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Intro -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Introduction -- 1: The International Economic Crisis -- Introduction -- Failure to Overcome the Crisis of 1973 -- The Financial Sphere's Choice (Public Borrowing and Financialization) -- The Crisis of Financialization -- The European Crisis -- References -- 2: The Greek Crisis -- Introduction -- On the Bloated Public Sector, Excessively High Wages and Other Such -- The Real Problem: The Lack of Competitiveness of Greek Capitalism and the Aggravation of This Phenomenon in Times of Crisis -- The Crisis in the Current Account Balance -- On the Question of Debt -- The Question of the Public Deficit and the Role of Taxation -- The Banking System -- The Coming of the Crisis -- References -- 3: Addressing the Crisis Through Support Packages and Memoranda -- 4: Changes in the Economy -- Introduction -- The Evolution of Key Elements in the Greek Economy -- The Situation in Individual Sectors and Subsectors -- The Survival and Growth of the Most Competitive Oligopolistic Enterprises -- References -- 5: The Social Impact of the Crisis -- Introduction -- Impact on Income -- The Changes in Labour Relations -- The Rise in Unemployment -- The Distribution of Wealth and the Growth of Social Inequalities -- The Growth of Poverty -- The Crisis in Health Care -- References -- 6: Change in Social Stratification in the Greece of Crisis (2009-2017) -- Introduction -- The Theoretical Framework -- Changes in Social Stratification -- References -- 7: Transformations in the State -- Introduction -- The International Context -- The Issue of Authoritarian Statism -- What Are the Characteristics of Authoritarian Statism? -- The Role of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the EU -- Authoritarian Transformation of the Greek State -- Changes in the Internal Operation of State Mechanisms.

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Publisher -- Front Matter -- List of Supporters -- Contents -- Introduction -- PART I - From the Beginnings of Globalisation to the Middle Ages: The Geographical and Systemic Expansion of the Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Radius of Action -- CHAPTER 1 - Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Vikings, and the Hanseatic League -- Phoenician Trading Activities, Colonies, and the Establishment of Towns: Forerunners of Globalisation in the Mediterranean -- Hellenisation of the World and the First Phase of Globalisation -- More than 200 Years of Globalisation under the Leadership of Rome -- Venice as the New Centre of the Globalisation Process in the Mediterranean -- The Vikings as Precursors of the First Phase of Globalisation in Northern Europe -- The Rise and Fall of the Hanseatic League -- The Importance of External and Internal Peace for the Globalisation Process -- Globalisation and the Protection of Trade Routes -- Cities as a Driving Force in the Globalisation Process -- The Importance of an Adequate Infrastructure -- Globalisation, Technical Progress and Financial Innovations -- Economic and Social Adaptability as Determinants for Lasting Success or Decline -- CHAPTER 2 - Hamburg's Road to Becoming a Major Hanseatic City -- Speculation about Hammaburg -- A Fresh Start in the Second Half of the 12th Century -- Hamburg a Blind Spot in World Economic Development -- Hamburg: Lübeck's North Sea Port -- 1266: The Hanseatic City of Hamburg -- The Wendish Monetary Union: A Common Northwest European Currency -- The Need for Safe and Free Shipping on the River Elbe -- The Permanent Battle against Privateers and Pirates -- Hamburg: The European Beer Capital -- Advantages of a Diversified Economic Structure -- The Costs of Protectionism -- Hamburg Thrives - Lübeck Stagnates

After the global financial crisis in 2008-2010, the governance framework of the European Union's economic and fiscal policy has undergone several changes. The Stability and Growth Pact - the core of the EU's fiscal governance framework - has been reinforced by the "sixpack", the "two-pack", the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, and the rules are grounded in the European Semester process. After 10 years since the initial major changes were introduced into the EU's legislative framework and given the current times of fiscal uncertainty as well as ongoing discussions on revising and improving the Stability and Growth Pact rules once again, it is of utmost importance to understand the impacts these past reforms have had on member states in the first place. The paper serves two purposes. First and foremost, the main goal of the paper is to build on the existing knowledge on Europeanization in order to bring into one single framework a whole set of different policy measures and their potential impact on the member state's budgeting processes. Secondly, the theoretical discussion is followed by an empirical case study of Estonia. The case study not only illustrated and mapped out potential impacts that the EU's economic and fiscal governance measures can have on a national budgetary process and demonstrated the potential degree of domestic change in response to these various policy measures, but also provided preliminary insights in the possible mediating factors that could additionally influence domestic adaption.

