Corruption
In: Development in practice, Volume 17, Issue 4-5, p. 672-678
ISSN: 1364-9213
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In: Development in practice, Volume 17, Issue 4-5, p. 672-678
ISSN: 1364-9213
In: Political and Civic Leadership: A Reference Handbook, p. 258-266
In: International anti-corruption regimes in Europe: between corruption, integration, and culture, p. 125-135
In: Russian politics and law, Volume 51, Issue 4, p. 3-7
ISSN: 1558-0962
In: Crime, law and social change: an interdisciplinary journal, Volume 59, Issue 1, p. 137-138
ISSN: 0925-4994
In: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, p. 551-566
World Affairs Online
Problems with conventional definitions of political corruption are highlighted to better define such political behavior. Three categories are identified: corruption by public officials; public officials' abuse of their offices; & corruption by business enterprises & other private citizens. Political corruption is not perceived as a seminal characteristic of organized crime syndicates. Various legal, public interest, & public opinion definitions of political corruption are examined, further demonstrating the problem of preserving traditional definitions. Analysis of several public opinion definitions of corruption indicates significant differences in how the public defines political corruption & that these notions have changed over time. In addition, different nations posses disparate legal, public interest, & public opinion understandings of political corruption. The need to acknowledge the legitimacy of multiple definitions of corruption is stressed. 22 References. J. W. Parker
SSRN
In: Economics & politics, Volume 23, Issue 2, p. 195-219
ISSN: 1468-0343
We challenge the conventional definition of corruption through the analysis of legal forms of corruption, and by devoting special attention to influence induced by the private sector. This paper studies the determinants of the world pattern of legal and illegal corruption by proposing a simple theoretical model of endogenous corruption and related legal framework, and its thorough empirical test. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified: one based on illegal corruption, where the elite does not face any binding incentives to limit corruption; one centered around legal corruption, where the elite must incur a cost to legally protect corruption; and finally a no-corruption outcome, where the population is able to effectively react to corruption. Testable implications from the model are derived based on country-wide parameters. Crucially, we use a rich corporate survey, including 8,279 firms in 104 countries, tailored for this research, and featuring measures of legal corruption that are novel to the literature. The microdimension of the database enables improving on familiar shortcomings associated with the use of endogeneity-prone, country-wide indices of perceived corruption. The empirical results, making use of a broad range of proxies and sources, generally validate the model's explanations. Adapted from the source document.
In: Development and the State in the 21st Century, p. 140-164