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Background In summer 2014, an autochthonous outbreak of dengue occurred in Tokyo, Japan, in which Yoyogi Park acted as the focal area of transmission. Recognizing the outbreak, concerted efforts were made to control viral spread, which included mosquito control, public announcement of the outbreak, and a total ban on entering the park. We sought to assess the effectiveness of these control measures. Methodology/Principal findings We used a mathematical model to describe the transmission dynamics. Using dates of exposure and illness onset, we categorized cases into three groups according to the availability of these datasets. The infection process was parametrically modeled by generation, and convolution of the infection process and the incubation period was fitted to the data. By estimating the effective reproduction number, we determined that the effect of dengue risk communication together with mosquito control from 28 August 2014 was insufficiently large to lower the reproduction number to below 1. However, once Yoyogi Park was closed on 4 September, the value of the effective reproduction number began to fall below 1, and the associated relative reduction in the effective reproduction number was estimated to be 20%-60%. The mean incubation period was an estimated 5.8 days. Conclusions/Significance Regardless of the assumed number of generations of cases, the combined effect of mosquito control, risk communication, and park closure appeared to be successful in interrupting the chain of dengue transmission in Tokyo. Author summary Evaluating the interventions implemented during an outbreak of mosquito-borne disease is of utmost importance, offering lessons for future control strategies. By retrospectively analyzing data of the first autochthonous dengue epidemic of the 21st century in Tokyo, Japan, we assessed the effectiveness of the interventions. Once a dengue outbreak was confirmed in late August 2014, the government of Japan took drastic mosquito control measures, targeting both adults and larvae. News of the outbreak was also widely disseminated via mass media along with experts' recommendations as to how people could avoid the risks of dengue infection. As the outbreak was not immediately controlled, the focal area of transmission, Yoyogi Park, was closed on 4 September. Using a mathematical model, we assessed how well dengue virus transmission was intervened in relation to the start times of interventions. As we incorporated precise timing into the model, we directly modeled the time of infection and accounted for the time delay from infection to illness onset. Thus, we revealed that mosquito control and risk communication measures alone could not interrupt the chain of transmission; however, adding park closure to these interventions was substantially effective in reducing the number of transmissions.

The availability of statistics on the number of S's enrolled for higher educ in countries other than their own is largely a product of the work of UNESCO. A distinction between the pol'al signif of study abroad & its intercultural signif needs to be made. Partly because of problems of definition (of foreign S, higher educ, & fields of study) & partly because of inadequate information from some countries, the number of foreign S's enrolled for higher educ can only broadly be reported as 120,000-166,000. About 95% of S's studying abroad are concentrated in the following 30 countries: 35,000-40,000, the US; 10,000-20,000, France, GB; 10,000-14,000, Argentina; 5,000-6,000, Federal Republic of Germany; 4,000-4,500, Switzerland; 3,500-4,000, Japan, Netherlands; 3,000-3,500, Austria, Canada, Mexico; 2,500-3,000, Egypt, Italy, Vatican; 2,000-2,500, India, Spain; 1,500-2,000, Australia, Philippines, Lebanon, Uruguay; 1,000-1,500, Belgium, Chile, Ireland, Portugal, South Africa; 500-1,000, Cuba, Hungary, Sweden, Syria, Venezuela. Estimates of the countries from which foreign S's come are as follows: 8,000-10,000, US; 7,000-8,000, French overseas territories, Canada, UK non-self-governing territories; 4,000-5,000, China, Federal Republic of Germany; 3,000-4,000, Greece, India, Korea; 2,000-3,000, Iran, GB; 1,000-2,000 Ceylon, Colombia, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela; 500-1,000, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Puerto Rico, South Africa, Sweden, Yugoslavia. The % of S's studying in various fields are: humanities including educ, 25-27; soc sci including law, 19-23; medical sci 15-18; engineering & technology, 15-16; natural sci's, 12-14; others, 6-10. From 15%-20% of S's studying abroad are F. The largest number of scholarships for foreign S's in the yr 1955-56 were provided by the US, France, Egypt, Turkey, GB, & Sweden. Other scholarships were provided by international org's such as the UN. A diff conception of the signif of the above figures is obtained if they are related to the total enrollments for higher educ in each of the participating countries. In these terms (the foreign S's in US Coll's & U's represent only 1.5% of the (total - sum) enrollment). The corresponding figure for GB is 10.7%; for France, 10.3%; for Austria, 18%; for Switzerland, 25.3% for India, 0.4%; & for Japan, 0.7%. B. J. Keeley.