AbstractThe 2010–2012 euro crisis prompted a wave of institutional reforms in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), and one of the most remarkable changes was the creation of a permanent bailout facility for troubled sovereigns. The birth of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 was preceded by harsh debates, reflecting a conflict between a German view of country-level responsibility and French-Italian calls for more risk sharing. These tensions have remained ever since, which was also highlighted by conflicts regarding the ESMs overhaul at the end of 2019. Concerns of Italy then drew attention to the fact that a wide range of issues prevented the community from finalizing the post-crisis structure of the eurozone. This paper focuses on the evolution of the EMU financial assistance framework up until the latest efforts for its reform. We analyse the impact of related policy announcements on changes in sovereign bond yields of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland (i.e. the most vulnerable countries during the euro crisis). Our findings show that news on bailout arrangements significantly contributed to a contemporaneous moderation of periphery bond yields, especially in the case of shorter maturities. This result hints at the role of common facilities in supporting financial stability. To enhance this feature, a 'package approach' (i.e. multiple reforms together, as stressed by Italy) may well need to be considered. Such a broad perspective can help strengthen the euro area once the acute threat of the coronavirus pandemic is averted.

French President Emmanuel Macron has announced his goal of revitalising Franco-German relations and founding a 'new partnership' between Paris and Berlin. However, in foreign and security policy, and in certain areas of his Europe policy, this aspiration has rarely been fulfilled. The main reasons are structural changes in international relations, which the French and German sides have reacted to differently. Paris is looking for new ways of preserving its autonomy in defence policy and of filling the strategic vacuum that has been created by the waning US interest in Europe and its periphery. Berlin emphasises the development of NATO and the EU as fundamental organisations for German foreign policy. Reconciling bilateral interests is also complicated by national solo efforts, indifference, and inadequate exchange of experience. The first precondition for intensifying bilateral cooperation is for Paris and Berlin to conduct a comprehensive review of the international conflict situation in their existing cooperation formats as regards foreign and security policy. The two governments need to discuss openly to what extent their national interests are concerned, and then determine concrete measures. Second, they must refrain from national solo efforts and be sensitive to the other's pressure points in foreign, security and Europe policy. The Franco-German Parliamentary Assembly needs to urge the executive of both countries to fulfil the Élysée Treaty and the Aachen Treaty. The findings presented here will be complemented by case studies on Libya, the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Economic and Monetary Union, Russia, NATO, and Turkey.

Before the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, discussions were already taking place on how to complete Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and increase its resilience, inter alia, by speeding up economic convergence. The impact of the current unprecedented crisis on the euro area economy has given the debate new impetus. As a contribution to this topic - and without going into details of new mechanisms for crisis resolution - this paper analyses the role of fiscal transfers in real and business cycle convergence at a regional level. The paper distinguishes between net fiscal transfers - a broad measure defined as the ratio between disposable and primary incomes - and EU structural and investment funds. It provides evidence that net fiscal transfers have contributed to income redistribution across regions and to faster convergence in disposable incomes, although not to higher economic growth and real convergence. More positive evidence has been found for the role of the EU structural and investment funds over the medium term, based on the newly available - and richest so far - European Commission database. Going forward, in addition to efficiency considerations, which are important for real convergence, recommendations on the size and allocation of fiscal transfers should account for their impact on the business cycle. At the same time, in the longer run, it should be borne in mind that fiscal transfers are no substitute for genuine structural reforms and sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies when it comes to promoting sustainable economic growth and convergence.

Growing imbalances in the balance of payments of the euro countries are usually attributed to the divergence in competitiveness related to unequal increases of wages or unit wage costs in member states. However, an empirical analysis of international trade and portfolio investment data shows that the growing current account deficits in countries like Greece, Spain, and Portugal up to the recent crisis were rather due to growing capital exports from countries like Germany and France. Moreover, economic divergences are not so much the result of direct competition between the countries of the eurozone but rather due to their unequal integration into the changing international division of labour. While German producers profited a lot from the transformation in regions like Eastern Europe and China, producers in Southern Europe came under increasing pressure by new competitors in other low-wage areas. Even if to a different extent, the relative importance of the eurozone as a market and an area of investment has declined for all the member states analyzed here. The growing economic and political contradictions in the eurozone are leading to different scenarios, depending on the development of the balance of forces: There could be a deepening of the integration of the eurozone member countries, but also the exit of single countries from the eurozone. Depending on the political balance of forces, ruptures with the current regime of the monetary union and with the European treaties could have very different meanings for the social classes.

