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This article was published by IET under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode ; Purpose Diminishing local government budgets and the need to reduce highway works activities necessitate cost effective and efficient processes. This paper investigates streamlining road works administrative processes to enhance coordinated working at Derby City Council. Design/methodology/approach Case study research of a local authority was undertaken using Business Process Mapping. Specifically, Swimlane analysis enabled re-engineering of business processes from design stage, to works permit issuance. Process improvement recommendations were validated by nine industry experts through a focus group and semi-structured interviews. A logic map was developed for transferability to other Councils, identifying key attributes for a successful administrative road works management process. Findings Research revealed inherent silo working and processes built around fragmented IT systems creating process inefficiency. Validation found numerous practices and management styles were culturally embedded and common across Councils. Peer reviewed recommendations are made to improve working practices, including improving IT systems, removing process bottlenecks, and training staff. Research implications Whilst road works management policy is generally under-researched, it's strategic and negative impacts are widely acknowledged. This study highlights the day-to-day operational problems which are interconnected to the strategic impact, bridging an important gap in knowledge, as well as adding to Business Process Re-engineering literature. Originality/novelty The research adds to a limited of body of road works management policy research, and also presents a high-level logic map for Councils to adopt as appropriate.

RésuméL'auto‐coordination en entreprise, ou coordination des activités produite par les employés eux‐mêmes plutôt que par des tiers, est un phénomène encore mal appréhendé par les sciences administratives. La notion d'ajustement mutuel avancée par certains auteurs apparaît notamment comme une notion passablement réductrice. Cet article fait part de certains des résultats d'une recherche exploratoire effectuée récemment dans une entreprise québécoise de services sur le thème de la coordination, qui confirment les limites des théories courantes en matiére d'auto‐coordination, et qui apportent diverses pistes d'élargissement de la compréhension de cet espace de pratiques.AbstractSelf‐coordination within an enterprise, or the coordination of activities performed by the employees themselves rather than by third parties, is a phenomenon that remains poorly understood by the administrative sciences. In particular, the notion of mutual adjustment put forward by some authors appears to be a rather limited one. This article presents some of the results of an exploratory research work conducted recently in a Quebec services enterprise on the topic of coordination, confirming the limits of current theories on the subject of self‐coordination, and opening up various avenues for broadening our understanding of this area of practices.

International audience ; Sophia Antipolis was created by the public authorities to attract high value added activities on the French Riviera, in the aim of strengthening a local economy driven historically by tourism. The theoretical model that has inspired the creation of Sophia Antipolis is governed by a top-down approach. The agglomerations externalities, had not sprung up naturally from the dynamics of entreprises located in the cluster. The economic model of Sophia Antipolis is completely different of the traditional innovative district studied by Alfred Marshall (bottom-up approach). Nowadays, the cluster of Sophia-Antipolis is rich of external linkages, but poor of internal relations between the firms. In this local system of Innovation, a large numbers of actors in different sectors are present but any of them is sufficiently dominant to drive the cluster orientations. In this sense, this Local System of Innovation (LSI) is not reliable in the long run. Very few, almost no technological collaborations can be observed. The sustainability of the Sophia-Antipolis cluster does not really depend on the territory. the weakness of the cooperation between companies of the cluster can be partially explained by the local multinational firms which have their branch facilities located in the local system of innovation but at the same time their head office external to the cluster with main decision taken from outside, limiting the potential for local synergies and local collaboration. The aim of this paper is to understand the coordination mechanisms between enterprises and the main factors of success who made Sophia-Antipolis the largest technology park in the Europe. Such a study presents the Top-down strategy of developpement choosen by the government from the origins of Sophia-Antipolis to promote agglomeration externalities and the increasing returns to adoption gained by firms entering in the park.

International audience ; Sophia Antipolis was created by the public authorities to attract high value added activities on the French Riviera, in the aim of strengthening a local economy driven historically by tourism. The theoretical model that has inspired the creation of Sophia Antipolis is governed by a top-down approach. The agglomerations externalities, had not sprung up naturally from the dynamics of entreprises located in the cluster. The economic model of Sophia Antipolis is completely different of the traditional innovative district studied by Alfred Marshall (bottom-up approach). Nowadays, the cluster of Sophia-Antipolis is rich of external linkages, but poor of internal relations between the firms. In this local system of Innovation, a large numbers of actors in different sectors are present but any of them is sufficiently dominant to drive the cluster orientations. In this sense, this Local System of Innovation (LSI) is not reliable in the long run. Very few, almost no technological collaborations can be observed. The sustainability of the Sophia-Antipolis cluster does not really depend on the territory. the weakness of the cooperation between companies of the cluster can be partially explained by the local multinational firms which have their branch facilities located in the local system of innovation but at the same time their head office external to the cluster with main decision taken from outside, limiting the potential for local synergies and local collaboration. The aim of this paper is to understand the coordination mechanisms between enterprises and the main factors of success who made Sophia-Antipolis the largest technology park in the Europe. Such a study presents the Top-down strategy of developpement choosen by the government from the origins of Sophia-Antipolis to promote agglomeration externalities and the increasing returns to adoption gained by firms entering in the park.

International audience ; Sophia Antipolis was created by the public authorities to attract high value added activities on the French Riviera, in the aim of strengthening a local economy driven historically by tourism. The theoretical model that has inspired the creation of Sophia Antipolis is governed by a top-down approach. The agglomerations externalities, had not sprung up naturally from the dynamics of entreprises located in the cluster. The economic model of Sophia Antipolis is completely different of the traditional innovative district studied by Alfred Marshall (bottom-up approach). Nowadays, the cluster of Sophia-Antipolis is rich of external linkages, but poor of internal relations between the firms. In this local system of Innovation, a large numbers of actors in different sectors are present but any of them is sufficiently dominant to drive the cluster orientations. In this sense, this Local System of Innovation (LSI) is not reliable in the long run. Very few, almost no technological collaborations can be observed. The sustainability of the Sophia-Antipolis cluster does not really depend on the territory. the weakness of the cooperation between companies of the cluster can be partially explained by the local multinational firms which have their branch facilities located in the local system of innovation but at the same time their head office external to the cluster with main decision taken from outside, limiting the potential for local synergies and local collaboration. The aim of this paper is to understand the coordination mechanisms between enterprises and the main factors of success who made Sophia-Antipolis the largest technology park in the Europe. Such a study presents the Top-down strategy of developpement choosen by the government from the origins of Sophia-Antipolis to promote agglomeration externalities and the increasing returns to adoption gained by firms entering in the park.

This paper explores the hypothesis that the credibility of economic policy making in Argentina (or lack thereof) has impacted the volatility of economic performance. To establish the link, a historical review of economic policy making and economic outcomes over the quarter century is presented, informed by a survey of the literature on credibility and the political economy of reforms. A more fundamental question is why policy shifts are so frequent, and this necessarily relates to the political institutions underlying policy making. A recent literature on citizen engagement and accountability, combined with international experience, is then used to consider policy options that could help reestablish credibility during the new administration.

Alan Walters: Britains Economic Renaissance. Oxford University Press, New York 1986, 200 Seiten, 29,95 Dollar

Adapted from the source document.