Search results

In this paper we develop a theory of "Kosher Wars†under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi's rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America's voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.

A type of conventional wisdom has developed among many scholars that industrialized countries with independent central banks produce lower relative inflation rates than countries that do not have these institutions. We argue that the relative importance of central bank independence for fighting inflation changed fundamentally from the 1970s to the 1980s as a result of experiences in the advanced industrialized democracies, which led both Right and Left governments to move toward more neo-liberal macroeconomic policies. As governments made price stability more of a priority, the anti-inflationary effects of independent central banks would become much less pronounced. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed in the study in a multi-variate regression analysis using data from eighteen industrialized democracies.

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social secur ity. This level depends on the difference between population growth and interest rate and on the redistributiveness of benefit rule.

A perennial problem in public opinion research is how best not only to model not only static characteristics, but also to understand trends, movements, & changes in public opinion. Additionally, there is the challenge of connecting various policy areas into one networked policy space, a space that contains the various positions on often disparate substantive policy areas. The model presented here provides a 3-D topographical representation of policy areas according to ideology, scope, & salience; creates an internal dynamic in each policy area; & maps the interaction between policy areas. Data are obtained from Gallup poll questions addressing three policy areas (health & welfare, economics, & defense) for 1968, 1977, & 1988. Initial results of the model demonstrate some evidence for a dynamic complexity in public opinion, both within & between policy areas. When the three separate policy areas are allowed to dynamically redistribute salience across neighborhoods, & also to influence other policy spaces, we see that the predicted topography of public opinion is similar to the actual distribution, reducing error by up to 50% when compared to a random approximation. 1 Table, 6 Figures, 32 References. Adapted from the source document.

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In such a setting, a (redistributive) Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The medium wages workers (not the lowest) join the retirees to form a majority and vote for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between population growth and interest rate and on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ not only according to age but also productivity. In such a setting, a (redistributive) Pay-As-You-Go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is larger than the rate of population growth. The medium wages workers (not the lowest) join the retirees to form a majority and vote for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between population growth and interest rate and on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.