"Growing imbalances in the balance of payments of the euro countries are usually attributed to the divergence in competitiveness related to unequal increases of wages or unit wage costs in member states. However, an empirical analysis of international trade and portfolio investment data shows that the growing current account deficits in countries like Greece, Spain, and Portugal up to the recent crisis were rather due to growing capital exports from countries like Germany and France. Moreover, economic divergences are not so much the result of direct competition between the countries of the eurozone but rather due to their unequal integration into the changing international division of labour. While German producers profited a lot from the transformation in regions like Eastern Europe and China, producers in Southern Europe came under increasing pressure by new competitors in other low-wage areas. Even if to a different extent, the relative importance of the eurozone as a market and an area of investment has declined for all the member states analyzed here. The growing economic and political contradictions in the eurozone are leading to different scenarios, depending on the development of the balance of forces: there could be a deepening of the integration of the eurozone member countries, but also the exit of single countries from the eurozone. Depending on the political balance of forces, ruptures with the current regime of the monetary union and with the European treaties could have very different meanings for the social classes." (author's abstract)

It is argued here that the younger generation of One Nation Conservatives made a concerted effort to conform to the requirements of the free market agenda of the Thatcher governments during the 1980s. This served to distinguish them from the older generation of wets who had preceded them in the cabinet and who had been more inclined to engage in coded criticism of that agenda. The younger One Nation Conservatives knew that they had to conform if they wanted to hold office and the problems which Britain faced gave them a structural, as well as a personal, motive for conformity. Their willingness to conform made them important members of the second and third Thatcher governments. They provided a renewed radical impetus to government policy in the mid and late 1980s, which culminated in the introduction of the community charge or poll tax, and they possessed the communication skills needed to promote those policies in public. The efforts which the younger generation of One Nation Conservatives made to conform in the sphere of domestic economic policy were undone, after Thatcher had been replaced by Major in November 1990, by the issue on which they retained their distinctiveness: Europe. Their continued expression of pro‐European views became a problem for them after Thatcher had recoiled from the prospect of economic and monetary union in the late 1980s, because it proved to those on the right of the Conservative Party that they were not really 'one of us' at all.

This essay starts, after a short introduction on the importance and dimensions of "inclusive growth", with a brief empirical sketch on to what extent Europe has already succeeded with respect to this ambitious goal. The result is quite sobering and gives rise to the question: why is it so? The main part of this paper is devoted to answering this question by presenting a model based on the trade-off between comparable productive capacity (CPC) and flexibility. After the introduction of the monetary union, this trade-off sharpened for many EU member states whose CPC now falls below the fair level playing field. To compensate for the lack of comparable productive capacities, flexibility measures would be necessary (e.g. downward wage flexibility, regional mobility and cuts in social expenditures) to an extent which is unrealistic or would erode social cohesion and democracy. As alternative, the possible future role of the European Social Model could consist of the implementation of four strategies: First, investive social transfers, in particular by establishing a European Fund for Employment and Income Security (EIS) to strengthen the inclusive function and stabilisation impact of national unemployment insurance systems; second, protected flexibility, in particular the promotion of an internal functional flexibility through work sharing; third, investing in people, in particular by strengthening dual learning systems and by inducing mobility chains (making transitions pay); and fourth, efficient labour market regulation for better utilising existing capacities and restraining inefficient forms of flexibility. Examples for each strategy are presented to illustrate and stimulate the debate.

In this paper research we want to present the new low reforming in public administration system in Albania.Like any robust reform process, we face significant challenges across a spectrum of efforts. Designing country strategies was more time and labor intensive than originally anticipated, particularly because a large number of partners were engaged in the process to determine tough trade-offs. In the year ahead, we will continue to prioritize the development of country strategies and enable better coordination with our partners to reconcile competing priorities and focus on areas where we each have a comparative advantage. Regular political and economic dialogue between the EU and the country has continued through the SAA structures. The Stabilisation and Association Committee and Council met in March and April 2013 respectively. Meetings of six subcommittees and a meeting of the special group on public administration reform were held. Albania participates in the multilateral economic dialogue with the Commission and the EU Member States to prepare the country for participation in multilateral surveillance and economic policy coordination under the EU's Economic and Monetary Union Our effort to focus our assistance programs has been successful for the past two years either because we successfully exited from sustainable projects or because our programming was too minimal to have a true impact. As we look ahead, we must continue to make tough choices and use each country's strategy as the backbone for decision-making to ensure the greatest development impact. DOI:10.5901/ajis.2014.v3n3p358

