Search results

"Am 16. Dezember 2001 erhielt Marc Ravalomanana im ersten Wahlgang der Präsidentschaftswahlen in Madagaskar die Mehrheit vor dem amtierenden Präsidenten Didier Ratsiraka. Die Stimmauszählung führte zu einer Wahlkrise. Das Innenministerium behauptete, Ravalomanana habe 46 Prozent der Stimmen erhalten, wohingegen eine unabhängige Kommission Ravalomanana 50,5 Prozent der Stimmen und somit den Sieg im ersten Wahlgang zuerkannte. Hunderttausende Madagassen gingen zur Unterstützung Ravalomananas auf die Straße, was zu einem gewaltsamen, fünf Monate anhaltenden Aufruhr führte. Diese Studie stellt die Frage: Darf ein Herausforderer zu nicht verfassungsmäßigen Maßnahmen greifen, wenn er sich in hohem Maße einem betrügerischen Wahlablauf und einem Mangel an verfassungsmäßigen Möglichkeiten zur Korrektur des Ergebnisses gegenüber sieht? Wo Demokratisierung sich ganz auf formale Prozesse konzentriert und dabei andere liberale demokratische Maßnahmen ausschließt, muss dieser Prozess letztendlich zu einem unanfechtbaren Ergebnis kommen - andernfalls gerät der Demokratisierungsprozess in Gefahr." (Autorenreferat)

'Am 16. Dezember 2001 erhielt Marc Ravalomanana im ersten Wahlgang der Präsidentschaftswahlen in Madagaskar die Mehrheit vor dem amtierenden Präsidenten Didier Ratsiraka. Die Stimmauszählung führte zu einer Wahlkrise. Das Innenministerium behauptete, Ravalomanana habe 46 Prozent der Stimmen erhalten, wohingegen eine unabhängige Kommission Ravalomanana 50,5 Prozent der Stimmen und somit den Sieg im ersten Wahlgang zuerkannte. Hunderttausende Madagassen gingen zur Unterstützung Ravalomananas auf die Straße, was zu einem gewaltsamen, fünf Monate anhaltenden Aufruhr führte. Diese Studie stellt die Frage: Darf ein Herausforderer zu nicht verfassungsmäßigen Maßnahmen greifen, wenn er sich in hohem Maße einem betrügerischen Wahlablauf und einem Mangel an verfassungsmäßigen Möglichkeiten zur Korrektur des Ergebnisses gegenüber sieht? Wo Demokratisierung sich ganz auf formale Prozesse konzentriert und dabei andere liberale demokratische Maßnahmen ausschließt, muss dieser Prozess letztendlich zu einem unanfechtbaren Ergebnis kommen - andernfalls gerät der Demokratisierungsprozess in Gefahr.' (Autorenreferat)

Amid the debates as to whether India practises democracy in the true fashion, the stupendous role of the Election Commission of India (ECI) clearly exhibits that India adopts at least a robust electoral democracy. Stringent election codes of conduct are imposed on political parties. The ECI ensures that all Indian citizens eligible for political rights exercise their franchise independently. They are sufficiently empowered to choose their representatives. Since the responsibilities of ensuring free and fair elections are shouldered by the Election Commission, there is no doubt that it holds one of the worthiest roles in shaping Indian democracy. This article seeks to examine the changing role of the ECI in building electoral democracy in the country. Most importantly, the present article attempts to examine the noteworthy measures undertaken by the ECI to bolster the electoral democracy in India in the 21st century.

In The Fundamental Voter, John H. Aldrich, Suhyen Bae, and Bailey K. Sanders explain why the notion that we are divided into tribal loyalties is, at best, only partially correct, and discuss how the divisions rest on much more substantive politics than they once did. In the past, the American public based voting primarily on partisan loyalties; today they do so on five fundamental forces: party, ideology, issues, race, and economics. Since the 1980s, these fundamentals have grown increasingly important, such that voters are now sorted into two bitterly divided sides. Voters have come to deeply dislike the opposition, a state of affairs that threatens the peaceful progress of democratic politics in the United States.

This book examines the significance of the 2015 elections in consolidating Nigeria's democracy, in the context of the difficulty of routinizing democracy since the attainment of nationhood in 1960 and the return to civil rule in May 1999, in particular. It offers a complete analysis of Nigeria's electoral process, outlining how the dynamics of limited changes in the constitutional, institutional, attitudinal and behavioural frameworks that underpin electoral competition played out in the elections. The authors further examine the conduct and outcome of the 2015 elections against the background of the pattern of electoralism that had been established since the return to democracy in 1999. In doing so, they draw attention to the dialectics of continuity and change that have been thrown up by the elections and how the lessons learned can be used to build a more enduring democratic system. The book will be of interest to students and academics of political science, development studies, democratisation and election studies, and African government and politics.--

1. The elections to the estates general -- 2. Subjects into citizens -- 3. The first municipal elections -- 4. The first cantonal elections -- 5. The emergence of a new political elite in 1790 -- 6. Revolutionary electoral culture and the dynamics of voting in assemblies -- 7. Elections of the justices of the peace -- 8. The elections of June 1791 for the first National Legislature -- 9. The elections of June and August-September 1791 and the renewal of the political personnel -- 10. The establishment of the First French Republic -- 11. Ratification of the constitutions of 1793 and 1795 -- 12. The transformation of electoral politics in the directory and Napoleonic periods.

It is often held that the establishment of electoral democracy is key to the creation of political legitimacy. This article challenges this idea and presents an alternative. Many empirical studies reveal that electoral democracy has no necessary implications for the establishment of legitimacy. Even in the successful and stable Nordic democracies, there is scant evidence that legitimacy is created on the input side of the political system. For example political legitimacy in the former Yugoslavia broke down not because ethnic groups realized they would become permanent minorities but because the new Croatian state violated citizens' rights in the exercise of power. Legitimacy turns out to be created, maintained, and destroyed not at the input but at the output side of the political system. Hence, political legitimacy depends at least as much on the quality of government than on the capacity of electoral systems to create effective representation.

Published: 28 April 2018 ; In an interdependent world, this sensation that not everyone who should be here is here, that our constituencies should be completed with other criteria of inclusion, that there may be some who have been illegitimately excluded from our group points to a triple inclusion―spatial, temporal and natural―that we should undertake: the inclusion of our neighbors, of our descendants and of the environment. None of these three "votes" enough. One of the principal challenges of contemporary democracies is how to reintroduce these subjects in our systems of representation and decision-making. If this hypothesis is correct, then we have a true democratic deficit and the habitual question about whether democracy is possible beyond the national state should be reformulated to ask instead whether democracy is possible without including those who are outside the national state, or more concretely, whether we can continue calling a political system a democracy if it does not internalize the interests of its contemporaries, does not anticipate the rights of future generations or does not recognize in some way the political subjectivity of nature.