This book presents insightful perspectives on the invocation, implementation and application of UN-approved financial sanctions and related issues. With contributions from academics, diplomats and UN panel experts, Yoshimura offers an analysis of how the UN financial sanctions have evolved, the different roles of various major international actors in agreeing and deploying them, and their success in achieving desired outcomes. It also sheds light on a vital role of Japan in the formulation and deployment of financial sanctions, as the third largest economy in the world with very limited armed forces and a pacifist constitution. Offering valuable consideration into one of the key implements of international law, this is an essential guide for scholars and practitioners in Diplomacy and International Relations.

In 'Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Regional Challenges and Cooperation', Suk Kyoon Kim provides an important multidisciplinary perspective on maritime disputes in one of the most dynamic areas of the world: Northeast Asia, a region of divergent political and economic systems where the legacy of a tumultuous past continues to overshadow current events. The text highlights maritime issues on the Korean Peninsula and extends an analytical eye to neighboring China, Japan and Russia. Kim explores in-depth the factors and issues at stake with complex maritime disputes, focusing on maritime boundary delimitation, territory, energy resources, fishery, marine pollution, and security and safety. This volume provides a timely international law perspective informed by an intricate historical, political, and socio-economic context, while offering a vision for future cooperation

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980S, MOST ANALYSTS OF EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THOUGHT THAT THE REGIONAL CONFIGURATION OF POWER WHICH HAD EMERGED AT THE END OF THE 1970S WOULD ENDURE THROUGHOUT THIS DECADE AND BEYOND. THIS NEW CONFIGURATION WAS A RESPONSE TO THE GROWING SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND VIETNAM'S EXPANSIONIST AMBITIONS AND WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A QUASI-ALLIANCE AMONG THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND CHINA IN NORTHEAST ASIA SUPPORTED BY GROWING LINKS WITH THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN), A GROUP OF NON-COMMUNIST STATES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. RECENTLY, DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST ASIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HAVE SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT CURRENT POWER ALIGNMENTS MAY BE LESS DURABLE THAN PREDICTED. GROWING STRAINS AMONG WASHINGTON, TOKYO, AND BEIJING HAVE RAISED DOUBTS ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THEIR QUASI-ALLIANCE.

Das kapitalistische System in seiner imperialistischen Ausdehnung hat die ökonomische Rolle der Frau in einigen asiatischen Gesellschaften entscheidend beeinträchtigt. Dieser Prozeß wirkt direkt auf die geschlechtsspezifische Arbeitsverteilung und Machtstruktur in den Metropolen zurück. In den vorkolonialen Gesellschaften Thailands, Indonesiens und Japans waren die Frauen wichtige Trägerinnen der hauswirtschaftlichen Subsistenzproduktion und besaßen eine relativ große Verfügungsgewalt und Artikulationsmöglichkeit in der Dorfgemeinschaft. Obwohl sie grundsätzlich den Männern unterstellt waren, hatte die Hierarchie des Alters Vorrang vor der des Geschlechts. Die hauswirtschaftliche Subsistenzökonomie wurde durch den Kolonialismus und die Unterordnung unter den Weltmarkt aufgelöst bzw. deformiert. Gemeinsam mit den an der Ausbeutung beteiligten einheimischen Eliten zerstörten die imperialistischen Staaten die Subsistenzwirtschaft als integrierte Wirtschaftsform, indem sie sie für das kapitalistische System funktionalisierten. Ihr obliegt nunmehr primär die Produktion und Reproduktion von Arbeitskraft für das Kapital. Das Eindringen von Kapital in diese Länder führte zu Migrationsbewegungen in die Städte, wo vorher in der Subsistenzwirtschaft beschäftigte Frauen und Mädchen Arbeit entweder als Dienstmädchen im Haushalt, in der Industrie oder in der Prostitution fanden. Die zugewanderten Frauen in den Städten sind einer doppelten Diskriminierung - als billigste Arbeitskräfte und als Objekt sexueller Ausbeutung - ausgesetzt und haben den Rückhalt dörflicher Systeme der Frauenkooperation und -solidarität verloren. Frauenarbeit wird tendenziell aufgesplittert in wachsende Reproduktionsarbeit (Hauswirtschaft), Lohnarbeit und sexuelle Arbeit (Prostitution). Damit einher geht ein Bedeutungsverlust der Frauen als soziale Kraft in der Dorfgemeinschaft. (HH)

