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In history, the idea of uncertainty has taken on many forms, both in the methodological field, with for example the definition of historical sources as traces, and in epistemological terms, with the major question of causality or even ontological with the infinite extension of the "historian's territory". Nevertheless, more than an operative notion perhaps, it has long remained as an invariant, a kind of epistemological madguard (a "residue" according to the term adopted by Marc Bloch) of historical knowledge. The question of the historicization of the idea of uncertainty in the historical discipline is related to the place assigned to it in the epistemology of historians, always in tension with the desire for scientificity and truth that has long structured the disciplinarization and professionalization of history. Where do we place the cursor between uncertainty and truth for historical knowledge? This could be the guiding question to periodize the place of the idea of uncertainty in history and roughly distinguish after a predominantly scientist phase linked to the professionalization of the historical discipline (19th-first 20th century), a phase of doubts about history's ability to tell the truth, which became clear at the end of the 1970s and could conveniently be characterized as the great reversal of uncertainty in history, which, from an embarrassing limitation to reducing as much as possible, became an operating principle for defatalising history. However, it will be necessary to question this periodization, more or less modelled on the general evolutions of the sciences, marked in particular by the rise in power of probabilistic and indeterministic approaches and more or less directly related to what is perceived by the majority as the rise of uncertainty in the historical world itself ; this will require taking into account another level of analysis that adds to the weight of uncertainty in history, the moral and political dimension around the question of the social function of history.

This yearbook is the fourth in the series with the title Globalistics and Globalization Studies.
The subtitle of the present volume is Global History & Big History. The point is that today our
global world really demands global knowledge. Thus, there are a few actively developing
multidisciplinary approaches and integral disciplines among which one can name Global Studies,
Global History and Big History. They all provide a connection between the past, present, and
future. Big History with its vast and extremely heterogeneous field of research encompasses all
the forms of existence and all timescales and brings together constantly updated information from
the scientific disciplines and the humanities. Global History is transnational or world history
which examines history from a global perspective, making a wide use of comparative history and
of the history of multiple cultures and nations. Global Studies express the view of systemic
and epistemological unity of global processes. Thus, one may argue that Global Studies and
Globalistics can well be combined with Global History and Big History and such a multidisciplinary
approach can open wide horizons for the modern university education as it helps to
form a global view of various processes.

"The abuse of history is common and quite possibly once more on the rise. Although this is well documented, there is no general theory that enables historians to identify, prove, explain, and evaluate the many types of abuse of history. In this book, the author presents such a theory. Reflecting on the responsible use of history, the author identifies the duties that the living has toward the dead and analyzes the rights to memory and history necessary to fulfill these duties. He concludes his argument by proposing a code of ethics as a guide for responsible historians. This work is vital for any historian who wants to oppose and prevent the abuse of history."-- Book jacket

