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The objective of the study was to identify the design patterns and distinctive features of the institution of complicity in a crime in certain criminal laws. The methodology was based on the use of legislative interpretation operations and techniques such as the hermeneutics of criminal texts, which allows to identify the structural, constructive, and substantive features of the rules on complicity in a crime. The scientific novelty of the work lies in the textological approach of the criminal-legal regulations of the institution of complicity. This approach allows to interpret the standards in a comparative aspect, taking into account the deep level of their construction. Among the results obtained are:(1) the inclusion of complicity rules in other criminal law institutions is an unjustified design technique; (2) the absence of a complex of titles in the institution of complicity reduces the level of quality of this institution; (3) the presence of definitive rules in the institution of complicity significantly increases its quality; (4) the differentiation of accomplices in crime should not be excessive and arbitrary; (5) the rules on attempted complicity in a crime increase the preventive potential of criminal law.

The article discusses the norms of criminal legislation of the Russian Empire and the RSFSR on crimes infringing on copyright. The author derives the interrelationships of the earlier norms on infringement of copyright and the current article 146 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. It is proposed to reject in part 1 of Article 146 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation the term «attribution of authorship». ; В статье рассматриваются нормы уголовного законодательства Российской империи и РСФСР о преступлениях, посягающих на авторское право. Автор выводит взаимосвязи ранее действовавших норм о посягательствах на авторское право и нынешней статьи 146 Уголовного кодекса РФ. Предлагается отказаться в части 1 статьи 146 Уголовного кодекса РФ от термина «присвоение авторства».

In institutional theory, it is a challenge to explain how rule-setting occurs in transnational contexts with high rule ambiguity and distributed agency. In this article, we address this problem by arguing that emergent and deliberate institutional strategies, though often treated as exclusive opposites, need to be considered in concert. This is demonstrated by analysing transnational law-making in the context of commercial and corporate law. Transnational law-making is thereby conceived as a process driven by the practical problem-solving and sense-making efforts of legal practitioners in large international law firms and international legal associations. Focal actors can exploit the results of this process to deliberately influence the development of law. A concept of two nested cycles of incidental and strategic law-making is employed to explain how dominant influences of common law become interwoven with influences from multiple other legal traditions that eventually trickle up. This article highlights the role of professionals as practice-based experts engaging in practical and political actions, the effects of which shape transnational rule-setting.

The theme of responsibility has grown considerably during the twentieth century. Legal professionals, whose lawyer , have not escaped this trend. Renowned in good faith , the lawyer was assured held liable solely on the basis of gross negligence or deceit.The use of these concepts was essential for it to be sentenced , thus restricting any appeal against it to the pure case study. Ethic ensured the integrity of the lawyer, and was a real obstacle to the idea of any responsibility towards the customer. His responsibility was limited to disciplinary field. But this is gone. The judge and legislator have framed the new activities of the lawyer and have updated various obligations for civil and criminal point.Now , the lawyer may be sentenced for civil, criminal and disciplinary. ; Le thème de la responsabilité s'est considérablement développé durant le vingtième siècle, les professionnels du droit, dont l'avocat, n'ont pas échappé à cette mouvance. Réputé de bonne foi, ce dernier était assuré de voir sa responsabilité engagée uniquement sur la base d'une faute lourde ou du dol. Le recours à ces notions était indispensable pour qu'il soit inquiété, restreignant ainsi tout recours à son encontre au pur cas d'école. La déontologie, garantie de l'intégrité de l'avocat formait comme un écran, véritable obstacle à l'idée de toute responsabilité à l'égard du client. Ce n'est que face à ses pairs que le professionnel pouvait avoir à rendre des comptes ou dans le cadre d'éventuels délits d'audience. Sa responsabilité était ainsi limitée au plan disciplinaire. Ces temps sont aujourd'hui révolus. Se basant sur la déontologie, le juge et le législateur entendent encadrer les nouvelles activités de l'avocat et ont mis au jour différentes obligations sur le plan civil comme pénal. Désormais,l'avocat répond de son activité sur le plan civil, pénal et disciplinaire.

The theme of responsibility has grown considerably during the twentieth century. Legal professionals, whose lawyer , have not escaped this trend. Renowned in good faith , the lawyer was assured held liable solely on the basis of gross negligence or deceit.The use of these concepts was essential for it to be sentenced , thus restricting any appeal against it to the pure case study. Ethic ensured the integrity of the lawyer, and was a real obstacle to the idea of any responsibility towards the customer. His responsibility was limited to disciplinary field. But this is gone. The judge and legislator have framed the new activities of the lawyer and have updated various obligations for civil and criminal point.Now , the lawyer may be sentenced for civil, criminal and disciplinary. ; Le thème de la responsabilité s'est considérablement développé durant le vingtième siècle, les professionnels du droit, dont l'avocat, n'ont pas échappé à cette mouvance. Réputé de bonne foi, ce dernier était assuré de voir sa responsabilité engagée uniquement sur la base d'une faute lourde ou du dol. Le recours à ces notions était indispensable pour qu'il soit inquiété, restreignant ainsi tout recours à son encontre au pur cas d'école. La déontologie, garantie de l'intégrité de l'avocat formait comme un écran, véritable obstacle à l'idée de toute responsabilité à l'égard du client. Ce n'est que face à ses pairs que le professionnel pouvait avoir à rendre des comptes ou dans le cadre d'éventuels délits d'audience. Sa responsabilité était ainsi limitée au plan disciplinaire. Ces temps sont aujourd'hui révolus. Se basant sur la déontologie, le juge et le législateur entendent encadrer les nouvelles activités de l'avocat et ont mis au jour différentes obligations sur le plan civil comme pénal. Désormais,l'avocat répond de son activité sur le plan civil, pénal et disciplinaire.