Auch nach dem Gipfeltreffen von US-Präsident Donald Trump und Nordkoreas Staatschef Kim Jong Un am 12. Juni 2018 in Singapur zählt die Krise um Nordkoreas Atom- und Massenvernichtungswaffenprogramm zu den gefährlichsten und komplexesten der Welt. Im Zentrum des Konflikts steht das ungeklärte, angespannte Verhältnis zwischen Nordkorea und den USA, fokussiert auf das Thema Atomwaffenbesitz. Darum gruppieren sich weitere Konfliktlagen, die durch gegenläufige Interessen Chinas, Japans, Nordkoreas, Russlands, Südkoreas und der USA gekennzeichnet sind. Zudem gibt es etwa zwischen Konfliktlagen in der Sicherheits-, Menschenrechts- und Wirtschaftspolitik vielfältige Wechselwirkungen. Für Deutschland und Europa ist eine friedliche Lösung des Konflikts - oder zumindest die Vermeidung einer militärischen Eskalation - von zentraler Bedeutung. Europa kann und sollte darauf hinwirken, dass Nordkorea als Herausforderung für die globalen Ordnungsstrukturen behandelt wird. Eine Bearbeitung der unter den Begriff "Nordkorea-Konflikt" subsumierten Problemlagen, die darauf zielt, einen Krieg zu vermeiden, die globalen Ordnungsstrukturen zu festigen und die Situation der Menschen in Nordkorea zu verbessern, erfordert einen langen Atem und wird nur schrittweise Erfolge zeitigen.

Inhaltsangabe:Introduction: We are living in an internationalized world; global trade keeps increasing and more companies from many countries around the world are going national at an astounding rate. This is a reflection of strong economic growth around the world and the globalization of the economy and corporations. Offices are spread from one continent to another and travel is essential to business. This is the reason why "business travel is increasing," states Hubert Joly, president and chief executive officer of CWT. In today's business world, you might well find yourself as an international manager in a foreign subsidiary of an American firm, facing on a daily basis all aspects of international management. Or you could end up at the home office in Germany coordinating operations with foreign affiliates. Or you could travel to countries like Japan or China, negotiating export sales or dealing with suppliers, customers, or franchise parties. Many different kinds of positions are available in the global arena, and training in international and cross-cultural management and negotiation styles is becoming a critical ingredient in moving up to high-level positions in global organizations. "In 2006, a record 30.1 million U.S. travelers visited overseas markets, an increase of five percent from 2005." One of the top five overseas markets visited by U.S. travelers in 2006 was Germany. China (if combining travel the PRC and Hong Kong) would have tied as second. Contributing to the new record for outbound travel, seven of the top 20 U.S. outbound destination markets posted records in 2006, including Japan and China. Hundreds of thousands of jobs in the Germany owe their existence and sustainment to business travel. In Germany, the effects of a growing European Union and worldwide business travel create a stable demand for modern transport infrastructures and services. The USA is one of the two most important business travel destinations for the German economy, closely followed by China. Two markets will dominate travel interests in the future: the USA and China. No other countries will be as important for business trips as these two different giants. China's economy still enjoys a huge growing potential although its gross domestic product (GDP) has maintained a double-digit growth for four straight years and hit a new high of 10.7 in the first three quarters of 2006. The growth rate of China's labor productivity stood at 9.5 percent last year, beating all other countries across the world. Since undergoing reform and being made more open, however, the speed of economic development has increased by an average of about 10% each year for the past twenty years. The challenge is that even with all the good will in the world, miscommunication is likely to happen, especially when there are significant cultural differences between communicators, such as from the United States, Germany, China and Japan. Whatever the size or nature of a firm, it is clear that an increasing number of managers around the world will be involved in international business. That involvement will include both foreign and/or domestic assignments requiring interactions with people and firms from other countries. The objective of this thesis is to understand and improve the interaction of businessmen from the four largest economies of the world - the United States, Japan, Germany and China. Furthermore it is tried to explain, describe, and compare cultural differences, identify culturally communication and negotiation practices, and to use effective cross-cultural negotiation techniques and strategies within countries and cultures in international business settings. Knowing how even small differences in culture might cause huge misunderstandings in everyday business life, we can foresee