From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat? ; Shipping list no.: 2009-0036-S ; Includes bibliographical references and index ; v. 1. 1945-1955 -- v. 2. 1956-1972 ; Volume 2: 1956-1972 -- Foreword -- Preface -- Executive Summary -- A: Introduction -- B: Setting -- 1: Influential factors -- 2: Context in 1955 -- 3: General overview -- C: Strategic actions -- 1: Parallel decisions during the period -- 2: Contrasts in choice -- 3: Tactics-US-Soviet air and missile defense strategy -- D: Conclusions -- 1: Summary judgments -- 2: Conclusion -- Chapter 1: US And Soviet Strategies For Strategic Air And Missile Defense, 1955-1972: A Comparison -- A: Introduction -- B: What was different from the first decade? -- 1: 1955 environment -- 2: 1955 problem-where to go next -- 3: Options-more defense or more offense -- C: Contrasting responses -- 1: Importance of air defense strategy -- 2: Impact of technology on strategic options -- 3: Summary-US-Soviet air and missile defense strategy -- 4: Judgments -- D: Reasons and influences -- 1: Parallel decisions during the period -- 2: Corollaries and consequences -- 3: Implications for US air/missile defense -- E: Conclusion -- Chapter 2: Blue Air Defense Strategy, 1955-1972 -- A: Administrative note -- B: Introduction and abstract -- C: Prelude to 1955 -- D: Blue strategy, 1955-1972 -- 1: 1955-4 October 1957: Emphasis on the air-breathing threat defense (the decision to build up the air defense system) -- 2: 4 October 1957-January 1961: Reevaluation of the strategic threat (the decision to deploy first generation IRBMs/ICBMs) -- 3: January 1961-January 1968: McNarma years -- 4: Decision not to deploy a ballistic missile defense system -- 5: Calendar years 1968-1972 plans for the future of air defense -- E: Summary -- 1: Politics of congress as it affected air defense -- 2: JCS/service participation in air defense strategy -- 3: Impact of detente on air defense -- 4: Decision 1: Build-up of the air defense system, January 1955 -- 5: Decision 2: Decision to deploy first generation IRBM/ICBMs of 1958 -- 6: Decision 3: Decisions not to deploy new air defense systems in the 1959-1962 period -- 7: Decision 4: Decision not to deploy a ballistic missile defense system through September 1967 -- 8: Decision 5: Decision for detente -- Annexes -- 1: CONUS air defense "master plan" -- 2: DERs and DEW line -- 3: Phasedown of C2 systems, 1958-1963 -- 4: Threat assessments in a secondary source -- 5: Changing threat estimates, 1954-1956 -- Chapter 3: Soviet Air And Defense Strategy -- A: Introduction -- B: Studies of behavior -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Great debate in military thought -- 3: Public statements on antiballistic missile defense capabilities -- C: Major decisions -- 1: Role of major decisions -- 2: Decision to deploy SAMs extensively -- 3: Decision to revamp the National Air Defense Forces -- 4: Decision to upgrade civil defense -- 5: Decision to continue a major role for fighter aviation -- 6: Decision to deploy ABMs -- 7: Decision to negotiate an ABM treaty -- D: Major factors shaping Soviet strategy -- 1: Factors -- 2: Threat perception -- 3: Reaction and interaction-the APVO case -- 4: Response to major events and crises -- 5: Relative importance of strategic defense -- 6: Budgetary constraints -- E: Soviet strategy-a synthesis -- 1: Basic thrust of Soviet strategy -- 2: Rationale of Soviet strategy -- 3: Weapons and resource strategy -- 4: Summary -- Chapter 4: American Systems -- Section 1: General -- A: Limitations -- B: Purpose -- C: Approach -- D: Chapter organization -- E: Analysis factors -- F: Status, end of 1955 -- 1: Approach -- 2: Organizational and command -- 3: Surveillance and early warning -- 4: Fighter interceptors -- 5: Ground-based antiaircraft defenses -- 6: Strategy -- Section 2: Air Defense, 1956-1972 -- A: Approach -- B: 1956-1960 -- 1: Organization, command, and control -- 2: Surveillance and early warning -- 3: Fighter interceptors -- 4: Antiaircraft gun and SAM defenses -- 5: Operational problems -- C: 1961-1964 -- 1: Organization, command, and control -- 2: Surveillance and early warning -- 3: Fighter interceptors -- 4: Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defenses -- 5: Operational problems -- D: 1965-1968 -- 1: Status of the air defense system, January 1965 -- 2: Organization, command, and control -- 3: Surveillance and early warning -- 4: Fighter interceptors -- 5: Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) defenses -- 6: Modernized air defense concept -- E: 1969-1972 -- 1: Organization, command, and control -- 2: Surveillance and early warning -- 3: Fighter interceptors -- 4: Surface-to-Air Missile (Sam) Defenses -- 5: Air defense of the southern United States -- 6: Air defense with reduced forces -- 7: Planning directives -- 8: Air defense of ABM facilities -- F: 1972 view of future system requirements -- 1: