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"This book examines the origins, evolution and future of proposals for a UN 'Legion'- a permanent military force recruited, trained and deployed by the UN. The idea has grown, re-emerged and evolved in direct connection with the development of UN international military forces. The proposed universal soldiers have been seen as the future representatives of a modern world constabulary, international police or humanitarian chivalry. They have also invariably evoked the idea of mercenaries and resurrected fears of supranational government and a 'world army'. Yet, the concretization, in one form or another, of the project of a UN 'Legion' may well be conditional on the viability of the original Utopia, and vice versa. The extreme polarization of the debate, reflecting a tendency to negate the inherent contradictions of reality, reminds us of the historical dimension of the building of international organization, a 'work in progress'."--Jacket

FOLLOWING THE END OF THE COLD WAR THERE DEVELOPED A GENERAL PERCEPTION THAT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN) WOULD NOW BE ABLE TO ADOPT A MORE ENHANCED ROLE AS THE WORLD'S PEACEKEEPER AND PEACEMAKER, ESPECIALLY IF IT ENJOYED THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES. THIS VIEW APPEARED TO BE VINDICATED FOLLOWING THE SUCCESSFUL U.S.-LED UN OPERATION TO LIBERATE KUWAIT FROM SADDAM HUSSEIN IN 1991. HOWEVER, SINCE THEN THE RELUCTANCE OF THE WEST TO BECOME INVOLVED IN AFRICA'S CONFLICTS UNLESS IT IS FOR THEIR OWN ENDS, POINTS TO THE NEED TO ESTABLISH AN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPIG STRUCTURE. YET, AS THIS ARTICLE DEMONSTRATES, POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRUCTURES IN AFRICA ARE NOT YET IN PLACE. THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT ANY ORGANIZATION WILL FILL THE POST-COLD WAR SECURITY VACUUM.

Using a unique application of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), this book provides a critical, interdisciplinary, examination of the contemporary practice of UN peacekeeping. Is peacekeeping intervention? Since its conception in the mid-1950s, peacekeeping has significantly evolved from traditional, lightly armed, passive operations to robust, multi-dimensional stabilisation peacekeeping operations. This raises questions as to whether this is simply a natural evolution of peacekeeping or whether it marks an expansion of the concept beyond its boundaries, pushing it into the realm of peace enforcement or intervention. In response, this book examines the frameworks which govern UN peacekeeping and seeks to understand the relationship between peacekeeping and the principle of non-intervention. Providing practical examples from the United Nations' operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and drawing upon interviews with key international actors including UN personnel, the book explores the boundaries of peacekeeping, contending that peacekeeping, at times, becomes a form of intervention. This, the book argues, is detrimental both to the concept of peacekeeping and to the host state, and it concludes by offering a series of recommendations to re-affirm peacekeeping's boundaries and amplify the effectiveness of contemporary peacekeeping.

Indonesia is frequently mentioned as an emerging player in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping, but its role has been understudied compared to other emerging powers. Drawing on interviews with foreign and defence ministry officials, and independent analysts in Jakarta, as well as statements by Indonesian representatives in the UN and other forums, this article makes three arguments. First, although Indonesia has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), there has been a major change in policy in the last decade, with much greater importance attached to peacekeeping. Jakarta has set itself the goal of becoming a top ten troop contributing country with 4,000 personnel deployed by 2019. Second, although Indonesia retains a strong preference for traditional "blue helmet" missions mandated by the UN Security Council (UNSC), and based on principles of host country consent, impartiality and non-use of force, its views on peacekeeping are evolving. While Indonesia has concerns about aspects of the "new" peacekeeping agenda, such as Protection of Civilians and robust peace enforcement missions, in practice it has proved to be more pragmatic than some of its rhetoric might suggest. Third, although emerging powers are frequently portrayed as conservative, Indonesia has been an advocate for a more ambitious approach to peacekeeping in Southeast Asia. It was the first to argue for an ASEAN peacekeeping force and has supported the use of regional troops to monitor peace agreements. In sum, the Indonesian case supports some of the claims made about emerging powers and peace operations but challenges others, underlining the diversity of this group of states.