It is commonplace to speak of central bank "independence" as if it were both a reality and a necessity. While the Federal Reserve is subject to the "dual mandate", it has substantial discretion in its interpretation of the vague call for high employment and low inflation. Most important, the Fed's independence is supposed to insulate it from political pressures coming from Congress and the US Treasury to "print money" to finance budget deficits. As in many developed nations, this prohibition was written into US law from the founding of the Fed in 1913. In practice, the prohibition is easy to evade, as we found during World War II, when budget deficits ran up to a quarter of US GDP. If a central bank stands ready to buy government bonds in the secondary market to peg an interest rate, then private banks will buy bonds in the new-issue market and sell them to the central bank at a virtually guaranteed price. Since central bank purchases of securities supply the reserves needed by banks to buy government debt, a virtuous circle is created, so that the treasury faces no financing constraint. That is what the 1951 Accord was supposedly all about: ending the cheap source of US Treasury finance. Since the global financial crisis hit in 2007, these matters have come to the fore in both the United States and the European Monetary Union, with those worried about inflation warning that the central banks are essentially "printing money" to keep sovereign-government borrowing costs low. .

AbstractAgainst the backdrop of the current euro area crisis and the imbalance at the heart of the Economic and Monetary Union, this chapter will explore the current state of fiscal integration, as well as its likely future and limits. It will do so by, first, creating a 'map to fiscal integration' that takes into account the degree of legalisation of state cooperation, as well as the subject-matter of particular fiscal rules. The three measures or packs of measures adopted by the euro countries since the start of the crisis will be discussed and located within this map to fiscal integration. The chapter will show that a distinction can be drawn between (1) what will be referred to here as 'balance rules', or rules that concern budgetary discipline and balance, and (2) substantive rules or measures that concern the allocation of resources within a state and thus have a distributive or redistributive effect. Once the state of play of fiscal integration is clear, the chapter will turn to the shape of future integration in this area, arguing that further fiscal integration—or legal integration that goes beyond balance rules and crosses into the (re)distributive area—is severely limited by the current Treaties and that, moreover, even a hypothetical Treaty amendment with a view to creating a full EU fiscal policy of this kind would run into significant theoretical problems, both as a matter of EU law and of national constitutional law.

It is generally held, from both a global and a European perspective, that the three most impor-tant objectives for the years to come are 1) the reduction of current account imbalances, 2) the reduction of public deficits, and 3) the reduction of unemployment. This paper argues that the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCPs) for the period 2010-2013, submitted by the euro area member states to the European Commission in January/February 2010, will not achieve all three objectives. Indeed, under current circumstances, the simultaneous realisation of these objectives would be like "squaring a circle". We show that the SCPs rely on rather optimistic assumptions about private sector demand and GDP growth, given the degree of fiscal consolidation. At the same time, they imply that current account imbalances in EMU would remain quite significant until 2013. Our analysis is mainly based on a few simple accounting identities and places special emphasis on Germany. It leads us to conclude that, in the absence of a drastic deterioration of private financial balances, the only way to achieve the GDP growth rates projected in the SCPs (and, ideally, current account rebalancing) would be for the governments of surplus countries to be prepared to run higher deficits over the next few years. This would be more "fiscally responsible" than the current focus on deficit reduc-tion. Failure to do so may result in persistently high unemployment in the years to come and may threaten the European Monetary Union.

The recent admission of Slovakia into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) stands in sharp contrast with the considerable difficulties faced by Hungary with the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria. This is a puzzling development for two reasons: first, during the early phase of the transition process Hungary was way ahead of Slovakia, and second, the high level of political polarization and general public disillusionment is a shared characteristic of the two countries and not conducive to reforms in either case. In order to address these puzzles a theoretical framework is developed examining the conditions of structural reforms in a low-trust environment, where promises about long-term benefits for short-term costs are not believed. After the identification of potential factors that can overcome the gap in credibility, the theoretical framework is applied to the transition history of the two countries. Based on this comparative analysis it is shown that in a both cases reform cycles rather than sustainable progress can be observed. The main conclusion of the analysis is that their current differences can be explained partly by their different position in the reform cycle and partly by the longer rule of reformers in Slovakia. This implies that in the absence of an elite consensus on continuing the reforms, the current success of Slovakia might prove temporary similarly to that of Hungary in the 1990s. The loss of an external disciplining force after Slovakia's recent admission into the EMU increases the chances of such development.