them, and hopefully make better communication and negotiation with our business relations in other cultures.Inhaltsverzeichnis:Table of Contents: Table of ContentsII List of FiguresIV List of TablesV List of AbbreviationsVI Introduction1 PART I Culture5 1.Definition of Culture5 2.Models to Classify Cultures7 2.1Cultural Dimensions according to Hofstede7 2.1.1Power Distance Index7 2.1.2Individualism - Collectivism8 2.1.3Uncertainty Avoidance Index8 2.1.4Masculinity - Femininity9 2.1.5Long-Term Orientation10 2.1.6Hofstede's Dimensions for the United States11 2.1.7Hofstede's Dimensions for Germany11 2.1.8Hofstede's Dimensions for Japan12 2.1.9Hofstede's Dimensions for China12 2.2The Iceberg Model of Culture13 2.3The Trompenaars' Model of Cultural Orientation14 PART II Negotiation and Communication Styles19 3.Time Conceptualization / Cultural Time Differences19 3.1Monochronic vs. Polychronic Time21 3.2Interactions between M-time and P-time Cultures24 3.3Working Times25 3.4Paid Annual Leave28 4.Nonverbal Communication31 4.1Body Language and Gestures31 4.2Greetings35 4.3Touch and Personal Space38 5.Cross-Cultural Etiquette42 5.1Table Etiquette / Table Manners42 5.2Dress Etiquette50 5.3Gift-Giving Etiquette53 6.The Do's and Don'ts of Business Behavior59 7.High-Context vs. Low-Context Cultures71 8.Face and Face Saving76 PART III Barriers to Cross-Cultural Communication83 9.Stereotypes and Prejudices83 9.1Definition of Stereotypes and Prejudices83 9.2Origins of Stereotypes87 9.3"Sophisticated" Stereotypes88 9.4Stereotypes Change90 10.Cross-Cultural Communication Problems92 10.1Language Difficulties92 10.2Cultural Barriers93 10.3Sentence Structure Differences94 10.4Nonverbal Communication Problems95 10.5Difficulties with Idioms95 10.6Reasons for Communication Problems97 10.6.1Potential Solutions98 Conclusion101 BibliographyVII Online SourcesXITextprobe:Text Sample: Chapter 3.3, Working Times: The working times and ethics of the four countries Japan, Germany, the United States and China differ greatly. In big Japanese cities, long working days (12 hours is typical) and long careers (a lifetime in the same company) are common. They use time to build harmonious agreements and harmonious relationships with each other. This means, effectively, putting people first. The Western visitor may think he is wasting yet more time on wining and dining after the official work day is over, while he is stuck between apparently inconclusive meetings and the final business decision.1 However, that time is everything but wasted. The kind of stiff patterns and conventions of Japanese office life fall away and the people can easier get in touch with each other. Japanese businessmen consider this also as a way to relieve business stress. The German view of time is extremely integrated with careful scheduling. Delegation, although practiced with thoroughness, usually has strings attached. This organization can make innovative decisions painful, since the subordinate's decision time with his boss is kept separate from his communication time with the business partner. The junior employee has full authority over an agreed and accorded range of decisions, but that range can never include the unexpected. If the employee takes the conservative way and blocks the upward progress of a surprise proposal of a foreign business partner, the answer they get to hear is always "I am not empowered to bring this matter to my boss's attention," the business negotiations are stuck. Even if German employees try the back door, and the boss likes the idea, he will be reluctant to overrule his subordinate. The economic emergency of the pas-war years when rules were frequently broken in order to get an urgent job done, was a long time ago. The German attitude to time is changing. Germans leave the office on time and keep themselves freehanded holidays. According to a senior manager of a German car firm: "Japanese competition is really unfair. We work efficiently; they work efficiently and long." Flexibility, enthusiasm, and teamwork are very important in the U.S. workplace. In general, Americans consider working and being productive very important and being busy as well as working extensively may also serve as their way of obtaining self-esteem. Speed in decision-making is in opposite proportion to bureaucracy. "North American industry is often hung on top-down decision-making systems; "why change a winning formula?" is a rhetorical question most frequently asked by the man at the top who invented the formula. For all their protestations about time being money, American middle managers frequently disappoint by their hesitations and procrastination." The decision making process of Chinese businessmen is slow. Foreigners should not expect to conclude their business quickly. Many Chinese will want to refer to the stars or wait for a lucky day before they make a decision. Basically