Performance characteristics deficiencies in the 1972 air defense force system -- 2: New system development -- 3: Modernized air defense concept -- 4: Recommended force levels, modernized air defense force -- G: Characteristics and strategic implications deduced from the development, deployment, and modification of the air defense system, 1945-1972 -- 1: General -- 2: Significant events -- 3: Air defense in a continental perspective -- 4: System deployments -- 5: Significance of the threat -- Section 3: Ballistic Missile Defense -- A: Approach -- B: New dimension -- C: Nike Zeus development -- 1: Early years -- 2: Assignment of responsibilities -- 3: Early plans -- 4: Conflicting factors -- 5: Accelerated deployment -- D: Nike-X is born -- E: Assured destruction and damage limitation -- 1: McNamara's inconsistency -- 2: Back to the drawing board -- F: Limited Nike-X: the Chinese threat -- G: Sentinel decision -- H: Sentinel deployment -- I: Demise of sentinel -- J: Safeguard -- K: SALT -- Section 4: Space defense -- A: Approach -- B: Missile and space surveillance and warning systems -- 1: Authority -- 2: Composition -- 3: BMEWS -- 4: SLBM warning system -- 5: Over-the-horizon, forward scatter radar (440L) -- 6: Space detection and tracking system -- 7: Defense Support Program (DSP) -- C: Space defense system -- D: Status-1972 -- Section 5: Civil defense, 1955-1972 -- A: Introduction -- B: History -- C: Threat perceptions -- D: Congress, shelters, and the ABM -- E: Conclusions -- Chapter 5: Soviet Systems For Strategic Defense -- A: Introduction -- B: Systems of PVO strany -- 1: Systems of anti-aircraft defense aviation (APVO) -- 2: Systems of anti-aircraft defense missile troops (ZRV) -- 3: ABM systems -- 4: Systems of the radiotechnical troops (RTV) -- C: Soviet civil defense systems -- 1: Overview -- 2: Post-1955 developments (1955-1962) -- 3: 1962-1968 -- 4: Civil defense and the ABM -- 5: Civil defense and limited conflicts -- 6: Perceptions of the western threat -- 7: Psychological /ideological implications -- 8: 1968-1972 -- Appendixes -- A: Chronology of American air defense systems (1956-1972) -- B: Chronology of ballistic missile and space defense (1955-1972) -- C: Chronology of Soviet air defense systems (1956-1972) -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index ; Volume 1: 1945-1955 -- Foreword -- Preface -- Executive summary -- Chapter 1: American And Soviet Strategy: A Comparison -- A: Factors influencing air defense development and deployment, 1945-1950 -- 1: Perspectives of the threat and strategic realities -- 2: Impetus for decisions -- 3: Influence of intelligence and some economic limitations -- Increasing focus on Europe -- 5: Strategic concepts -- 6: Domestic political considerations -- 7: Decision style -- 8: Significant initial air defense decisions -- B: Systems developments -- 1: Unilateral efforts, service concepts, and continuing momentum in a context of challenge and change -- 2: Air defense systems components -- C: Factors influencing development and deployment, 1950-1955 -- 1: Air defense requirements and related actions -- 2: Summer study group-other air defense views -- 3: Soviet perspectives after Stalin -- 4: Evolution of the "new look"-NSC 162 -- 5: Growing differences -- D: Systems development -- 1: Overview -- 2: Air defense system components -- E: Summary judgments -- Chapter 2: American Strategy For Air And Ballistic Missile Defense -- A: 1945-1950: Entering the atomic era -- 1: World War II heritage -- 2: Immediate postwar developments -- 3: Planning and developing an air defense -- 4: Summary: 1943-1950 -- B: 1950-1955: Defense against the World War II threat -- 1: Strategic interaction: impact of the Korean War -- 2: Strategic interaction: the Soviet thermonuclear device I -- 3: Summary: 1950-1955 -- 4: Evaluation of US Strategic Air Defense 1945-1955 -- Chapter 3: Soviet Strategy For Air And Ballistic Missile Defense -- A: Historical backdrop -- 1: Long-term factors -- 2: Soviet air defense: the inter-war years -- 3: World War II experience -- B: Formative years, 1945-1950 -- 1: Strategic context -- 2: Organizational approach -- 3: Pursuit of systems development -- 4: Soviet strategy -- 5: Summary: 1945-1950 -- C: System established, 1950-1955 -- 1: Strategic context -- 2: Organizational integrity achieved -- 3: Systems mix in transition -- 4: Interim strategy -- 5: Korean proving ground -- 6: Summary: 1950-1955 -- D: Decision making in Soviet