Einstellungen und Verhalten der Niederländer gegenüber Entwicklungsländern und Entwicklungshilfe.
Themen: Wahrnehmung der Situation und der Probleme der Entwicklungsländer; Beurteilung der Effizienz verschiedener Maßnahmen zur Entwicklungshilfe; Informiertheit über Entwicklungshilfeaktionen und Informationsquellen der Befragten zu diesem Themenkreis; eigene Teilnahme an Entwicklungshilfeaktionen.
One area that has the potential for an earthquake is West Sulawesi. When an earthquake occurs, the West Sulawesi government will arrange disaster aid distribution through the Regional Disaster Management Agency (BPBD). This research aims at designing an information system to help the management of aid supplies in West Sulawesi. We used a descriptive method in this research. The qualitative approach was also used in this study to obtain the data. The results show that the difficulty faced by BPBD Majene is in communication between various parties involved in disaster management and recording disaster data. It is due to the complex conditions of the Majene earthquake and difficult coordination. So that in developing this information system is expected to provide easy access by users. In conclusion, with this information system, they can share information by the access rights in the information system.
The Israel Defense Forces are focused on facilitating humanitarian aid entering northern Gaza as well as on receiving aid that will arrive via the US-built temporary floating pier off the coast of Gaza. The IDF's 99th division also began operating to secure the Netzerim corridor in Gaza, a key element of protecting the aid that may arrive whether by land or by sea. The post IDF Focuses on Humanitarian Aid in Gaza first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.
AbstractAs a result of frequent exposure to trauma, aid workers are at high risk for negative psychological symptoms. Training specifically geared at fostering critical incident self-efficacy in humanitarian aid workers may bolster critical incident self-efficacy as well as general self-efficacy as they relate to experiences of traumatic symptomatology and resilience. Sixty-three aid workers completed questionnaires regarding efficacy, resilience, coping, and posttraumatic stress symptomatology at baseline, and 46 aid workers completed the same measures after the training workshop. Multiple regression analysis indicated that higher levels of self-efficacy related to higher resilience levels. General self-efficacy and critical incident coping self-efficacy (CICSE) were stronger after the training, even when controlling for histories of trauma. Histories of trauma contributed significant variance to CICSE before the training but were insignificant after the training. These findings suggest that aid organizations can support their workers by providing training that promotes resilience through enhancing efficacies.
This paper examines the effect of humanitarian aid on fertility and economic growth. In an overlapping generations model, where health status in adulthood depends on health in childhood, adult agents allocate their time to work, leisure and childrearing activities. Humanitarian aid influences the probability of survival to adulthood, health in childhood, and the time that adults allocate to childrearing, giving rise to an ambiguous effect on both fertility and growth. An empirical investigation for the period 1973–2007 suggests that humanitarian aid has on average a zero effect on the rates of fertility and of per capita output growth.
How do the perceived motives of donor states shape recipient attitudes toward foreign aid in a conflict zone? This research note evaluates the impact of two frames that characterize the motives of foreign powers involved in a civil conflict in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. These frames portray foreign actors as providing aid either to alleviate suffering during conflict (humanitarian frame) or to increase their power and influence in the recipient country (political influence frame). We demonstrate how framing impacts attitudes toward foreign assistance from the European Union and the Russian government among potential aid recipients in the Donbas. The results show that frames impact support for foreign aid from the European Union but have no effect on views of Russian aid. Counter to conventional expectations, aid provided for geopolitical, strategic reasons may be viewed as a positive, stabilizing force—even more than foreign aid provided for humanitarian reasons.
Humanitarian aid carries with it the condition of being moral hazardous -- as do all actions of all humans. For example, aid can maintain the status quo, which can be highly detrimental to repressed groups. Humanitarian aid can help prop up a war economy & perhaps most commonly, aid allows states to pass off their responsibilities of caring for their own citizens to the aid organizations. Aid organizations & aid workers must be aware of, & must accept, the moral ambiguity & the far-reaching consequences, of their actions. However, they must not be paralyzed by their awareness of moral complexities since all human action contains a moral element & no course of action -- or inaction -- is morally neutral. 12 References. D. Knaff
International humanitarian aid is pivotal in the response to natural disasters suffered by low-and middle-income countries. While its allocation has been shown to be influenced by donors' foreign policy considerations, power relations within recipient countries have not been addressed. This paper is the first to investigate the role of regional and ethnic favoritism in the formation of humanitarian aid flows. We construct a novel dataset combining information on birth regions of political leaders and the geographic distribution of ethnic groups within countries with high numbers of natural disasters building on census (IPUMS) and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) data. Our results suggest that the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) disburses larger amounts of aid when natural disasters affect the birth region of the countries' leader. We find some evidence that OFDA disburses aid more frequently to leaders' birth regions as well as when regions hit by disasters are populated by politically powerful or discriminated ethnicities. Our findings imply that humanitarian aid is not given for humanitarian reasons alone, but also serves elite interests within recipient countries.
Significance Threats to human livelihoods resulting from natural hazards are increasing due to climate change. Climate-related disasters such as floods, storms, and droughts have destroyed shelter, reduced crop yields, harmed livestock, and fueled conflict, especially in developing countries. The key finding is that UN aid in the aftermath of climate-related disasters is largely driven by humanitarian need. The UN seems able to fend off donor states’ strategic interest and allocate more aid after disasters where hazard severity is greater and need is more pressing. Based on this finding, we argue that the UN lives up to its stated principles of neutrality, impartiality, and independence in disaster aid, corroborating the legitimacy of the UN in allocating disaster aid.
