Search results

In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU–Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use – these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine – is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical applicati­on of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and theirs correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU–Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. Optimists, moderates and skep­tics are more "ideal", resumptive entitlements characterizing the Western interpreters of engagement according theirs believe in the success of the practical implementation of the doctrine. Generalizing the optimists it is worth to note that they trust the strategy of enga­gement and believe that is possible to harmonize two-tracks policy (temptation and intimidation) toward Russia. Moderates believe in the future of engagement in long term perspective same as optimists. They link the success of engagement with the perspective of strategic consolidation of the EU directed by old-member states of the EU to the expense of the interests of the new-comers. Skeptics are inclined to emphasize the lack of values dimension in the EU–Rus­sia relations. According to skeptics, the lack creates the opportunity for the mutual cooperation and for power struggle seeking to overreach each other and to prevail over each other.The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values, pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia en­gagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define theirs own cultural-political identities.

In the article, the EU and Russia relations are analyzed as paying specific attention to the conceptual and practical weight provided for the conjunction "and" when EU–Russia relations are interpreted and practically constructed in the West. The answer which is in common use – these relations are intellectually based and practically shaped according the engagement doctrine – is known well. However, the common answer does not eliminate the problem why the perspective of the practical applicati­on of engagement toward Russia is still under dispute in the West? The article proceeds to revealing the specifics of the Western attitudes in regard to engagement with Russia and theirs correlation with the cultural-political identities of engagement's participants. The conjunction "and" emphasizing the EU–Russia relations is interpreted in three ways: optimistically, equably and skeptically. Optimists, moderates and skep­tics are more "ideal", resumptive entitlements characterizing the Western interpreters of engagement according theirs believe in the success of the practical implementation of the doctrine. Generalizing the optimists it is worth to note that they trust the strategy of enga­gement and believe that is possible to harmonize two-tracks policy (temptation and intimidation) toward Russia. Moderates believe in the future of engagement in long term perspective same as optimists. They link the success of engagement with the perspective of strategic consolidation of the EU directed by old-member states of the EU to the expense of the interests of the new-comers. Skeptics are inclined to emphasize the lack of values dimension in the EU–Rus­sia relations. According to skeptics, the lack creates the opportunity for the mutual cooperation and for power struggle seeking to overreach each other and to prevail over each other.The diversity of interpretations is stimulating by the nodus of factors (history, values, pragmatic interests) which is still affects the EU and Russia relations as well as different attitudes toward the perspectives of co-operation in the future. The very important source of the diversity is the difference in disparity of position regarding the geopolitical development of Eurasia. The article ends with the conclusion that the direction of the EU and Russia en­gagement will be strongly influenced by the reciprocal attempts to define theirs own cultural-political identities. ; Straipsnyje analizuojami Europos Sąjungos (ES) ir Rusijos santykiai aiš­kinantis, koks konceptualus ir praktinis krūvis Vakaruose suteikiamas jungtukui "ir" interpretuojant bei realiai konstruojant ES ir Rusijos santykius. Bendro po­būdžio atsakymas – šie santykiai intelektualiai paremti ir praktikoje yra mode­liuojami atsispiriant į vadinamąją "engagement'o" doktriną – neblogai žinomas. Tačiau bendro pobūdžio atsakymas nepašalina problemos, kodėl iki šiol Vaka­ruose ginčijamasi dėl "engagement'o" taikymo Rusijos atveju perspektyvos? Analizė atskleidžia ES (Vakarams) būdingų požiūrių į "engagement'o" dok­triną Rusijos atžvilgiu ypatumus ir jų koreliaciją su dabartiniais "engagement'o" dalyvių kultūriniais ir politiniais tapatumais. Vakaruose jungtuku "ir" pabrėžiamas Europos Sąjungos ir Rusijos san­tykis yra interpretuojamas trejopai. Aiškinimų įvairovę stimuliuoja sudėtinga istorinių, vertybinių ir pragmatiniais vadinamų veiksnių, iki šiol dariusių įta­ką Europos ir Rusijos santykių raidai, sąveika ir skirtingi požiūriai į bendra­darbiavimo perspektyvas ateityje. Svarbus aiškinimų įvairovės šaltinis yra ir skirtingos Eurazijos žemyno būsimos geopolitinės raidos vizijos. Akivaizdi ir dar viena aplinkybė, o būtent tai, kad analizuojamo ES ir Rusijos "engagement'o" kryptį labai stipriai paveiks jo dalyvių kultūrinio ir politinio tapatumo paieškos.