nothing is possible without "guanxi" in China. "Guanxi" means "relations" and it stands for connections defined by reciprocity and mutual obligations." The basis of a contact varies. New relations must be raised intensively and carefully--for example, with invitations for dinners and with small favors or presents, as these will keep the relationship going. All business is personal: it is essential for success or failure to have "guanxi" and belong to a social network. The Chinese separate people into two groups: we and the others, no matter how it is in business life or in private life. Everything is based on reciprocal trust and accomplishment. The time it takes to establish such "guanxi" relationships is often underrated. Westerners should allow for adequate time in their business travels to establish and nurture their relations. Time spent by Western businessmen in building relationships is honored by the Chinese side. "The more time one invests in establishing good relations with business partners, the more important the partners feel and consequently the more face you give them." It is very difficult to compare the actual hours worked, because of a lack of uniform statistics. A major problem is that in some cases national figures distinguish between full- and part-time workers and in others they do not. Possibly, the best way of comparing working time among businessmen from Germany, Japan and the USA, is to look at annual working hours. The Japan Institute of Labor (JIL), based on several national figures, has produced estimates for annual total hours actually worked for Japan, the USA and Germany. The annual number of hours actually worked was 1,970 in Japan in 2000, which was virtually on par with the USA at 1,986 hours. Germany was far behind with 1,525 hours (1999). Therefore the average American worked about 450 hours more than the average German. Figures for average collectively agreed annual working hours are available from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) for eight European Union (EU) countries where working time is measured on this basis, while JIL has produced figures for "scheduled" annual working hours in Japan and the USA. Allowing for differences in calculation methods, the Table 6 shows that the differences among the EU countries, Japan and the USA are generally far less when considering normal/scheduled hours than for actual hours. This indicates that the differences between Germany, Japan and the USA lie more in the overtime and additional hours worked. Chapter 3.4, Paid Annual Leave: The amount of paid annual leave to which workers are entitled is another important aspect of working time (a factor which obviously influences the annual duration of working time). In the EU, figures are available from EIRO for the average number of days of collective agreed annual leave. These show an average annual leave entitlement in 2001 of 25.7 days. Germans have a 30-day average. For Japan, figures are available from JIL on the average paid holiday entitlement, which were 18.0 days in 2000. Nevertheless, entitled holidays in Japan are actually not taken. In 2000, only 49.5% of annual leave entitlement (8.9 days) was taken on average. The latest figures available for the USA from the U.S. Department of Labor are the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). They refer to 2001 and cover "average vacation days" in the medium and large private sector. No total figure is available for all workers, but separate ones for varying lengths of service. Therefore, annual vacation days stood at 9.6 days at one year's service, 13.8 days at five years' service, 16.9 days at 10 years' service and 20.3 days at 20 years' service. Special attention has been given to the issue of extensive working hours in China, but the extent and nature of the situation has never been fully understood. There has not been much information provided on exactly what feelings the Chinese workers have towards their working time. Also, depending on the length of the service, the annual paid leave varies between 5 and 15 days. The standard of annual working hours has been estimated to be set as 2,000 hours. The weekly working hours of employees with local urban household registration were found to be 44.2 hours, making it the shortest working time. Employees with rural household registration had the longest weekly working time which was 48.4 hours. The variable time is much more complex than it is possible to convey. It influences the course of communications, and can be responsible for conflict or the escalation of conflict when it leads to miscommunication or misinterpretation. A culturally-fluent approach to conflict means working over time to understand these and other ways communication varies across cultures, and applying these understandings in order to enhance business relationships among those from different countries.