air and ballistic defense -- 1: Problem of data -- 2: Major actors -- 3: Influences on decision making -- 4: Consequences -- E: Appraisal for the first decade -- 1: Accomplishments of the period -- 2: Relative values -- 3: Absolute values -- 4: Strategic decisions: why and how -- Chapter 4: American Systems -- A: Introduction -- B: History of civil defense -- 1: World War II background -- 2: Initial civil defense planning -- 3: Civil defense operating agencies, 1951 -- 4: Period from 1952-1955 -- C: History of surface-to-air missiles -- 1: Background -- 2: AAF-ASF split -- 3: Work begins on Nike and GAPA -- 4: Race of the engineers -- 5: Bureaucratic struggle over missile programs -- D: History of antiballistic missiles -- 1: Technological problems -- 2: World War II experience -- 3: Post-war developments -- E: History of jet interceptors -- 1: Background -- 2: Shift to jet interceptors -- 3: Summary -- 4: Decisions for Supersonic Interceptors, 1948-1955 -- 5: Summary: 1950-1955 -- F: History of early warning systems, 1945-1955 -- 1: Introduction -- 2: DEW line -- 3: Track II-Lashup -- 4: Track III-Supremacy and the "permanent" system -- 5: Track IV-Mid-Canada line -- 6: Track V-Pinetree line -- G: History of command and control, 1945-1955 -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Pre-1945 decisions -- 3: Immediate post-war decisions -- 4: Korean War period -- 5: Post-Korean War developments -- 6: Summary -- Chapter 5: Soviet Systems -- A: Introduction -- B: History of fighter aircraft of PVO -- 1: Pre-war experience -- 2: Performance of Soviet aviation during WWII -- 3: Post-World War II developments -- 4: Observations based on the evolution of interceptor designs -- C: Antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles -- 1: World War II experience -- 2: Post-War development (1945-1955) -- 3: Evaluation -- D: History of early warning systems -- 1: Pre-1945 developments -- 2: Assessment of post-war requirements -- 3: Developments after 1945 -- 4: Summary -- E: History of civil defense in the Soviet Union, 1945-1955 -- 1: Introduction -- 2: Post-war developments: general -- 3: Organization -- 4: Training -- 5: Shelters, evacuation, and dispersal -- 6: Summary -- Appendixes -- A: Concepts of air defense before 1945 -- B: Chronology of American air and ballistic missile defense systems -- C: Chronology of Soviet air and ballistic missile defense -- D: Figures -- Bibliography -- Index ; From the book's Foreword: In the early 1970s, the U.S. Army Center of Military History contracted with BDM Corporation for a history of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet air and missile threats during the Cold War. The resulting two-volume History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense covers the years 1945-1972 when the strategic arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was at its height. The study was first published for limited distribution in 1975 and recently declassified with minimal redaction. These volumes address the passive and active defense strategies, technologies, and techniques adopted by both U.S. and Soviet defense planners. Much of their actions centered around three common questions: How might we be attacked? How shall we defend our country? What can technology do to solve the basic problems of defending against this new intercontinental threat? ; Mode of access: Internet.

The subject of the course that I shall offer this year at the Collège de France is the economy and society—or, better, the traditional ecodemography of the world long gone—as they "functioned," if one may use this term, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century, or, more precisely, from 1300-1320 to 1720-1730. Forsake of convenience, this world will be de-limited by the present frontiers of France—a decision of pure form with no implication of tri-color or fleur-de-lys. We shall be concerned with about 15 to 20 million people in every period, although there will be long intervals between actual dates. To be sure, a similar study could be carried out (and probably will be if it has not been already) among our neighbors: Germany, Italy, without a doubt Spain, but possibly not the British Isles. One of the paradoxes of such an undertaking is that the Kingdom of England, where The World We Have Lost was first defined with such penetrating insight, is of all western countries the one where that world was the least typical and the least stable.