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Argues that the push towards unification, especially German Chancellor Kohl's drive for European Monetary Union (EMU), can distract attention from the liberal order which provides for security and liberty and should spread across the continent.

The present work analyses the writings of Mises and Hayek on the relation between a liberal order and a free market, and the role of economic theory in advancing the appreciation of democratic institutions, considering the context of their expositions. Subsequently, it tries to address the contemporary state of political and economic affairs in the light of their teachings, highlighting missing aspects in today's public debate and what should be taken into account for a coherent defense of the liberal order. ; El presente trabajo analiza los textos de Mises y Hayek sobre la relación entre el orden liberal y libe mercado, así como el papel de la teoría económica en el avance del reconocimiento de las instituciones democráticas, considerando el contexto de sus exposiciones. Posteriormente, intentamos tratar el estado actual de los asuntos políticos y económicos a la luz de sus enseñanzas, resaltando los aspectos ausentes en el debate público actual y que deben ser considerados en una defenza coherente del orden liberal. ; O presente trabalho analisa os escritos de Mises e Hayek sobre a relação entre a ordem liberal e livre mercado, bem como o papel da teoria econômica no avanço do reconhecimento das instituições democráticas, considerando o contexto de suas exposições. Posteriormente, tentamos tratar o estado atual dos assuntos políticos e econômicos à luz de seus ensinamentos, destacando os aspectos ausentes no debate público atual e que devem ser levados em consideração em uma defesa coerente da ordem liberal.

Liberal democracy is in decline across the globe. Why? The literature provides many answers, i.e., a decline in the power and gatekeeping role of political parties (Lavinsky and Ziblatt), the role of intellectuals (Applebaum), changes in political campaign financing (Balkin), the anti-liberal influence of Donald Trump (Kendzior), the flaws of "democracy" itself (Mounk), to name just a few. Most scholars, however, neglect the underlying causes of these proximate phenomena. In this essay I take a sociological and social-psychological approach to explore the underlying causes. I focus on liberal democracy's decline in the Industrial West, particularly the United States. I argue that this decline can be partly attributed to the inherent weaknesses/limitations of liberalism, exacerbated in the 21st century by neo-liberal economic forces and digital technology. I contend that liberal values of equality, tolerance, the rule of law, and rational debate chafe against the sacrosanct entrenchment of the neo-liberal free market and its laissez-faire ideology, as well as the inherent liberal neglect of the human need for status, community, heroes, and the impulse to unleash passionate grievances. This chafing has now opened lesions in liberal institutions, exacerbated by widespread disinformation and obscene inequality, I offer three suggestions to strengthen 21st century liberalism: government regulation of social media to censure hate speech and disinformation, new taxes on wealth to reduce economic inequality, and an expansion of the public realm—parks, libraries, beaches, public schools, etc., where "money doesn't matter." This last suggestion is crucial. Because economic inequality and precarity will persist in a liberal democratic society even when taxation is more equitable, expansion of the public realm is needed to reduce the impact of inequality in liberal democratic society.

In the present article I display the ideological foundations of the current system of representative democracy and question the liberal core beliefs that it is per definitionem superior to other political systems and that material causation will lead to a world of liberal democracies (or to a liberal democratic world state) because of this. The argument is developed in three steps. First, the creative power of ideas and ideologies is displayed. Secondly, an analysis of the historical growth of the liberal democracy regime is employed. Lastly, internal contradictions and problems are extracted from the structure displayed. The paper ultimately derives three conclusions. First, the foundations of the liberal-democratic system are ideological and thus relative. There have been alternative forms of public participation in political decision-making processes. Secondly, the system is bound by its ideological roots to turn imperialist but will fail in contexts that do not share its historical development. Thirdly, the nearer future will see an increasing tension between the old elites of the system and forces for change driven by advances in ICT. Instead of the liberal world state, the liberal order might thus evolve internally into a new mode of knowledge production and rule administration based on mass participation rather than on the election of representatives. Article visualizations:

The rise of populism in Western democracies creates presumed threats on liberal international order. Although a number of scholarly works are dedicated to the populist challenge on liberal democracy, the analysis of populism's implications on the liberal order is limited. This paper deliberates on a concise review of the consequences of populism on the Western liberal order. In order to delineate the study, the article is devoted to the Western populism and its implications on liberal order. The paper, while analyzing the components of liberal international order by drawing on the analytical framework of structural liberalism, intends to claim that populism has adverse consequences on certain elements of the order than others. However, the implication is not an inflection point for the Western liberal order. Furthermore, this paper also provides some explanations behind the limitations of the populist threats to the Western liberal order. The main argument to highlight is that populism is detrimental more to liberal democracy than to the liberal order itself, and the Western liberal order has the capacity to withstand the tide of populism.