After the cold war, when the Eastern block collapsed, considerable changes were made in the world security architecture. Althought it seemed like a beginning of more certain and secure era, cold war ending didn't fulfill expectations neither the main actors in the cold war conflict, nor the expectations of the rest of the world. Besides, collapse of one block, didn't stop growth dynamic of new power centers. Tendencies for power are not new and unfamiliar to human. When bypolar system collapsed, other subjects started fighting for the positions. PRC role with her enormous people potential, growing economy and strengthened military is evident. Soviet Union, accordingly Russian Federation, believed that there was no more need for strenghtening the other block, especially when the opposite doesn't exist. But, former partners included the opposite side, and that made more tensions between Russia and United States. Rest of the world didn't get better chance to create own future. On the contrary, especially for the peripheral and semiperipheral countries, new threats appeared that destabilized individual and collective security. Efforts to make human community rational, were always idealism and those efforts were considered utopian, but under the given circumstances, for the international stability, the most accseptable model is model of global triangle - China, Russia, USA. Reason why this three countries is ther specific potention: USA is powerful technological, military and political center, RF is worlds warehouse' and China is the worlds manufacture. In the globalism domination over nationalism era that model could be the optimal 'braking and balance' system in the international relations- political ideal that all liberal schools wanted to acchievestarting Lock, Montesquieu, Rousseau till today. ; Raspad Istočnog bloka nije zaustavio dinamiku razvoja novih centara moći. Krah bipolarizma samo je razotkrio pozornicu na kojoj se odigrava bespoštedna borba različitih subjekata za jačanje sopstvenog uticaja u međunarodnim odnosima. U kontekstu regionalnih sila, u tom smislu je posebno izražen primer NR Kine koja ima ogroman potencijal u ljudstvu, industrija je u ekspanziji i ima vidno ojačanu vojnu efektivu. Nakon brzog pridruživanja bivših članica Varšavskog ugovora nekadašnjem protivničkom taboru, nastupile su nove tenzije na relaciji Rusija i SAD. Prestanak Hladnog rata doneo je i prestanak konfrontacija, ali se međunarodna zajednica suočila sa neophodnošću da preuredi odnose između subjekata i da stvori nove, univerzalnije i trajnije bezbednosne mehanizme. Čini se da je u realnim okolnostima, za stabilnost međunarodne zajednice, najprihvatljiviji model globalnog trougla čija bi temena predstavljali: SAD, RF i NR Kina. Razlozi njegovog postojanja proističu iz specifičnih potencijala koje poseduju ove države: SAD kao moćan tehnološki, vojni i politički centar; RF, kao svetsko skladište i NR Kina, kao svetska manufaktura. Uprkos činjenici da sve tri strane trougla imaju svoje specifične i, u mnogim elementima, suprotstavljene interese, to bi mogao da bude najoptimalniji sistem kočnica i ravnoteže u međunarodnim odnosima.

Šiame darbe yra siekiama išsiaiškinti kokia buvo kandidatų į Lietuvos Respublikos Prezidentus retorika Rusijos ir jos keliamos grėsmės šalies nacionaliniam saugumui atžvilgiu 2009 m., 2014 m. ir 2019 m. rinkimų kampanijų metu bei kaip ši retorika pakito lyginant šiuos trejus rinkimus. Jie kaip tyrimo objektas pasirinkti todėl, kad tiek 2009 m., tiek 2014 m. rinkimai vyko praėjus vos keletui mėnesių po Sakartvelo-Rusijos konflikto bei Krymo aneksijos ir karo Donbase pradžios, o 2019 m. - tebesitęsiant konfliktui Ukrainoje. Siekiant atsakyti į tyrimo klausimą, darbe yra analizuojami kandidatų rinkimų programų dokumentai bei kandidatų pasisakymai visuomeninio transliuotojo rengtose debatų laidose prieš kiekvienus iš tyrimo apimtyje esančių rinkimų. Atlikta lyginamoji analizė parodė, kad buvo pastebimas reikšmingas pokytis kandidatų retorikoje vertinant Rusiją, Lietuvos dvišalius santykius su ja ir Rusijos keliamą grėsmę šalies nacionaliniam saugumui - 2014 m. ir 2019 m. rinkimų kampanijų metu Rusija, kitaip nei 2009 m., daugumos kandidatų imta vertinti kaip šalis agresorė, kelianti grėsmę taip pat ir Lietuvos saugumui.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.

This doctoral dissertation explores, why Poland pursued a policy of engagement and balancing towards Russia between the parliamentary elections in 2001 and the European Unions Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius in 2013. Such a policy was conducted by a middle power towards a major power, though in such cases structural realism predicts that middle powers either bandwagon or balance against major powers. Thus, this research employs neoclassical realist theory and the method of systematic process analysis to find out the reasons behind Poland's decisions in foreign policy and for that purpose four hypotheses are formulated and tested. It turned out that Poland engaged Russia for several reasons. In 2001-2005 and 2005-2007 Poland attempted to change Russia's intentions towards Poland. However, in 2007-2013 the pursuit of such policy was dictated by motives of domestic politics. But most importantly in three cases of 2001-2005, 2005-2006 and 2007-2013 Polish governments sought through a policy of engagement to show Western states, that Poland is not a "russophobic country," trying to entangle the EU and NATO into its drive to withhold Russia's expansionism.