Search results

After decades of debate, the lines of distinction between textualism and purposivism have been carefully drawn with respect to the judicial task of statutory interpretation. Far less attention has been devoted to the question of how executive branch officials approach statutory interpretation. While scholars have contrasted agencies' interpretive practices from those of courts, they have not yet developed a theory of agency statutory interpretation. This Article develops a purposivist theory of agency statutory interpretation on the ground that regulatory statutes oblige agencies to implement the statutes they administer in that manner. Regulatory statutes not only grant powers but also impose a duty on agencies to carry out those powers in accordance with the principles or purposes the statutes establish. To comply with that duty, agencies must develop a conception of the purposes that the statute requires them to pursue and select a course of action that best carries forward those purposes within the means permitted by the statute; in short, agencies must take a purposivist approach. Moreover, this Article argues that agencies' institutional capacities—a familiar constellation of expertise, indirect political accountability, and ability to vet proposals before adopting them—make them ideally suited to carry out the task of purposive interpretation. Understanding agency interpretation as purposive by statutory design has significant implications for long-standing debates. First, it suggests that the focus of judicial review should be on the agency's specification of the statute's purposes and chosen means to implement those purposes, questions that are not squarely addressed by the Chevron doctrine. Second, by providing an account of the character of the agency's statutory duties, this analysis helps to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate political and presidential influences on the agency. Finally, investigating the debate between purposivism and textualism beyond the courts exposes a renewed ...

Der Verfasser stellt zunächst die Entwicklung in der Exekutive in Rußland seit 1991 dar und arbeitet vor allem die starke Stellung von Präsidialamt und Sicherheitsrat gegenüber den im wesentlichen für wirtschaftliche Fragen zuständigen Regierungsstellen heraus. Er skizziert im folgenden den personellen Wechsel in einer Vielzahl von Schlüsselpositionen der Jelzin-Administration nach der Auflösung des Obersten Sowjet im September und den Parlamentswahlen im Dezember 1993. In diesem Zusammenhang wird vor allem auf das fast völlige Verschwinden reformorientierter Kräfte in der Exekutive hingewiesen. Der Verfasser legt einen detaillierten Überblick über die Besetzung der Schlüsselpositionen in der Russischen Föderation sowohl in der Exekutive (Präsidialamt, Regierung) wie auch in der Legislative vor. (BIOst-Wpt)

AbstractWe study presidential patronage as a form of distributive politics. To do so, we introduce comprehensive data on supervisory personnel in the executive branch between 1925 and 1959 and link each bureaucrat to the congressional representative from their home district. We identify testable hypotheses regarding the impact of electoral considerations, partisanship, and legislative support on the distribution of bureaucratic appointments across districts. Results from a variety of fixed‐effects estimation strategies are consistent with several forms of presidential patronage. Our results provide initial evidence about the mechanisms through which patronage appointments are administered in the executive branch and illustrate how presidential politics affects the composition of the federal government.

IGR and the New Federalism are synonymous. Former President Nixon summarized the New Federalism as "A cooperative venture among governments at all levels ... in which power, funds, and authority are channeled increas ingly to those governments which are closest to the people." IGR is essentially an art and primarily an exercise in the be havioral field. The thread which binds government officials intergovernmentally is the financing and administration of federal grants-in-aid and other forms of federal financial assis tance. Concern in the executive branch for IGR developed in the last 20 years; thus its roots in American governance are not yet very deep. The views and support of public interest groups as well as the sympathetic attention of Congress are essential to the pursuit of IGR goals and objectives in the executive branch. In relations between levels of government, partnership rather than paternalism must prevail. The rise of stronger chief executives and decentralization of power from Washington are noted. Confidence of Americans in their own government is essential to achieving a federal system working in all parts, well-managed and equitably financed.