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AbstractThis paper introduces the Prince incentive system for measuring preferences. Prince combines the tractability of direct matching, allowing for the precise and direct elicitation of indifference values, with the clarity and validity of choice lists. It makes incentive compatibility completely transparent to subjects, avoiding the opaqueness of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. It can be used for adaptive experiments while avoiding any possibility of strategic behavior by subjects. To illustrate Prince's wide applicability, we investigate preference reversals, the discrepancy between willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and the major components of decision making under uncertainty: utilities, subjective beliefs, and ambiguity attitudes. Prince allows for measuring utility under risk and ambiguity in a tractable and incentive-compatible manner even if expected utility is violated. Our empirical findings support modern behavioral views, e.g., confirming the endowment effect and showing that utility is closer to linear than classically thought. In a comparative study, Prince gives better results than a classical implementation of the random incentive system.

Equity theorists have frequently attempted to rank order situations of injustice in terms of preference, motivation to redress justice, and/or overt behavioral responses. The present paper deals with some difficulties facing those efforts and proposes a basis for more precise predictions. It is shown, through a structural specification of their various component types (socalled minor types), why a situation which is less preferred than others in one case may be more preferred than those in another, i.e., the preferential order reversed. This is demonstrated empirically in the present study. Two major types of injustice situations (Under/Over and Under/Just) were involved, one more unjust than the other. Each one encompassed, and was represented by three structurally different minor types. According to the predictions, subjects' preferences for either one of the two major types of injustice situations varied with the particular minor type presented in the study as representing the underlying major types. The findings have implications for the design offuture equity studies.

Hume's Treatise of Human Nature is not only a canonical text of philosophy, but also a pioneering work of psychology, anticipating many findings of modern behavioural economics. According to Hume's theory of mind, the concept of rationality does not apply to choices or moral judgements. But in in his theory of justice, Hume explains preference reversals between smaller-sooner and larger-later options in terms of far-sighted 'true' preferences and psychologically-induced errors of short-sightedness. Anticipating a common idea in behavioural welfare economics, he proposes a role for government in helping individuals to overcome self-control problems in acting justly. I examine Hume's position and assess its coherence. I conclude that Hume's theory of mind is consistent and psychologically well-grounded, but does not support the concepts of true preference and error that appear in his theory of justice. However, the fundamental logic of that theory does not depend on assumptions about self-control problems.

This paper examines consumer preferences for the attributes of alternative sources of water supply in Chennai, based on a household survey where respondents were given the description of a set of options. Their decision to choose one of the options is examined using discrete choice models. Whether consumer preferences are hierarchical or lexicographic is also briefly examined. Access to a yard tap is considered to be a more important attribute than water quantity, quality and the provider (the private sector or public sector). In general, the estimated willingness to pay is substantially higher than the present monthly water expenditures. However, some consumers, specially those living in the peri-urban areas, do not seem to be willing to pay for water supply improvements. Among the plausible reasons are a lack of trust in the public utility or a manifestation of the equity politics in India (the peri-urban households claiming their entitlement to subsidized water), or the presence of preference reversal.

The scholarly traditions that explain the federal judicial state building in the United States are countered with a new theory of federal courts. A game theoretic Congressional centered account & a judicial court centered account are compared to the new approach of a jurisdiction game applied to the Fugitive Slave Act. The jurisdiction game puts the federalism back into federal court analysis by including the preferences of state voters, states rightists & moderns. The apparent preference reversals of antebellum abolitionists & slave holders, the passage of the Removal Act of 1875 & state sovereign immunity are integrated into the analysis. This model overcomes the current silence over the national versus state power in theories of federal courts. The integration of institutions & preferences is useful to explore the consequences for federal judicial power on deep preferences, although it says little about the origins of shifting passions & structure. Figures, Appendixes, References. J. Harwell