Few issues in global politics are as contentious as foreign aid – how much rich countries should give, in what ways, to whom. For years, it has been a commonplace that U.S. policies are stingy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) routinely ranks the United States far behind its industrialized peers in official development assistance (ODA), measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). An endless parade of critics has implored the government to do more; some suggest that the Bush Administration's support for the Monterrey Consensus, which sets a goal of increasing assistance to 0.7% of GNI, commits it to do more. Against these allegations of miserliness, executive officials and certain sympathetic scholars have begun to argue that the published statistics are misleading because they fail to account for individual and corporate philanthropy. What the OECD misses, this argument runs, is the exceptional extent of Americans' private generosity.
Since 2015, the 'refugee crisis' in Greece has turned the Eastern Mediterranean migration route into one of the main entry points to Europe. In response, a grassroots solidarity movement has emerged in the Aegean islands that has become instrumental for boat rescue at sea, and for camp service provision. These local and international volunteers, as well as refugees, identify as 'New Humanitarians'. This paper presents the emic aspects of the 'New Humanitarians', and focuses on vernacular actors and how they challenge the humanitarian landscape in Greece by examining their principles, practices, and discourse. A key finding is that the 'New Humanitarian' principles that they model revisit the existing ones—i.e. solidarity, hospitality, equality, and agency. Other findings show that the 'New Humanitarians' are reproducing governing technologies imposed by the government and other agencies. They do so while trying to contest mainstream humanitarianism and pleading for much-needed change in the European border regime and refugee management systems.
Few issues in global politics are as contentious as foreign aid – how much rich countries should give, in what ways, to whom. For years, it has been a commonplace that U.S. policies are stingy. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) routinely ranks the United States far behind its industrialized peers in official development assistance (ODA), measured as a percentage of gross national income (GNI). An endless parade of critics has implored the government to do more; some suggest that the Bush Administration's support for the Monterrey Consensus, which sets a goal of increasing assistance to 0.7% of GNI, commits it to do more. Against these allegations of miserliness, executive officials and certain sympathetic scholars have begun to argue that the published statistics are misleading because they fail to account for individual and corporate philanthropy. What the OECD misses, this argument runs, is the exceptional extent of Americans' private generosity. What both sides of the debate have missed, this Article proposes, is not the role of the private sector in generating foreign aid but the role of tax expenditures in subsidizing it. Better known as tax breaks or loopholes, tax expenditures are deviations from the normal tax structure "designed to favor a particular industry, activity, or class of persons." They take the form of deductions, exemptions, exclusions, deferrals, credits, or preferential rates. Economically, these "expenditures" may be seen as equivalent to direct government outlays: if U.S. taxpayers saved $70 billion last year from, say, the mortgage interest deduction, the government therefore gave a $70 billion (implicit) subsidy to homeownership. Stanley Surrey pioneered the theory of tax expenditures in the late 1960s, and the concept is now widely, though not universally, credited. Since 1974, Congress has required the annual publication of a tax expenditure budget. Although not immediately evident from the budget data, in recent years a growing amount of expenditure has gone toward foreign aid. The reason lies in America's tax treatment of nonprofit organizations. Whenever U.S. charities and foundations spend money overseas – as they have increasingly been doing – some portion of this spending can be attributed to the support they receive from numerous state and federal tax privileges. More controversially, several other domestic tax expenditures, such as the deferral granted to foreign source active business income, might also be seen as providing foreign assistance. Unlike traditional ODA, these tax expenditure funds are privately organized and distributed, yet unlike voluntary transfers they are paid for by the public fisc. This is not private aid; it is privatized aid. The basic, descriptive goal of this Article is to show, in Parts I and II, how nonprofit tax policies have shaped the content of American aid. This analysis implies that the definition of ODA should be revised, as the next Part explains. The broader goal is to begin to connect these insights, in the balance of Part III, with the literatures on tax expenditures and international development – and, in so doing, to illuminate some attractive and unattractive features of using tax expenditures in the foreign aid context. While my focus throughout is on the United States, the central argument can be generalized to any country with broadly analogous international tax policies.
The article analyzes the Canadian foreign aid relationship with Asia; focusing primarily on the motivations and reasons why the government should rethink the utilization of scarce resources to promote wellbeing and strategic ties. The author then presents the argument, that despite the traditional leveraging of its foreign aid relations, Canada has been slow in responding to the dramatic changes and shifts in Asia and has not effectively recalibrated such programs. Utilizing the writing of Carol Lancaster, the author explains the instrument role of foreign aid and main purposes: diplomatic, developmental, humanitarian relief, commercial, and less prominently, cultural. The article then examines concerning reasons behind such utilization; explains the Asian aid policy in effect through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the International Development Research Center (IDRC); and discusses the policy shift, levels attained, projects, and the role and influence of multi and bilateral aid agencies in the region. Then the article addresses the diversions from this coherent strategy of the CIDA; exemplifies implementation and administering through humanitarian relief efforts in the Indian Ocean nations and Afghanistan; discusses the present state of bilateral and multilateral aid funding, and cites developmental interests in areas such as Indonesia, and Vietnam. The article also looks at bureaucratic organizational constraints and other problems factored in the aid process, discussing programming policy, programming, projects, and personnel hierarchy. Finally, the author opines on the future of aid and the uncertainty and purpose of the strategy behind implementing such programs. Adapted from the source document.
