Search results

1 Analyzing Government -- Two Approaches to Analyzing Government -- The Interest-Group Theory of Government -- Plan of the Study -- Notes -- 2 Questions to be Answered -- Wealth Transfers and Organization Costs -- The "Market" for Wealth Transfers -- What This Analysis Is Not About -- What This Analysis Is About -- Summary -- Appendix: Heterogeneity Begets Wealth Redistribution -- Notes -- 3 The Demand and Supply of Wealth Transfers -- Maximizing the Returns from Legislation in a Bicameral -- Vote Market -- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures -- Summary -- Notes -- 4 Legislatures as Wage Cartels -- Theory and Preliminary Implications -- A Test of Relative Wage Implications -- Wage Pay and Malfeasance -- Summary -- Notes -- 5 The Outside Earnings of Politicians -- The Market for Legislators -- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures -- Low Wage Pay as an Entry Barrier in Politics -- Summary -- Notes -- 6 The Supply of Majority Leadership -- Competition for Majority Leadership -- Empirical Evidence from State Legislatures -- Summary -- Notes -- 7 The Determinants of Executive Branch Compensation -- Gubernatorial Compensation -- The Question of Malfeasance -- Summary -- Notes -- 8 Summary, Conclusions, and Future Directions -- Notes -- Name Index.

Despite the fact that gouernment in the United States relies more heavily on nonprofit organizations than on its own instrumentalities to deliver government- funded human services, and that nonprofits receive more of their income from government than from any other single source, the phenomenon of government- nonprofit partnership has been largely overlooked both in analyses of the welfare state and in research on the voluntary sector. This article argues that this neglect of government-nonprofit ties is less the product of a lack of research than of important weaknesses in theory. Both the theory of the welfare state and the theory of the voluntary sector, moreover, are deficient. To overcome these weaknesses, the article advances an alternative theoretical formulation that replaces the prevailing con ception of the welfare state with the concept of "third-party government," and replaces the current "market failure-government failure" theory of the voluntary sector with a theory built around the concept of "voluntary failure" instead. Viewed through these alternative conceptual lenses, the phenomenon of government-non profit partnership comes into far better view and becomes far more understandable. Against the backdrop of this alternative theory, the article then identifies a number of principles that should guide government-nonprofit relations in the years ahead.

In this introduction to the Policy Study Journal's special issue on punctuated equilibrium, we provide an overview of the approach, how it evolved, some of the major critiques directed at it, and some of the major developments it has spawned. We argue that the most important aspect of a theory or framework is not whether it is right or wrong, but the extent to which it is fruitful; that is, the extent to which it stimulated further research. Finally, we review the articles in this issue and put them in context.

This article aims to defend that the hypothesis of the interaction between the government and the anti–systemic political action is the answer to a question on what is the axis of a critical theory of government. From a methodological point of view, the study applies this hypothesis to the analysis of the concrete, that is, to the analysis of governance and its forms of social and political coordination (hierarchical government, self–government and co–government) from a critical theory point of view. The outcome is the idea of counter-governance, which interprets the governance and its forms in an anti–systemic way, in other words, as a kind of government that uses hierarchy, autopoiesis and asymmetrycal networks in order to subject human activity to the capitalist law of value. ; El presente artículo defiende la hipótesis de la interacción entre gobierno y acción política antisistémica como respuesta a la pregunta de cuál es el eje de una teoría crítica de la cuestión gubernativa. Desde el punto de vista metodológico, se procede aplicando tal hipótesis al análisis de lo concreto, esto es, de la gobernanza y sus formas de coordinación sociopolítica: gobierno jerárquico, autogobierno y cogobierno. El resultado es la noción de contragobernanza, la cual recoge dichas formas, pero las reinterpreta en perspectiva antisistémica, así: la gobernanza como el orden que utiliza indistintamente la jerarquía, la autopoiesis y las redes asimétricas con el fin de someter la actividad humana a la ley capitalista del valor.