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This article introduces a novel dataset on the agenda of the European Council, the most powerful political body and core informal agenda setter of the EU. Using the approach taken by the Comparative Agendas Project, we trace political issue attention over a 38-year period (1975-2012). The insights in the agenda-setting processes within the European Council shed more light on the overall agenda of the EU and its temporal dynamics. This article explains the construction of the dataset, describes its features, and gives some examples of possible applications. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Research on elections to the European Parliament (EP) has consistently found that European elections are distinguished by a lack of European content. Such elections, in spite of the growing powers exercised by the EP, remain 'second-order'. Clearly, however, EU-related issues have affected the performance of some political parties in EP elections, particularly in countries such as Sweden and Denmark. In our empirical analysis of the three most recent EP elections, we explain party choice as a function of both European and non-EU-related factors. Through the use of standard regression models, we find that the parties that have not 'got their act together' on European issues—whose internal fractionalization leads to ambiguities about their stance on EU integration—systematically perform worse. We also corroborate some of the implications of the 'second-order' model and resolve some empirical disputes.

The European Parliament's increased legislative role in recent years means that its actions are now more likely to have an impact on national parties' policy choices and, indirectly, on their electoral fortunes. This article examines the extent to which national party delegations deal with this by ensuring representativeness among their committee contingents. Using a technique borrowed from Cox and McCubbins (1993), the article compares the voting behaviour of committee contingents with their national party delegations on the basis of roll-call votes. The analysis shows that, for the most part, national parties ensure higher levels of representativeness on committees that have legislative power. The results support the assertion that, as the European Parliament's actions matter more, national parties have become more concerned with their MEPs' activities.

This article compares preferences for Europeanizing 13 policies among European elites, national elites, and public opinion. Elites are more willing to cede national authority in sovereignty areas, but citizens are more favorable to EU social policies. Are there contrasting logics at work? The answer is two-sided. Elites and public preferences are similar in that both are least enthusiastic about Europeanizing high-spending policies. Here is a common distributional logic: shifting authority could destabilize vested interests. However, as the single market intensifies labor market volatility, the public seeks to contain this distributional risk through selectively Europeanizing market-flanking policies. In contrast, elite preferences are consistent with a functional rationale that conceives European integration as an optimal solution for internalizing externalities beyond the national state.

Focusing on social movement organizations (SMOs) in the Czech Republic, this article explores the level of transnational activism of these actors. Although knowledge exists on domestic interest groups' choice of European Union (EU) venues for lobbying, the influence of EU funding on protest and public campaigning by actors such as SMOs remains under-studied. We show what the level of transnationalization of SMOs is, what types of transnational strategies SMOs employ, and what explains these choices. Specifically, the article examines the effect the EU has had on Czech SMOs. We are interested in whether EU funding contributed to their de-radicalization and co-optation by the political elite, or rather empowered them to engage in transnational protest. The results of our analysis support the empowerment hypothesis. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

"The United States and the European Union" published on by Oxford University Press.

Increasingly, research on attitudes towards the European project focuses on transnational practices. This article furthers the transnational approach by offering the first systematic analysis of how domestic transnationalism – i.e. transnational practices conducted in the home country – influences the formation of pro-European sentiments. We argue that domestic transnational activities foster recognition of common, transnational interests and identities that support the European integration project. Using a 2013 Eurobarometer, we show the distinct need to pay attention to domestic transnationalism. Individuals engaging in more domestic transnational activities display more pro-European sentiments in four of our five dependent variables. Moreover, the effect of domestic transnationalism is particularly intense among less-educated citizens.

This article summarizes and extends the main lines of theorizing on public opinion on European integration. We test theories of economic calculus and communal identity in a multi-level analysis of Eurobarometer data. Both economic calculus and communal identity are influential, but the latter is stronger than the former. We theorize how the political consequences of identity are contested and shaped - that is to say, politically cued - in national contexts. The more national elites are divided, the more citizens are cued to oppose European integration, and this effect is particularly pronounced among citizens who see themselves as exclusively national. A model that synthesizes economic, identity, and cue theory explains around one-quarter of variation at the individual level and the bulk of variation at the national and party levels.

European support for integration is shaped by a range of economic, cultural, and political factors. However, in recent decades, scholars have argued that utilitarian calculations have become less important as European integration has advanced, and political entrepreneurs have mobilized nationalist identities. We analyze 24 years of responses to the Eurobarometer (1995–2018) to assess the influence of economic factors on public attitudes toward European integration. We find strong evidence that utilitarian factors are important across the entire panel. The performance of the macro-economy, as measured by unemployment, and an individual's position in the labor market, are consistent predictors of public support for and satisfaction with the European Union. Collective identity is also associated with attitudes toward the European Union. However, an individual's identity is also shaped by economic circumstances.

Does the n-issue space in domestic European polities reduce to one, two, or more dimensions? How do these dimensions relate to each other? More broadly, how does dimensionality vary across countries? We attempt to advance our understanding of political contestation in Europe by mapping the dimensionality of the political space across 24 countries using Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) data. We test how well different models of the European political space fit the CHES data and find that three-dimensional models best fit the data in all countries. However, there is considerable cross-national variation in how the three dimensions relate to one another. Given this, we present a new measure of dimensional complexity that captures the degree to which these three dimensions are related. In so doing, we improve our understanding of the complexity of the political space in European countries.

I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.

The author analyses the goals and instruments of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), discusses approaches which theorise its functioning, examines its policy content and develops a framework for its evaluation

I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999-2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article takes issue with conventional explanations of state preference formation on European integration. It tests the hypothesis that Left-Right ideology is a better predictor than nationality of party views on integration, then tests the relationship between government ideology and government position on several dozen proposals considered during the intergovernmental conference leading up to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It finds no significant relationship between nationality and preferences on integration, posing a challenge for liberal, functional and historical theories of state preference formation. However, there appears to be a significant and robust relationship between party ideology (and the resulting ideology of governments) and their preferences regarding integration generally, and the Amsterdam negotiations specifically.