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Game theory studies the strategic interactions between and among decision makers, players, through mathematical models called games. This paper presents an overview on the evolution of the application of game theory to fisheries economics. The first applications emerged in the late 1970s, focussing upon internationally shared fish stocks. This occurred in the context of the UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. During the 1980s and early 1990s the application of game theory to fisheries focused mainly on transboundary fish stocks. Thereafter, the applications to straddling fish stocks developed significantly, through the use of coalition games. This was a consequence of the mismanagement of these stocks, and the management regime brought forth in response by the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. The application of game theory to the management of national/regional fisheries is a new research frontier, as it is still much underexplored, when compared to international fisheries. This paper also summarizes the main research developments of a set of nine papers selected for this special issue on Game Theory and Fisheries. ; Peer reviewed

Abstract
Each member of a group chooses a position and has preferences regarding his chosen position. The group's harmony depends on the profile of chosen positions meeting a specific condition. We analyse a solution concept (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020) based on a permissible set of individual positions, which plays a role analogous to that of prices in competitive equilibrium. Given the permissible set, members choose their most preferred position. The set is tightened if the chosen positions are inharmonious and relaxed if the restrictions are unnecessary. This new equilibrium concept yields more attractive outcomes than does Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game.

Game Theory has been an essential tool in analyzing national security, international trade, and the global environment since Neumann and Morgenstern introduced it more than 45 years ago. Chamberlin examines the work of these two authors, focusing on the relationship between rationality and morality as it arises in strategic interactions among players in a game based on three essential features: rational behavior, consequentialism, and the self-interest of players. The author concludes that due to the egoistic nature of actors, political dilemmas cannot easily be solved through the use of Game Theory. Nonetheless, he insists on its validity in contributing to our thinking about the place of ethics in international affairs and in clarifying both the dangers and potential areas of cooperation inherent in many international relationships.

In this illuminating and instructive survey, author Steven J. Brams demonstrates both the insights and the pitfalls that can result from applying game theoretic models to the analysis of problems in political science. Using plenty of real-life examples, Brams shows how game theory can explain and elucidate complex political situations, from warfare to presidential vetoes. In these cases and others, game theory's mathematical structure provides a rigorous, consistent method for formulating, analyzing, and solving strategic problems. Minimal mathematical background is necessary, making the book

Formal political theory seeks to develop formal, mathematical models of political and economic processes. This book attempts to integrate the last twenty years of development in this field. Professor Ordeshook uses the modern developments in the theory of games (decision making with multiple, interactive decision makers) as the basis for the synthesis. Topics covered include models of elections and of committee processes, the demand and supply of public goods, and surveys of game theory and social-choice theory. Game Theory and Political Theory is designed as a textbook for graduate courses in formal political theory and political economy

Historical notes and references for the Foreword and Introduction -- 1 Noncooperative games -- 1 Noncooperative games and their components -- 2 Optimality principles in noncooperative games -- 3 Realizability of A-optimality principles -- 4 Realizability of A-principles in metastrategies -- 5 Realizability of equilibrium situations in mixed strategies -- 6 Natural topology in games -- Notes and references for Chapter 1 -- 2 Finite noncooperative games -- 1 Finite noncooperative games -- 2 Dyadic games -- 3 Solution of general finite noncooperative games -- 4 On the structure of the set of equilibria in finite noncooperative games -- 5 The complexity of solution of finite noncooperative games -- 6 Reduction to three-person games -- Notes and references for Chapter 3 -- 3 Two-person zero-sum games -- 1 Optimality in two-person zero-sum games -- 2 Basis of the maximin principle -- 3 Minimax theorems -- 4 Finitely additive strategies -- 5 Analytic games on the unit square -- 6 Separable games -- 7 Convex games -- 8 Games with a simple payoff function -- 9 Games of timing -- Notes and references for Chapter 3 -- 4 Matrix games -- 1 Basic concepts and propositions -- 2 Solution of matrix games of small format -- 3 Matrix games and linear programming -- 4 Description of all equilibrium situations in matrix and bimatrix games -- 5 Solution of matrix games with matrix payoffs of a special form -- 6 Approximate methods for solving matrix games -- 7 Structure of the set of a matrix game -- Notes and references for Chapter 4 -- References -- Collections -- List of Joint Authors -- Index of Notations.