employees are encouraged to blow the whistle at higher education institutions, despite legislation which protects disclosures made in good faith. The assessment is conducted in the light of empirical research conducted at a higher education institution, against literature gleaned on whistleblower legislation and its impact on good governance. The research was limited to the Durban University of Technology, a higher education institution (HEI) in South Africa and may not produce the same findings at other similar higher education institutions. A conceptual framework informed by legislation, policy and procedures and organizational culture was used to determine employee perceptions of whistleblower protection within higher education institutions. The research methodology focused on questionnaires administered to all employees. Despite the implementation of a whistleblowers line at the institution, employees are of the opinion that practices and procedures relating to whistleblowing have not encouraged whistleblowing or even decreased unethical conduct, In light of this research, recommendations are made to promote a culture of whistleblowing that broadly need to be supported and articulated throughout the institution.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to propose whistleblowing judgment (WBJ), positive mood (PM), and organizational ethical culture (OEC) as predictors of whistleblowing intention (WBI).Design/methodology/approachThe study obtains the data from 364 usable questionnaires collected from Chinese employees of ten banks in China.FindingsWBJ explains a high variance in WBI while OEC moderate the relationship. A three‐way interaction effect is observed, in which organizational culture affects the strength of PM as a moderator.Research limitations/implicationsFindings are interpreted with respect to theories of moral psychology and organizational behavior. Theoretical implications and limitations of the study are discussed, including potential self‐report bias and self‐selection bias.Originality/valueThe effect of PM on whistleblowing decision making depends on people's perceptions of OEC. Only when people perceive their organizational culture to be unethical do the effect of PM come into play.

Fraud is an enormous obstacle to a country's development because it can cause failure in achieving goals. The most significant source of fraud in Palembang Local Government of Indonesia arises from the procurement of goods and services, which reached 49.1% in 2020. Therefore, this study aims to examine how fraud awareness and good government governance affect fraud prevention. This paper targets one of the Regional Government areas of Palembang City, Indonesia. One hundred twenty-two respondents comprised the head of budget staff, budget user authority staff, and commitment-making committee staff. Data were obtained using a questionnaire with a Likert scale. The study employed two endogenous variables (fraud prevention and fraud awareness), one intervening (fraud awareness), and two exogenous variables (whistleblowing and good government governance). Following this, structural equation models were used to examine the relationships between each variable. The study results show a significant positive effect of whistleblowing and good governance on fraud awareness. In contrast, fraud awareness had no significant impact on fraud prevention. The obtained results found that fraud awareness cannot mediate the whistleblowing system through fraud prevention; also, fraud awareness is not a moderating variable to influence good governance through fraud prevention. The paper contributed empirical evidence to explore fraud prevention approaches by maintaining consistency in the implementation of the whistleblowing system, anti-corruption culture, and supervision to identify unusual activities.

Reporting—often by ordinary individuals—is the most common means by which authorities become aware of crimes, misconduct, and other types of deviant behavior. In this article, I integrate research across a variety of disciplines and domains to review the role of social influence in the decision to report. Such influences operate at the individual, group, and societal levels to shape reporting behavior, as potential reporters respond to both direct and indirect pressures, along with considering the anticipated reactions of others were a report to be made. Together, these influences can either suppress or promote reporting, which shapes who is identified, investigated, and ultimately punished for deviant behavior within organizations, communities, and states.

Abstract: This is essentially a "now it can be told" account of a massive fraud perpetrated on the Brisbane City Council in the mid‐1970s by six attendants in a council car park, who manipulated bundy clocks to falsify departure times on parking tickets surrendered by departing motorists. Because of bitter personal rivalry between two senior council officials, which was complicated by (i) strong support for one official at elected member level, (ii) the subsequently discovered domestic liaison of the latter official with one of the prime suspects, and (iii) bungling in the crown prosecutor's office leading to a judge's decision to throw out the initial conspiracy charge against the car park attendants, it seemed that they might be reinstated and resume stealing on a massive scale. A method of dealing effectively with the issue, involving "blowing the whistle" while protecting the identity of the whistleblowers, was therefore devised. As a result, the thieves were eventually charged and convicted individually. The senior official who advised against police investigation of the suspected fraud while concealing his relationship with a prime suspect was also punished. The paper concludes with a defence of the deception perpetrated by whistleblowers to protect themselves from possible retribution.