More than ten years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, none of the major powers, including Russia, has developed a cohesive geopolitical strategy for dealing with the countries and regions that once made up the USSR. Even after September 11 and the sudden importance of Central Asia in the struggle against global terrorism, the United States continues to deal with the region in fragmented and incomplete ways. Thinking Strategically, the first volume in a series focusing on security challenges posed by the former Soviet Union, addresses the economic, political, and security interests at stake in Kazakhstan for Russia, the US, China, Europe, and Japan.Kazakhstan presents an interesting case study both because of its role as a pivot point between Russia and the world beyond and because of its position in Central Asia. The contributors to this book call it variously a buffer, a meeting place, a bridge, a gateway, and a strategic arena. Because of its internal problems--which include great economic uncertainty despite vast oil wealth, a disintegrating infrastructure, and the potential for internal instability--and its geopolitical position, Kazakhstan and the region of Central Asia present a complex set of opportunities and dangers for the major powers.The authors of each chapter, who come from Russia, the United States, China, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Kazakhstan, address the security challenges posed by Kazakhstan and Central Asia from the point of view of their respective countries or regions. From the Russian perspective, for example, Kazakhstan itself is central--as a bulwark against instability and a close economic partner--and Central Asia subordinate; other countries tend to view the entire Central Asia region strategically.

Abstract
From a perspective of change in the institution's function, the history of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) can be divided into four periods: 1989–1995, 1996–2001, 2001–2006, and 2007–present. APEC's activities in each of these periods have been organized around major themes: respectively, the establishment of guidelines for liberalization; the implementation of liberalization measures; security issues such as counter-terrorism; and the establishment of a free trade area. American political will can be seen as a major driving force behind these changes in APEC's agenda-setting. However, norm setting during the first and second periods encountered objections from China and Japan, respectively. During the third period, the Bush administration's interest in combating terrorism through APEC was not supported by Asian members, who emphasized APEC's primary role as a framework for economic cooperation, instead placed higher priorities on East Asian regionalism that excluded the US. In light of this shift, in the fourth period, the US once again urged that APEC should be used as a framework for liberalization and pushed for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). This period saw the discriminatory, legally-binding and reciprocity-based norms for trade liberalization take root in APEC, resulting largely from the American coalition-building approach through the promotion of the TPP as an existing integration framework. This has helped to create a critical mass while competition with China over regional trade policies becomes more intense, demonstrating the case where the US successfully set its own preferred agenda and norm together for the first time.