Le présent mémoire traite de la validité des contrats d'assurance assortis des clauses base réclamation au Québec. Contrat principalement usité en assurance de responsabilité civile professionnelle, les clauses base-réclamation se démarquent également par leur attractivité économique. Il s'agit de clauses qui définissent le sinistre comme le moment à partir duquel la réclamation est portée à l'attention de l'assuré. Celle-ci doit nécessairement survenir durant la période d'effectivité du contrat sous peine d'exclusion de garantie. Cependant, les effets des clauses base-réclamation questionnent l'ordre public sur leur conformité au droit. En l'absence de précision de la part du législateur, la doctrine semble osciller entre leur reconnaissance au titre de l'affirmation de la liberté contractuelle et leur rejet au nom de la protection de la partie faible. En vrai, pour les tenants de leur validité, il s'agirait d'une réception de solution de Common Law en droit civil tandis que pour ceux qui s'y opposent il s'agit d'une affirmation des principes fondamentaux de droit civil que l'on doit défendre. Ces disharmonies concourent à l'instauration d'une insécurité juridique faisant du régime des clauses base-réclamation un régime instable. Partant du constat de la place importante qu'occupent les clauses base-réclamation dans les contrats d'assurance de responsabilité civile professionnelle et du contentieux suscité autour de leur validité, nous avons entrepris de questionner le droit civil québécois sur les conditions de validité des contrats d'assurance assortis de clauses base-réclamation. Pour ce faire, nous avons abordé l'interprétation et la qualification des clauses base-réclamation avant d'aborder leurs effets sur les droits des tiers et des assurés. ; This brief deals with the validity of insurance contracts with basic claim clauses in Quebec. Contract mainly used in professional civil liability insurance; the basic-claim clauses also stand out for their economic attractiveness. These are clauses defining the loss as the moment from the claim is brought to the attention of the insured. This must necessarily occur during the period of effectiveness of the contract under penalty of exclusion of warranty. However, the effects of base-claim clauses question public policy on their compliance with the law. In the absence of precision on the part of the legislator, the doctrine seems to oscillate between their recognition under the assertion of contractual freedom and their rejection in the name of the protection of the weak party. In fact, for those who uphold their validity, it would be a question of receiving a Common Law solution in civil law, while for those who oppose it, it is an affirmation of the fundamental principles of civil law that we must defend. These disharmonies contribute to the establishment of legal uncertainty making the regime of base-claim clauses an unstable regime. Based on the observation of the important place occupied by base-claim clauses in professional civil liability insurance contracts and the litigation raised around their validity, we undertook to question Quebec civil law on the conditions of validity of contracts insurance with base-claim clauses. To do this, we discussed the interpretation and qualification of base-claim clauses before discussing their effects on the rights of third parties and policyholders.

"In legal jurisprudence, the phenomenon of "hard cases" presents itself as a dilemma between the legal positivists and the natural law realists. Of the former, without the metaphysical underpinnings of an objective legal or moral standard, the legal positivists cannot supply convincing arguments to supplant the sovereign as the origin and authority of law. The natural law realists face the problem of justifying the natural law. Against both views, S. Zinaich Jr. defends a middle position, Analytical Legal Naturalism (ALN). It represents an analytic norm, both necessarily true and known a posteriori. Against the legal positivists, it supplies an objective legal standard by removing--at least for hard cases--the necessity of the will of a sovereign authority. Against the natural law realists, ALN provides a nonmoral standard which, because of its analyticity and necessity, avoids the need for metaethical speculation. Finally, ALN provides a standard that not only supplies the universalizable punch to avoid political subjectivism, but does so in a conventional manner. Thus, ALN does not require a moral or modal reality as truth-making characteristics. Rather, it makes what is legally valuable or disvaluable dependent upon empirically verifiable facts that are legally relevant."

Firstly, the author analyses the theory of sovereignty from the point of its birth and then he considers more recent theoretical challenges facing the notion of sovereignty in a globalised world. Particular attention is paid to soft law – that new, formally non-binding source of international law in the light of its factual influence on the desovereignisation of states. The author holds the position that the relativisation of the notion of sovereignty has been a process that began already in the 18th century and that has only additionally accelerated with new challenges posed by globalisation. The author argues for the only possible and proper use of the notion of sovereignty in its original meaning as an absolute, completely unlimited, and indivisible power. On the other hand, he takes a critical approach not only to the theory of constitutional pluralism but also to the ideas of the state's legal sovereignty. He pleads for rejection of separating different aspects of sovereignty, artificially distinguishing between the factual and legal sovereignty, as well as the external and internal sovereignty. While theoretically possible, it is of no practical use because the notion of sovereignty can only be correctly understood as a political and legal illimitability. For all other various modalities and attempts at relativising and grading sovereignty, from the 18th century to this day, different terms should be coined. Being mindful of the situation in most of the present-day states, the author advocates the introduction of the term "pseudo-sovereignty".

Intro -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Introduction -- I The german revolution and the transformationof german law in the sixteenth century -- 1. The Reformation of the Church and of the State,1517-1555 -- 2. Lutheran Legal Philosophy -- 3. The Transformation of German Legal Science -- 4. The Transformation of German Criminal Law -- 5. The Transformation of German Civil and Economic Law -- 6. The Transformation of German Social Law -- II The english revolution and the transformationof english law in the seventeenth century -- 7. The English Revolution, 1640-1689 -- 8. The Transformation of English Legal Philosophy -- 9. The Transformation of English Legal Science -- 10. The Transformation of English Criminal Law -- 11. The Transformation of English Civil and Economic Law -- 12. The Transformation of English Social Law -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index.