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Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- Chapter 1. The Parties and Their Messages -- Chapter 2. The Media: Getting Out the Messages -- Chapter 3. Why Was Turnout So Low? -- Chapter 4. The Vote: Stability and Change -- Chapter 5. A Multi-Stage Model of Vote Choice -- Chapter 6. The Social Bases of Party Support -- Chapter 7. Values and Beliefs -- Chapter 8. Partisan Loyalties -- Chapter 9. The Economy -- Chapter 10. The Issues -- Chapter 11. Liberal Performance -- Chapter 12. The Leaders -- Chapter 13. Strategic Voting -- Conclusion -- Appendix A: Multinomial Estimations of Vote Choice Outside Quebec -- Appendix B: Multinomial Estimations of Vote Choice in Quebec -- Appendix C: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Parties Outside Quebec -- Appendix D: The Estimated Impact of Variables on the Propensity to Vote for the Parties in Quebec -- Appendix E: Description of Variables -- References

This paper studies support for upper chamber reforms in multinational countries. In his seminal work on the topic, Lijphart (1984) argues that the upper chamber can be used to accommodate minority groups. However, to date, we still know very little about the perception of minority populations of this institution. We explore this topic building upon an original survey experiment conducted in Scotland and Quebec, where there has been a recent debate about reforming the upper chamber. The results demonstrate that the national minorities in the UK and Canada strongly support a reform of the upper chamber. Also, we find that a reform that would increase the democratic legitimacy of the institution is more popular than one that would foster the regional representation of the minority group, even among respondents who report a strong regional identity.

We review theories of French elections, drawing on a recent general theory developed in our analysis of presidential elections (1988-2007). We offer an explanation for why President Sarkozy was not re-elected in 2012. Two key theoretical variables were involved: one long term-ideological identification-and one short term-economic evaluation. The effect of these variables changed greatly from 2007 to 2012, and together largely account for his loss of almost five percentage-points in second-round vote share. In 2007, he ran as an 'outsider' who galvanised the base of his traditional right party (the UMP), promising to solve the economic problems the country faced. In contrast, in 2012, he ran as an incumbent with a failed record. Thus, he experienced substantial defection from the Gaullist right, as well as more global dissatisfaction with his poor economic leadership, costing him his presidential re-election bid. Adapted from the source document.