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Who should have the last word on fundamental policy issues? This book analyzes the rise of two contenders - the people, through direct democracy, and the courts. Now available in nearly half the states, direct democracy has surged in recent decades. Through ballot measures, voters have slashed taxes, mandated government spending, imposed term limits on elected officials, enacted campaign finance reform, barred affirmative action, banned same-sex marriage, and adopted many other controversial laws. In several states, citizens now bypass legislatures to make the most important policy decisions. However, the 'people's rule' is not absolute. This book demonstrates that courts have used an expanding power of judicial review to invalidate citizen-enacted laws at remarkably high rates. The resulting conflict between the people and the courts threatens to produce a popular backlash against judges and raises profound questions about the proper scope of popular sovereignty and judicial power in a constitutional system

The expanding use of direct democracy in many established democracies reflects a desire to provide citizens with more opportunities to be involved in the political process. These changes are assumed to be embraced by those who demand greater citizen involvement, though the underlining motivation remains unclear. One theory assumes that support is likely to come from citizens who have a deep interest in politics and are politically active. Another theory offers a contrasting view, claiming that those who find themselves on the periphery of politics, and are largely disenchanted, find such proposals attractive. We examine these theories drawing on public opinion surveys from six established democracies. We find that younger citizens and those who are more interested in the political process are more supportive of direct democracy, while political disaffection has a less consistent impact.

Common to many social movement studies is the argument that ideological heterogeneity causes organizational dilemmas. Yet, few scholars consider, let alone test, the impact of ideological heterogeneity on direct democracy campaigns (DDCs). Drawing from the extant social movements literature, I argue that DDCs function like short-term social movements. Based on in-depth interviews of initiative activists, and in some cases participant-observation opportunities, I conclude that ideological heterogeneity is also a contributing cause of DDC failure. Ideological heterogeneity within DDCs either results in factionalism that wastes time and resources, or the development of homogeneous groups that pursue policies unacceptable to the median voter. I also conclude that ideological heterogeneity is more destructive to DDCs than social movements. Whereas social movements can adapt over time, DDCs must achieve a singular electoral victory, within a specific electoral cycle, in order to succeed. Therefore, time constraints make factionalism more problematic for DDCs.

"Who should have the last word on fundamental policy issues? This book analyzes the rise of two contenders - the people, through direct democracy, and the courts. It demonstrates that courts have used an expanding power of judicial review to invalidate citizen-enacted laws at remarkably high rates. The resulting conflict between the people and the courts threatens to produce a backlash against judges and raises profound questions about the proper scope of popular sovereignty and judicial power in a constitutional system."--[from book]

Based on survey data for Switzerland, new empirical findings on direct democracy are presented. In the first part, we show that, on average, public employees receive lower financial compensation under more direct democratic institutions. However, top bureaucrats are more constrained in direct de m ocracies and have to be compensated by higher wages for that loss of power. In the second part, we demonstrate that reported subjective well-being of the population is much higher in jurisdictions with stronger direct democratic rights. This is not only the case because people value political outcomes higher but they derive utility from the politcal process itself.

Analyzes the impact of direct democracy, eg, referendums, on public policy making, presenting data for Switzerland, the US, Australia, & the Federal Republic of Germany. It is concluded that direct democracy is an effective, but flexible veto player against expansive spending & taxation. The level of public expenditure & taxation is significantly lower in countries that have elements of direct democracy compared to pure representative democracies. Several theoretical arguments support this finding; eg, the social discount rate of voters is lower than that of politicians. Also, direct democracy is related to the benefit principle in public finance. Taxpayers want their payments to be related to public services they receive. They are therefore inclined to veto projects not reflecting their preferences. Moreover, referenda have an implicit restraining effect on governments, & the mere threat can reduce their capacity to act. 8 Tables, 61 References. Adapted from the source document.