Search results

AbstractToday's election campaigns are heavily data-driven. Despite the numerous skeptical voices questioning the compatibility of specific campaigning practices with fundamental principles of liberal democracies, there has to date been little comprehensive work in this area from the perspective of normative democratic theory. Our article addresses this gap by drawing on recent research on the normative theory of political parties in the field of deliberative democratic theory. The deliberative theories of democracy proposed by Habermas and Rawls contain structural elements of a normative theory of the political party: the special status of political parties as mediators between background culture and the political forum, between the political system and the public sphere, and between the individual and the state, confers on them a central position as actors in in the public use of reason and deliberation.We argue in this article for a view of digital campaigning as a policy of democracy promotion and for the proposition that, alongside other actors, political parties have a special responsibility in this regard. We point to the implications for the evaluation and design of digital political microtargeting that arise from the application of deliberative principles to political parties and consider the need they reveal for the ongoing development of detailed, nuanced normative theories of democracy.

A paper presented at the 5th National Conference of the National Association of Political Science Students (NAPSS) at the University of Abuja, Nigeria. Tuesday, 21st September, 2021

This book offers a view of West German social structure and political culture from a multidisciplinary perspective. Focusing on the remarkable changes that have taken place in West Germany since World War II, it provides a basis for judging what direction a united Germany is likely to take.

In this contribution we study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971-2010 period. From a panel causality study we find that income inequality has a negative causal effect on economic freedom, while causation does not run in the opposite direction. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic liberty is due to the elite's political power stemming from its disproportionate control over a country's economic resources. The elite uses this power to curtail economic freedom to defend its economic interests by discouraging innovation, competition and protecting its rents. Running a series of dynamic panel estimations, we show that the negative effect of income inequality on economic freedom is robust to different sets of controls and estimation techniques. Finally, we show that the dynamics of the inequality-freedom nexus are to some extent conditional upon a country's political regime. When inequality is low, democracies enjoy comparatively higher levels of economic liberty, in line with the interests of a large middle-class. By contrast, economic freedom is lower in democracies (compared to strongly autocratic regimes with the same income distribution) when inequality is high. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite cooperates with politicians and bureaucrats for their mutual benefit.

In this contribution we study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971-2010 period. From a panel causality study we find that income inequality has a negative causal effect on economic freedom, while causation does not run in the opposite direction. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic liberty is due to the elite's political power stemming from its disproportionate control over a country's economic resources. The elite uses this power to curtail economic freedom to defend its economic interests by discouraging innovation, competition and protecting its rents. Running a series of dynamic panel estimations, we show that the negative effect of income inequality on economic freedom is robust to different sets of controls and estimation techniques. Finally, we show that the dynamics of the inequality-freedom nexus are to some extent conditional upon a country's political regime. When inequality is low, democracies enjoy comparatively higher levels of economic liberty, in line with the interests of a large middle-class. By contrast, economic freedom is lower in democracies (compared to strongly autocratic regimes with the same income distribution) when inequality is high. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite cooperates with politicians and bureaucrats for their mutual benefit.

The Progressive Revolution in Politics and Political Science explores the scope, ambition, and effect of the Progressive revolution of a century ago, which relegated the theory and practice of the Founders to an antiquated historical phase. By contrast, our contributors see beyond the horizon of Progressivism to take account of the Founders' moral and political premises and illuminate its effects on our political science and political practice today. It is a study in political philosophy, intellectual history, and current political understanding