China has a complex relationship with its neighbours. With its increasing power, past problems have resurfaced, which will strain relationships between China and its neighbours. As its rise disturbs the balance of power within the region, Japan, South Korea and other regional powers will bear mixed feelings towards its growing regional influence. Despite China's emphasis on a "peaceful rise", the international system is always interpreted as a zero-sum game. From this perspective, China's increasing influence in East Asia comes at the expense of other powers, as this article explains. By exploring both old and new problems between China and its East Asian neighbours, this article analyses the difficulties that China's rise and other controversial issues in the region present. (China/GIGA)

Dragged down in important part by disapproval over the U.S. position on the Gaza war, the popular image of the United States abroad has declined over the past year, according to a new poll of public opinion in 34 countries released Tuesday by the Pew Research Center.The survey, the latest in an annual series that dates back more than two decades, also found that international confidence in U.S. democracy has fallen. A median of four in ten of the more than 40,000 respondents said U.S. democracy used to be a good model for other countries to follow but no longer is. That view was most pronounced in the ten European countries covered by the poll.This year's survey also found that respondents in 24 of the countries have more confidence in President Joe Biden to "do the right thing" in world affairs than they have in his rival, former President Donald Trump, while Trump was favored over Biden in two countries (Hungary and Tunisia). It found that there was no significant difference in confidence in the two men in the remaining eight countries.At the same time, however, confidence in Biden's stewardship of international issues fell over the past year in 14 of the 21 countries that were polled by Pew both this year and in 2023, by double digits in eight of the countries, notably South Africa, Australia, the UK, Poland, Sweden, Spain, Israel, and Japan.The survey was conducted from early January this year through the latter part of May. In addition to Hungary, the UK, Poland, Sweden, and Spain, European countries included France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the Netherlands. In the Americas, the poll covered Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.In the Asia-Pacific region, ten countries were polled. In addition to Australia and Japan, they included Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Besides South Africa, sub-Saharan African countries included Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria.Overall, views of the United States remained more positive than negative across all of the countries with a median of 54% of respondents offering a favorable opinion, with the most positive ratings found in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. In ten of the 21 countries that were also surveyed last year, however, favorable views fell by six percentage points or more, with the biggest declines found in Australia, Israel, South Africa, and Germany. As for confidence in Biden "to do the right thing" in world affairs, confidence was highest in sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South Africa where opinions were evenly split. In the Middle East, on the other hand, nearly 90% of respondents in both Turkey and Tunisia said they had "no confidence" in the U.S. president whose ratings were also mostly negative in Latin America (with the exception of Colombia), southern Europe, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, France and Hungary.Of five specific issues on which respondents were asked to rate Biden's performance, by far the most negative appraisals were related to his handling of the Gaza war. A median of 31% across the 34 countries said they approve of his conduct in that conflict, while a median of 57% said they disapproved. The most negative assessments were recorded in predominantly Muslim Turkey (8% approval), Tunisia (5%), and Malaysia (15%). Twenty-five percent or less of respondents in Hungary, Italy, Peru, Mexico, and Chile also said they approved of Biden's policy on Gaza.With respect to the war in Ukraine, a median of 39% of respondents voiced approval of Biden's policies. The most positive views of his performance in that war were recorded in Canada and Europe, particularly in Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and the UK. In Asia, views were most favorable in Japan and South Korea, although they still fell short of 50%. As with Ukraine, a median of 39% of respondents said they approved of Biden's approach to China with his strongest support of around 50% coming from respondents in Poland, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Kenya, and Nigeria.Asked to rate their confidence in four current national leaders "to do the right thing" in world affairs, French President Emmanuel Macron scored highest at 44% of all respondents, followed closely by Biden at 43% . Chinese President Xi Jinping received a median confidence score of 24%, and Russian President Vladimir Putin placed lowest at 21%. The lowest confidence scores for Putin came from European respondents (with the exception of Greece), Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Brazil, and Chile. European respondents also gave Xi poor marks, as did respondents in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Turkey, Brazil, and Chile.

