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Despite secularisation, there is growing recognition that some religious parties continue to influence elections and the formation of policy in several countries. But what explains why religious parties persist in some countries but not others? This study tests an argument holding that religious diversification promotes political cooperation and therefore reduces the number of religious parties. Using a data set of religious parties across advanced industrial democracies between 1945 and 2011, this paper analyses this argument and finds that religious diversity puts downward pressure on the number of religious parties over time.

Abstract. Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single–member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality–based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large–sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multi–member plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter–intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules.

Duverger's propositions concerning the psychological and mechanical consequences of electoral rules have previously been examined mainly through the lens of district magnitude, comparing the properties of single-member district plurality elections with those of multimember proportional representation elections. The empirical consequences of multimember plurality (MMP) rules, on the other hand, have received scant attention. Theory suggests that the effect of district magnitude on the number and concentration of parties will differ with regard to whether the allocation rules are plurality-based or proportional. I test this theory by drawing on a uniquely large-sample dataset where district magnitude and electoral formula vary but the basic universe of political parties is held constant, applying regression analysis to data from several thousand Hungarian local bodies elected in 1994 consisting of municipal councils, county councils, and mayors. The results indicate that omitting the variable of electoral formula has the potential to cause significant bias in estimates of Duvergerian consequences of district magnitude. In addition, the analysis of multimember plurality elections from the local election dataset reveals counter-intuitively that candidate and party entry may increase with district magnitude under MMP, suggesting important directions for future investigation of MMP rules. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

Draws on the work of Peter Ordeshook & Olga Shvetsova (1994 [see abstract 9407492]) to examine the influence of electoral laws & preexisting social cleavages in determining the number of parties in a given political system. Statistics from every polity with a free election in the 1980s (54 countries) are examined by multiple regression analysis. Results indicate that the number of parties in a polity is best understood as a multiplicative function of the interaction between electoral laws & social cleavages. It is concluded that bipartisan systems tend to form when there is a strong electoral system or few cleavages, while multipartisanism often results from many cleavages & a permissive electoral system. 3 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 59 References. Adapted from the source document.

Economic voting claims that citizens will reward or punish the incumbent government based on the state of the economy as a mechanism of democratic accountability. In negative economic voting, in order to vote against the government, citizens must have options (parties) in which to place their vote to voice discontent. If not, there is no opportunity to cast an 'economic vote' and abstention results, leading to a weakened economic effect. In this article I argue that the electoral system indirectly mediates the relationship between the economy and the vote by determining the number of viable parties which act as the conduit for punishing the incumbent. Cross-national data and individual-level data for the case of Spain are used to test the impact of the number of parties on economic voting. The findings suggest that when there are more viable parties competing, the probability of casting an economic vote increases.

The aim of this article is to present a critical overview of research methods (so called indexes) used for measuring different parameters of party systems. The starting point for further discussion is the semantic relevance theory developed by G. Sartori. In the next part of the article I will deal with the question whether this qualitative method can be quantified in any way. With this regard, I will analyse such indexes as: the effective number of parties index, the power indexes and the government relevance indexes. The article shows that despite many scholars' fears, political science has a large set of tools for making precise measurements of empirical data, which may be used for comparison. A theoretical concept of relevance, together with its "qualitative" test, combined with properly selected and configured quantitative techniques, guarantee the effective measurement of relevance also at the ordinal, or even the interval level. Thus, it is legitimate to refer to this approach as an "index method". ; Celem artykułu jest krytyczny przegląd popularnych technik badawczych (tzw. indeksów) wykorzystywanych do pomiaru różnych parametrów systemów partyjnych pod kątem ich użyteczności w badaniu relewancji partii politycznych. Punktem wyjścia dla dalszych rozważań jest nominalna koncepcja relewancji zaproponowana przez G. Sartoriego. W dalszej części podjęta zostanie próba odpowiedzi na pytanie czy ta jakościowa metoda może zostać w jakikolwiek sposób skwantyfikowana? W tym kontekście analizie poddane zostaną takie wskaźniki jak: indeks efektywnej liczby partii, indeksy siły i relewancji rządowej. Artykuł wykazuje, że wbrew obawom wielu badaczy, politologia dysponuje rozbudowanym zbiorem narzędzi umożliwiających dokonywanie precyzyjnych i komparatystycznie przydatnych pomiarów danych empirycznych. Teoretyczna koncepcja relewancji, wraz z jej jakościowym "testem", w połączeniu z odpowiednio dobranymi i skonfigurowanymi technikami ilościowymi gwarantują skuteczny pomiar relewancji również na poziomie porządkowym, a nawet interwałowym. Można zatem podejście to z powodzeniem nazwać "metodą indeksowa".