AS FAR AS THE UN'S ROLE IN MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IS CONCERNED, ONE OF THE MAIN CRITICISMS OF THE UN HAS ALWAYS BEEN THAT IT NEEDED TOO MUCH TIME FOR THE ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF A FORCE IN THE THEATER, VARYING, IN SOME CASES, FROM THREE TO FIVE MONTHS. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENOCIDE OF TUTSI AND OPPOSITION HUTU IN RWANDA IN 1994, IT WAS WIDELY SUGGESTED THAT A RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES COULD HAVE PREVENTED THE SLAUGHTER. MORE THAN EVER, PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY, EARLY WARNING AND RAPID DEPLOYMENT HAVE BECOME KEY CONCEPTS IN THE SEARCH FOR NEW POLICY INSTRUMENTS AIMED AT STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN CRISES. IN THIS CONTEXT, A NUMBER OF SUGGESTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR WHAT, IN UN JARGON, HAS BEEN OFFICIALLY CALLED "A CAPACITY FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT." WITHOUT ENTERING INTO AN EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF RAPID DEPLOYMENT MODALITIES IT IS CLEAR FROM VARIOUS PROPOSALS THAT THERE IS AMBIGUITY ABOUT WHETHER SUCH A CAPACITY IS FOR ENFORCEMENT AS WELL AS PEACEKEEPING, THAT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL PREFER STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THAT OTHER STATES HAVE BEEN MORE RADICAL IN DEVELOPING THE CONCEPT OF A RAPID REACTION FORCE, WITH ITS FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS.

Is the acquisition of personnel for UN peacekeeping missions susceptible to free-riding by UN member states? If so, what drives this behavior and what impact does this have on obtaining required personnel for the mission? Using data from 21 missions in 13 African countries between 1990 and 2010, this article addresses whether UN peacekeeping missions experience a shortfall in personnel due to incentives to free-ride by contributing states. It argues that as the number of states contributing to a mission increases, contributors have a greater incentive to free-ride and make suboptimal personnel contributions, leading to greater overall shortfall in the mission's personnel. However, this free-riding behavior can be mitigated by the economic incentives of contributor states. The findings support two central tenets of collective action theory: that free-riding by member states contributing to the mission is more prevalent when the number of contributors is larger, and when selective incentives such as economic gains are lower. These findings have implications for the strategic composition and efficacy of peacekeeping forces. More broadly, the results underscore the struggle of international organizations to obtain compliance from member states in achieving their international objectives.

This unique book, one of the first of its kind, discusses how human rights actually featured in UN peace operations in the deadly conflicts in the former Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1996. It is based on original materials in the possession of the author, who was Director of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslava from 1992 to 1996 and also served as Director of the Office of the UN Special Representative in charge of all peacemaking, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations in the region. The book brings out the strategic centrality of human rights in the wide-ranging humanitaria

In this Article I focus on the use of force in self-defense by United Nations peacekeepers that are members of military contingents. This is an important matter because the use of force in self-defense remains the foundation for the use of force inallUnited Nations peace operations—including aggressive or robust peacekeeping.

Existing research shows that peace after civil wars is more stable with peacekeepers present. Yet, violence persists in many postwar contexts, and although postwar violence is often strategic and closely linked to the faultlines of the preceding war, we know little about the impact of peacekeepers on such violence. What we know, moreover, focuses on the former combatants, while this study shows that the majority of deaths in postwar violence are inflicted by other armed actors. This is a challenge for peacekeepers who – for mandate or capacity reasons – usually focus on the warring parties. I argue that the impact of peacekeepers on postwar violence hinges on the extent to which they fill a public security gap after war, since responsibility for violence not covered by a mission's mandate lies with the often dysfunctional security agencies of the state. To test this I use a novel spatial approach to generate data that captures the manifold manifestations of violence across different postwar contexts. I find that only UN police – with their broader effect on public security – mitigate postwar violence generally. UN troops have some impact on civilian targeting by former combatants but no such effect could be identified for violence by other armed actors. The findings highlight the importance of peacekeeping police at a time when the modus operandi and capacity of UN police have been questioned, but also the importance of accounting for a multitude of violent actors when analysing the impact of international interventions more generally.