A search for a right-handed gauge boson W-R, decaying into a boosted right-handed heavy neutrino N-R, in the framework of Left-Right Symmetric Models is presented. It is based on data from proton-proton collisions with a centre-of-mass energy of 13 TeV collected by the ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider during the years 2015, 2016 and 2017, corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 80 fb(-1). The search is performed separately for electrons and muons in the final state. A distinguishing feature of the search is the use of large-radius jets containing electrons. Selections based on the signal topology result in smaller background compared to the expected signal. No significant deviation from the Standard Model prediction is observed and lower limits are set in the W-R and N-R mass plane. Mass values of the W-R smaller than 3.8-5 TeV are excluded for N-R in the mass range 0.1-1.8 TeV. (C) 2019 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. ; ANPCyT, Argentina ANPCyT; YerPhI, Armenia; ARC, Australia Australian Research Council; BMWFW, Austria; FWF, Austria Austrian Science Fund (FWF); ANAS, Azerbaijan Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences (ANAS); SSTC, Belarus; CNPq, Brazil National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq); FAPESP, Brazil Fundacao de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de Sao Paulo (FAPESP); NSERC, Canada Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada; NRC, Canada; CFI, Canada Canada Foundation for Innovation; CERN; CONICYT, Chile Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT); CAS, China Chinese Academy of Sciences; MOST, China Ministry of Science and Technology, China; NSFC, China National Natural Science Foundation of China; COLCIENCIAS, Colombia Departamento Administrativo de Ciencia, Tecnologia e Innovacion Colciencias; MSMT CR, Czech Republic Ministry of Education, Youth & Sports - Czech Republic Czech Republic Government; MPO CR, Czech Republic Czech Republic Government; VSC CR, Czech Republic Czech Republic Government; DNRF, Denmark; DNSRC, Denmark Danish Natural Science Research Council; IN2P3-CNRS, CEA-DRF/IRFU, France; SRNSFG, Georgia; BMBF, Germany Federal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF); HGF, Germany; MPG, Germany Max Planck Society; GSRT, Greece Greek Ministry of Development-GSRT; RGC, Hong Kong SAR, China Hong Kong Research Grants Council; ISF, Israel Israel Science Foundation; Benoziyo Center, Israel; INFN, Italy Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare; MEXT, Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (MEXT); JSPS, Japan Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan (MEXT)Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; CNRST, Morocco; NWO, Netherlands Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)Netherlands Government; RCN, Norway; MNiSW, Poland Ministry of Science and Higher Education, Poland; NCN, Poland; FCT, Portugal Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia (FCT); MNE/IFA, Romania; MES of Russia, Russian Federation Russian Federation; NRC KI, Russian Federation; JINR; MESTD, Serbia; MSSR, Slovakia; ARRS, Slovenia Slovenian Research Agency - Slovenia; MIZS, Slovenia; DST/NRF, South Africa; MINECO, Spain; SRC, Sweden; Wallenberg Foundation, Sweden; SERI, Switzerland; SNSF, Switzerland Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF); Canton of Bern, Switzerland; Canton of Geneva, Switzerland; MOST, Taiwan Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan; TAEK, Turkey Ministry of Energy & Natural Resources - Turkey; STFC, United Kingdom Science & Technology Facilities Council (STFC); DOE, United States of America United States Department of Energy (DOE); NSF, United States of America National Science Foundation (NSF); BCKDF, Canada; Canarie, Canada; CRC, Canada; Compute Canada, Canada; COST, European Union; ERC, European Union European Union (EU)European Research Council (ERC); ERDF, European Union European Union (EU); Horizon 2020, European Union; Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions, European Union European Union (EU); Investissements d' Avenir Labex and Idex, ANR, France French National Research Agency (ANR); DFG, Germany German Research Foundation (DFG); AvH Foundation, Germany Alexander von Humboldt Foundation; EU-ESF, Greece; Greek NSRF, Greece; BSFNSF, Israel; GIF, Israel German-Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development; CERCA Programme Generalitat de Catalunya, Spain; Royal Society, United KingdomRoyal Society of London; Leverhulme Trust, United Kingdom Leverhulme Trust; Herakleitos programme; Thales programme; Aristeia programme ; Open access journal ; This item from the UA Faculty Publications collection is made available by the University of Arizona with support from the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact us at repository@u.library.arizona.edu.