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Authorship attributed to George W. Bungay. Cf. Brown University, Dict. Cat. of the Harris Coll., v. 2. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Collection : The governing classes of Great Britain ; Collection : The governing classes of Great Britain ; Contient une table des matières

THE ARTICLE IS A CRITIQUE OF BOWLES' AND GINTIS' THEORY OF "CONTESTED EXCHANGE." THE AUTHOR POINTS OUT SEVERAL FLAWS IN THEIR THEORY WHICH, HE ARGUES, MAKE FOR AN "ASTRONOMICAL GAP" BETWEEN THE GRAND CONTESTED-EXCHANGE THEORY AND THE FRAGMENTS OF PARTS OF SUCH A THEORY WHICH ARE ACTUALLY AT HAND. FLAWS OF THE THEORY INCLUDE: AN OVEREMPHASIS ON THE ANALOGY AND INTERCONNECTEDNESS BETWEEN THE LABOR AND CREDIT MARKETS, AND AN OVERALL SKETCHY OUTLINE THAT DOES NOT ACTUALLY CONSTITUTE A THEORY.

Der Personenkult ist bekannt vor allem aus der Herrschaftszeit Stalins und Maos. Er hat seine Ursachen wohl eher in der aktuellen politischen Situation als in überkommenen politischen Traditionen. Der Personenkult birgt sowohl für eine Führerpersönlichkeit als auch für die abhängigen Gefolgsleute zahlreiche Vorteile. Auf Parteistruktur und Ideologie hat der Personenkult jedoch negative Wirkungen. (BIOst-Rsg)

This paper constructs and examines a macroeconomic model which combines features from both real and political business cycle models. We augment a standard real business cycle tax model by allowing for varying levels of government partisanship and competence in order to replicate two important empirical regularities: First, that on average the economy expands early under Democratic Presidents and contracts early under Republican Presidents. Second, that Presidents whose parties successfully retain the presidency have stronger than average growth in the second half of their terms. The model generates both of these features that conform to U.S. Post World War II data.

Reviews the contributions of the cognitive approach in helping political psychologists to understand how citizens think about the world of politics. Considers research concerned with both the mental structure or representation of information about the political world and research concerned with specifying the cognitive processes that produce political judgments and opinion, and concludes that political cognition scholarship has begun to live up to its promise. Suggests a research agenda for the future, pointing to directions for extending the political cognition paradigms. (Original abstract - amended)

A Civil Society? Collective Actors in Canadian Political
Life, Miriam Smith, Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2005, pp. 224.A curious thing about Canadian political science is that, compared to
its American or British counterparts, it offers very little analysis of
collective action outside of political parties. Even the interest groups
in Canada don't call themselves interest groups any more. So, when a
book on collective actors by a respected scholar like Miriam
Smith—who has made significant contributions to the study of
Canadian institutionalism and whose book on the lesbian and gay movement
is a gem—comes along, it is an event for the field. Because Smith
starts the book with a quote from my 1996 article with Jane Jenson on
regime shift, I was well invested from the first line and had high
expectations that Smith would not only set the macro institutional context
that she always does so well, but would provide an insightful analysis of
developments in collective action over the past decade that would build on
where Jenson and I left off.

We investigate the effects of the rise of the Internet as an additional mass medium on news consumption patterns and political attitudes. We use Swedish survey data from 2002 to 2007, the period during which online news media emerged. We find that broadband access is associated with online media consumption which, to some extent, crowds out offline consumption. Furthermore, these altered news consumption patterns have no or small effects on political attitudes.

This article is about how political regimes should generally be classified, & how Latin American regimes should be classified for the 1945-1999 period. We make five general claims about regime classification: (1) regime classification should rest on sound concepts & definitions, (2) it should be based on explicit & sensible coding & aggregation rules, (3) it necessarily involves some subjective judgments, (4) the debate about dichotomous vs continuous measures of democracy creates a false dilemma, & (5) dichotomous measures of democracy fail to capture intermediate regime types, obscuring variation that is essential for studying political regimes. This general discussion provides the grounding for our trichotomous ordinal scale, which codes regimes as democratic, semidemocratic, or authoritarian in 19 Latin American countries. Our trichotomous classification achieves greater differentiation than dichotomous classifications & yet avoids the need for massive information that a very finegrained measure would require. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 47 References. Adapted from the source document.

Digitalization in this article is considered as a mechanism for the formation, influence and transformation of public opinion, as a tool for "programming" the style of political thinking. In this article, the key issue is the relationship of processes: scientific and technical and socio-political. The need to study the use of the achievements of scientific and technological progress in various spheres of public life, including political, seems relevant. It is noted that digitalization in the modern world can be used as a powerful ideological weapon, serve as a platform for the dissemination of fake information, support for the culture of cancellation, Russophobic sentiments, cloning of modern forms of ostracism. The analysis of the characteristic features of the modern style of political thinking is carried out, it is emphasized that digitalization can influence the processes of transformation of a person's worldview, his way of thinking, style of political thinking.

The 'new mobilities paradigm' and critical security studies share vocabularies of mobility, circulation and security. Yet, there have been only limited intersections between these approaches. This article explores the relation between mobility and security by developing a series of epistemic-political distinctions between motion, circulation and mobility. It argues that different political grammars of mobility have emerged historically and that we need to attend to the particular articulations of these grammars today, which conjugate mobility to security and subjectivity. The article starts by placing the semantics of motion and circulation, on the one hand, and of mobility, on the other, in historical context. It shows that motion, circulation and mobility are entwined with the production of particular governmental subjects and objects of (in)security. Finally, it explores how grammars of mobility shape political responses in contemporary site of intense securitisation – the UK-French borderzone at Calais.