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Abstract:A qualified pluralism is defended that recognizes value in a variety of forms of political theory and resists arguments that purport to show that one particular approach should occupy a privileged position. Against realists, it is argued that abstract analyses of political values that bracket a wide range of facts about people and their circumstances can be both coherent and important, whereas against those who think "ideal theory" or the identification of ultimate principles should come first, it is argued that the case for always giving priority to either one of these is weak.

It is sometimes argued that ideal theories in political philosophy are a form of ideology. This article examines arguments building on the work of Charles Mills and Raymond Geuss for the claim that ideal theories are cognitively distorting belief systems that have the effect of stabilizing unjust social arrangements. I argue that Mills and Geuss neither succeed in establishing that the content of ideal theories is necessarily cognitively defective in the way characteristic for ideologies, nor can they make plausible which mechanisms ensure the alleged negative effects of the widespread acceptance of ideal theorizing. This does not mean that all hope is lost for the ideology objection, however. By turning to a second Marxian model of ideology, I argue that the ideological character of ideal theories is not so much a matter of their content, but rather of their form. Ideal theories falsely present the normative concepts that they use as semantically practice-independent and thereby block potential challenges from subordinate groups to dominant ideologies. It is therefore not the normative content of ideal theories which proves to be objectionable, but the particular role their concepts play in wider political discourse.

Elizabeth Anderson's The Imperative of Integration is most notable for its creative application of her conception of non-ideal theory. I assess Anderson's conception and argue that it does not adequately account for the necessary role of political ideals in non-ideal theory. Political ideals, I argue, determine what counts as a political problem and shape the practice of non-ideal theorizing in ways Anderson does not fully address. This methodological difference leads me to depart in a small but significant way from her criticism of the color-blind ideal: by failing to consider the role of ideals in defining political problems, Anderson's criticisms of the color-blind ideal fail to note the contradiction advocates of that ideal find between the critical implications of their view and its alleged policy prescriptions.

Some realists in political theory deny that the notion of feasibility has any place in realist theory, while others claim that feasibility constraints are essential elements of realist normative theorising. But none have so far clarified what exactly they are referring to when thinking of feasibility and political realism together. In this article, we develop a conception of the realist feasibility frontier based on an appraisal of how political realism should be distinguished from non-ideal theories. In this realist framework, political standards are feasible if they meet three requirements: they are (i) politically intelligible, (ii) contextually recognisable as authoritative, and (iii) contestable. We conclude by suggesting that our conception of realist feasibility might be compatible with utopian demands, thereby possibly finding favour with realists who otherwise refuse to resort to the notion of feasibility.

This essay considers the relationship between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. It begins with Rawls's conception of ideal theory and A. John Simmons's articulation of non-ideal theory. Both defend the priority of ideal theory over non-ideal theory. The essay then considers three different conceptions of the social barriers standing in the way of an ideal society, taken broadly from Mill, Marx, and Foucault. Each conception of power suggests a divergent strategy for pursuing non-ideal theory. The Foucauldian conception also suggests reasons to mistrust our own political and moral judgments. The essay advocates a more limited view of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory than is commonly described, in which ideal theory retains its logical priority but not its temporal priority. In other words, the essay argues that we will fare best when we focus first on reducing specific injustices while setting aside further speculation about the character of an ideal society.

This essay considers the relationship between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. It begins with Rawls's conception of ideal theory and A. John Simmons's articulation of non-ideal theory. Both defend the priority of ideal theory over non-ideal theory. The essay then considers three different conceptions of the social barriers standing in the way of an ideal society, taken broadly from Mill, Marx, and Foucault. Each conception of power suggests a divergent strategy for pursuing non-ideal theory. The Foucauldian conception also suggests reasons to mistrust our own political and moral judgments. The essay advocates a more limited view of the relationship between ideal and non-ideal theory than is commonly described, in which ideal theory retains its logical priority but not its temporal priority. In other words, the essay argues that we will fare best when we focus first on reducing specific injustices while setting aside further speculation about the character of an ideal society. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

Abstract:The essay agues that there is little scope for ideal theory in political
philosophy, even under Rawls's conception of its aims. It begins by
identifying features of a standard example of ideal theory in physics
— the ideal gas law, PV=NRT and draws attention to the
lack of these features in Rawls's derivation of the principles of
justice from the original position. A. John Simmons's defense of
ideal theory against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are further
criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes on to develop a conception
of the domain of social relations to be characterized by justice that suggests
that as a moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of
Rawls's later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal theory as
propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken starting point in the enterprise
of political philosophy. Differences between the domains of ideal theory in
mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and political philosophy on
the other, reinforce this conclusion.

AbstractRealist thinkers in political philosophy often criticize ideal theorists for neglecting or eliminating the fact of politics in their work. This is supposed to be problematic because we should never expect to overcome politics. Any theory that attempts to do so is said to be unrealistic, naïve, and impractical. Although much has been said in the dispute between realists and ideal theorists in recent years, this particular line of criticism, which should be distinguished from other criticisms of ideal theory, has not been clearly or explicitly addressed by ideal theorists in the literature. I deal with this issue by examining the ideal theory of John Rawls, which has been a prominent target of realist criticisms. My aim is to see where politics exists, or might exist, in Rawls's theory, and whether this politics satisfactorily answers to the various aspects of the realist's critique. My analysis suggests that there may be no inherent or necessary conflict between ideal theory and real politics, after all.

This article clarifies the disagreement concerning ideal theory's action-guiding capacity through the unpacking of two underlying disagreements. The first concerns the threshold for action-guidance on the scales of empirical and normative determinacy; I argue that the dispute between critics and proponents of ideal theory is not about whether ideal principles offer some specific information, but about which information should count as action-guiding. The second concerns the task of normative principles; I argue that the different weight critics and proponents attribute to the risks associated with ideal theory may reflect diverging views on whether principles primarily generate or explain normative judgments.