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Despite libertarianism's political popularity, tax scholarship is largely silent about the interaction between libertarian principles and the structure of our tax system. To fill that gap, this Article mines the nuances of libertarian theory for insights into one feature of our tax system—the charitable tax subsidies—and finds some surprising insights. Although one strand of libertarianism suggests that charitable tax subsidies are in and of themselves illegitimate, several other understandings of libertarianism see a role for the state to engage in a varying amount of redistribution or to provide varying amounts of public goods. Surprisingly, some readings even lend weight to the common criticism that the charitable tax subsidies do not do enough to assist the poor and disadvantaged. Only a lenient interpretation of classical liberalism that conceives of a vibrant non-profit sector as a public good in and of itself and an expansive reading of left-libertarianism support something akin to our current structure, in which elite cultural institutions such as the opera are subsidized even if they provide no free or discounted services to the poor. In addressing these questions, this Article rounds out a series on the interaction of distributive justice and the charitable tax subsidies.

In previous articles, we have argued that European Court of Justice's reliance on nondiscrimination as the basis for its decisions did not (and could not) satisfy commonly accepted tax policy norms, such as fairness, adminstrability, production of desired levels of revenues, avoidance of double taxation, fiscal policy goals, inter-nation fiscal equity, and so on. In addition, we argued that the Court cannot achieve consistent and coherent results by requiring nondiscrimination in both origin and destination countries for transactions involving the tax systems of more than one member state. We demonstrated that – in the absence of harmonized income tax bases and rates – the Court had entered a "labyrinth of impossibility." Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll claim to have discovered a single, normative criterion that not only resolves this dilemma, but also explains the existing nondiscrimination tax jurisprudence of both the European Court of Justice and the United States Supreme Court. In fact, their crucial, but unrealistic, assumption that taxpayers can never move from one state to another confines the actual scope of their analysis to a very small set of cases involving cross-border workers. Although they endorse economic efficiency as the guidestar for judicial decisions regarding tax discrimination, Mason and Knoll fail to provide any evidence that their proposed norm would reduce tax-induced distortions more than competing norms, even in the limited situations to which their analysis applies. Nor do they make a convincing case that they have found the key to understanding the confusing and inconsistent U.S. and EU judicial decisions, which are not confined to cross-border workers. Finally, implementation of their proposed norm by legislation or litigation is not practical, given the particular tax systems that they say would be required. In short, their proposed norm does not provide a way out of the "labyrinth of impossibility" created by a nondiscrimination approach to taxation of international transactions.

14.4 The Australian GST Compared to the Cook Islands VAT14.5 Likely Outcomes of Australiaâ#x80;#x99;s GST; Chapter Fifteenâ#x80;#x94;A Better Plan: Alternatives and Solutions to the Problems of the Australian GST System; 15.1 Introduction; 15.2 Alternatives; 15.3 Conclusion; Part III A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TAX AVOIDANCE SCHEMES IN AUSTRALIA; Chapter Sixteenâ#x80;#x94;Introduction; 16.1 Overview; 16.2 Australian Domestic Tax Avoidance Countermeasures (GAARS); Section Aâ#x80;#x94;Australian Domestic Tax Avoidance Countermeasures; Chapter Seventeenâ#x80;#x94;The Legislative Background to Tax Reducing Structures; 17.1 Introduction.

The rapid development of complex income taxation and welfare systems in the 20th century may give the impression that progressive wealth redistribution systems are uniquely modern. However, religious systems provided similar mechanisms for addressing economic injustice and poverty alleviation centuries earlier. Zakat is the obligation of almsgiving and is the third pillar of Islam - a requirement for all believers. In the early development of the Islamic community, zakat was collected as a tax by the state and the funds were distributed to a defined set of needy groups. As a theoretical matter, there are three insights that make zakat an especially relevant subject for modern legal scholars. First, zakat is an example of a modest wealth tax combined with an income tax that may be illustrative in the discourse regarding wealth taxes. Second, the jurisprudence of zakat supports the ethical conclusions of scholars who contend that property rights are attached to post rather than pre-tax income. Third, to the extent that zakat is considered a principal source of revenue for public programs, it might imply a limited role for government, focusing on equitable distribution of goods. This paper begins with a thorough evaluation and synthesis of the traditional Islamic jurisprudence related to zakat. The next section identifies three broad approaches to zakat adopted by modern Muslim states, with particular emphasis on ways that zakat is institutionalized legally. This is followed by an empirical analysis of the correlation of the approaches to zakat with (1) individual income and (2) wealth stratification. The article concludes with observations and policy recommendations related to zakat and broader legal theory based on the earlier qualitative analysis and empirical findings.

In previous articles, we have argued that the European Court of Justice's reliance on nondiscrimination as the basis for its decisions did not (and could not) satisfy commonly accepted tax policy norms, such as fairness, administrability, economic efficiency, production of desired levels of revenues, avoidance of double taxation, fiscal policy goals, inter-nation equity, and so on. In addition, we argued that the court cannot achieve consistent and coherent results by requiring nondiscrimination in both origin and destination countries for transactions involving the tax systems of more than one member state. We demonstrated that – in the absence of harmonized income tax bases and rates – the court had entered a "labyrinth of impossibility." Ruth Mason and Michael Knoll claim to have discovered a single normative criterion that not only resolves this dilemma, but also explains the existing nondiscrimination tax jurisprudence of both the European Court of Justice and the United States Supreme Court. Although they endorse economic efficiency as the lodestar for judicial decisions regarding tax discrimination, Mason and Knoll fail to provide any evidence that their proposed norm would reduce tax-induced distortions more than competing efficiency norms, even in the limited situations to which their analysis applies. In fact, their crucial, but unrealistic, assumption that taxpayers can never change their residences from one state to another confines the actual scope of their analysis to a very small set of cases involving cross-border workers. That analysis is further limited by an unrealistic assumption of flat-rate taxation for individual income. Nor do they make a convincing case that they have found the key to understanding the confusing and inconsistent U.S. and EU judicial decisions, which are not confined to cross-border workers. Finally, implementation of their proposed norm by legislation or litigation is not practical, given the particular tax systems that they say would be required. In short, their proposed norm does not provide a way out of the "labyrinth of impossibility" created by a nondiscrimination approach to taxation of international transactions.