The rise of populism in Western democracies creates presumed threats on liberal international order. Although a number of scholarly works are dedicated to the populist challenge on liberal democracy, the analysis of populism's implications on the liberal order is limited. This paper deliberates on a concise review of the consequences of populism on the Western liberal order. In order to delineate the study, the article is devoted to the Western populism and its implications on liberal order. The paper, while analyzing the components of liberal international order by drawing on the analytical framework of structural liberalism, intends to claim that populism has adverse consequences on certain elements of the order than others. However, the implication is not an inflection point for the Western liberal order. Furthermore, this paper also provides some explanations behind the limitations of the populist threats to the Western liberal order. The main argument to highlight is that populism is detrimental more to liberal democracy than to the liberal order itself, and the Western liberal order has the capacity to withstand the tide of populism.

Intro -- Acknowledgments -- Praise for The Wrecking of the Liberal World Order -- Contents -- About the Author -- 1 The Liberal Order and the Broken Pact Between Democracy and Market -- A Diverted Order -- The Pillars of the Liberal World Order -- The Great Discontinuity: From the "Liberal Triangle" to Rodrik's Trilemma -- The Structure of the Book -- References -- Part I Out of Route -- 2 Titanic, or the Unsinkable Order: Origins, Expansion, and Betrayal of the Liberal World Order (1945-2000) -- The Origins and Foundations of the Liberal World Order -- The Fall of the Berlin Wall: Expansion and Betrayal of the Liberal World Order (1945-2000) -- References -- 3 The Broken Promises That Hijacked the Liberal World Order: A Safer, Fairer, and Richer World -- 'A Safer World': Neither Invulnerable Nor Invincible-9/11, the Afghanistan War, and the Inadequacy of the Military Tool -- 'A Fairer World': The Invasion of Iraq and the Consequences of George W. Bush's and Tony Blair's Unpunished Lies -- 'A Richer World for Everyone': The Financial Crisis and the Substitution of Freedom and Equality with Arrogance and Privilege -- References -- Part II The Four Sides of the Iceberg -- 4 The Decline of American Leadership and the Rise of Chinese and Russian Authoritarian Powers -- 'Anchors away': the Russians are back and the Chinese are in -- From Obama disengagement in the Mediterranean to the Moscow-Tehran-Ankara triangle -- The Chinese challenge and the North Korean nuclear pasticcio -- References -- 5 The Molecularization of Threat: Jihadist Terrorism, Islamist Radicalization, and the Mediterranean Tragedy -- Non-State Actors' Threats and the Return of Security as a Source of Legitimacy for State Action -- The Migration Issue in the Mediterranean: A European Fiasco and an Oportunity for the Italian Far-Right.

AbstractFormal racial equality is a key aspect of the current Liberal International Order (LIO). It is subject to two main challenges: resurgent racial nationalism and substantive racial inequality. Combining work in International Relations with interdisciplinary studies on race, I submit that these challenges are the latest iteration of struggles between two transnational coalitions over the LIO's central racial provisions, which I call racial diversity regimes (RDRs). The traditional coalition has historically favored RDRs based on racial inequality and racial nationalism. The transformative coalition has favored RDRs based on racial equality and nonracial nationalism. I illustrate the argument by tracing the development of the liberal order's RDR as a function of intercoalitional struggles from one based on racial nationalism and inequality in 1919 to the current regime based on nonracial nationalism and limited equality. Today, racial nationalists belong to the traditional coalition and critics of racial inequality are part of the transformative coalition. The stakes of their struggles are high because they will determine whether we will live in a more racist or a more antiracist world. This article articulates a comprehensive framework that places race at the heart of the liberal order, offers the novel concept of "embedded racism" to capture how sovereignty shields domestic racism from foreign interference, and proposes an agenda for mainstream International Relations that takes race seriously.

Liberalism has been the most successful political ideology during the past two centuries in withstanding challenges and adapting to new environments. The liberal international order, set up after the Second World War and strengthened at the end of the Cold War, is going through a series of crises, propelled by deglobalization pressures, and the rise of illiberal and populist leaders, all challenging the three pillars of the liberal order: democracy, economic interdependence and international institutions. Two critical reasons for the decline of the liberal order are internal in terms of income distribution and institutional malaise. The article argues that the demise of the liberal order is not inevitable provided liberal states take remedial measures and adapt to the new environment as they did in 1919, 1930s, the second half of the 1940s, 1960s and 1991. Reformed globalization, or re-globalization is essential for facing the geopolitical challenges emanating from China and other illiberal states. The inability of other systems to offer both prosperity and freedom that the liberal order can provide is its main attractiveness. The connection between internal reforms in liberal states to address deepening inequalities and wealth distribution, a by-product of intensified globalization, and the prospects of liberal order's success is highlighted. The need for a refined welfare state taking into account the new realities to tackle the internal challenges is proposed.