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PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to review what is known about property cycles following the financial crisis of 2008.Design/methodology/approachThe method is to review the literature on property cycles published since the 1930s, to examine the extent to which endogenous causes have been identified as distinct from exogenous factors that may have produced cyclicality resulting from weak adjustment mechanisms but not cycles.FindingsWhilst there is broad consensus that the property market has delays in adjustment which produce oscillations resulting from external shocks, it is more difficult to identify endogenous causes of cycles, though there are some possible candidates, notably technical progress.Practical implicationsThe slump after 2008 has cost savers and taxpayers dear, so better means of predicting cycles so that policy makers can mitigate them is desirable.Originality/valueThe debate about whether property cycles result from exogenous shocks or endogenous causes is in danger of being lost sight of. If the former, then the property industry is a channel through which external factors feed through to the economy, albeit magnified by weak adjustment factors. If there are endogenous causes, then policy makers would be unwise to overlook their potential destabilising impact on the economy.

This collection of essays by one of the country's leading property theorists revitalizes the liberal personality theory of property.Departing from traditional libertarian and economic theories of property, Margaret Jane Radin argues that the law should take into account nonmonetary personal value attached to property-and that some things, such as bodily integrity, are so personal they should not be considered property at all. Gathered here are pieces ranging from Radin's classic early essay on property and personhood to her recent works on governmental ""taking"" of private proper

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Cultural Property als interdisziplinäre Forschungsaufgabe: eine Einleitung (Regina Bendix und Kilian Bizer) (1-24). I. Zwischen Heritage und Cultural Property - Flexibilisierte Kultur zwischen "Tradition, Modernität und Markt": Akteursbezogene Verwendungs- und Bedeutungsvielfalt von "kulturellem Erbe" (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin und Karin Klenke) (25-44); Sbek Thom nach seiner UNESCO Zertifizierung: eine Untersuchung der Dynamik des kambodschanischen Schattentheaters nach seiner Ernennung zum immateriellen Kulturerbe (Aditya Eggert) (45-64); Cultural Property und das Heritage-Regime der UNESCO: Parallelen in ideellen und wirtschaftlichen Inwertsetzungsprozessen von kulturellen Elementen (Arnika Peselmann und Philipp Socha) (65-90). II. Parameter des Schutzes von Cultural Property - Die UNESCO-Konvention zum Schutz des immateriellen (Kultur-)Erbes der Menschheit von 2003: Öffnung des Welterbekonzepts
oder Stärkung der kulturellen Hoheit des Staates? (Sven Mißling) (91-114); Ausdrucksformen der Folklore: freie und abhängige Schöpfungen (Philipp Zimbehl) (115-134); Der Schutz kultureller Güter: die Ökonomie der Identität (Marianna Bicskei, Kilian Bizer und Zulia Gubaydullina) (135-152); Ethnographische Filmarbeit und Copyright: Überlegungen zur Situation in Indonesien (Beate Engelbrecht) (153-176). III. Muster und Motivationen im Verhandeln von Cultural Property - Perspektiven der Differenzierung: multiple Ausdeutungen von traditionellem Wissen indigener Gemeinschaften in WIPO Verhandlungen (Stefan Groth) (177-196); Die verborgene Effektivität minimaler Resultate in internationalen Verhandlungen: der Fall der WIPO (Matthias Lankau, Kilian Bizer und Zulia Gubaydullina) (197-220). IV. Forschen über Cultural Property - Die technische Dimension der Konstitution/ Konstruktion von Cultural Property (Johannes Müske) (221-234); Der zunehmende Geltungsbereich kultureller Besitztümer und ihrer Politik (Rosemary Coombe) (235-260). V. Ausblick - On Cultural Property and Its Protection: A Law and Economics Comment (Ejan Mackaay) (261-270).

Property concerns conflicts – both conflicts between individuals and conflicts of interest. Conflicts between individuals have long been the paradigmatic property focus. According to this view, property debates circle around issues of autonomy and productive competition. But this is an impoverished view. In this Article, we shift attention to conflicts of interest. By helping people manage conflicts of interest, a well-governed property system balances interdependence with autonomy and productive cooperation with productive competition. We identify three mechanisms woven throughout property law that help manage conflicts of interest: (1) internalization of externalities; (2) democratization of management; and (3) de-escalation of transactions. We show that property law predictably selects among these mechanisms depending on the ratio of economic to social benefits that people seek from a group resource. When economic concerns predominate, property law typically uses contribution-based allocations of rights and responsibilities mediated by formal, foreground procedures; while at the social end of the spectrum we tend to see more egalitarian substantive rules operating in an informal, background safety net.

Property concerns conflicts - both conflicts between individuals and conflicts of interest. Conflicts between individuals have long been the paradigmatic property focus. According to this view, property debates circle around issues of autonomy and productive competition. But this is an impoverished view. In this Article, we shift attention to conflicts of interest. By helping people manage conflicts of interest, a well-governed property system balances interdependence with autonomy and productive cooperation with productive competition. We identify three mechanisms woven throughout property law that help manage conflicts of interest: (1) internalization of externalities; (2) democratization of management; and (3) de-escalation of transactions. We show that property law predictably selects among these mechanisms depending on the ratio of economic to social benefits that people seek from a group resource. When economic concerns predominate, property law typically uses contribution-based allocations of rights and responsibilities mediated by formal, foreground procedures, while at the social end of the spectrum we tend to see more egalitarian substantive rules operating as an informal, background safety net.