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s. Identification with security studies in European countries is pretty low (around 10%). Security studies have strong connections with international relations – 2/3 of those who teach security studies also teach international relations. Lecturers of security studies focus mostly on "hard" security issues (56% of security lecturers give policy advice on international affairs, development aid and EU-matters and 41% of security lecturers are solicited on matters pertaining to "defence"). The share of security lecturers who advise on "soft" security issues is 16%. The geopolitical situation is a strong predictor of the size of security experts'community in European countries. In less democratic countries more researchers identify with security studies.

s. Identification with security studies in European countries is pretty low (around 10%). Security studies have strong connections with international relations – 2/3 of those who teach security studies also teach international relations. Lecturers of security studies focus mostly on "hard" security issues (56% of security lecturers give policy advice on international affairs, development aid and EU-matters and 41% of security lecturers are solicited on matters pertaining to "defence"). The share of security lecturers who advise on "soft" security issues is 16%. The geopolitical situation is a strong predictor of the size of security experts'community in European countries. In less democratic countries more researchers identify with security studies.

s. Identification with security studies in European countries is pretty low (around 10%). Security studies have strong connections with international relations – 2/3 of those who teach security studies also teach international relations. Lecturers of security studies focus mostly on "hard" security issues (56% of security lecturers give policy advice on international affairs, development aid and EU-matters and 41% of security lecturers are solicited on matters pertaining to "defence"). The share of security lecturers who advise on "soft" security issues is 16%. The geopolitical situation is a strong predictor of the size of security experts'community in European countries. In less democratic countries more researchers identify with security studies.

O artigo examina a metodologia comparativa proposta no âmbito da abordagem "Análise Comparativa Histórica" (CHA). O proposito do artigo é destacar as vantagens adquiridas com a aplicação desta metodologia comparativa na interpretação de eventos complexos da atualidade. Ao fazê-lo, o artigo propõe orientações concretas sobre como aplicar esta metodologia para reforçar comparações históricas. Na tentativa de alcançar esses fins, o artigo visa três objetivos. Primeiro, mostrar como as comparações históricas são úteis para a identificação de padrões, mecanismos e dinâmicas por trás de processos complexos nas ciências sociais e políticas. Segundo, explicar as vantagens metodológicas da utilização da CHA em processos históricos complexos e explora algumas inovações metodológicas. E, por último, aplicar as proposições feitas pela CHA em dois eventos atuais: o surgimento do grupo armado "Estado Islâmico" e a disputa territorial russo-ucraniana. O artigo conclui que a CHA oferece um esquema comparativo inovador para compreender processos históricos complexo entre vários países.

Der Beitrag konstatiert Defizite bei der politikwissenschaftlichen Aufarbeitung der AIDS-Pandemie und deren verheerende Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklungsländer, speziell in Afrika. Als notwendige Forschungsfelder der politischen Wissenschaft werden identifiziert: 1. Unterschiede zwischen den Staaten bei der Behandlung des AIDS-Problems, 2. das Verhältnis zwischen Regierungen und NGOs im Hinblick auf AIDS, 3. AIDS und wirtschaftlicher Neoliberalismus, 4. AIDS im Kontext von Nord-Süd-Spannungen, 5. Zusammenhänge zwischen AIDS und Fragen internationaler Sicherheit. (DÜI-Kör)

Telling governments what to do is an ancient and important tradition in economics. Predicting what governments will do, i.e., endogenizing policy, is a newer activity, but one of growing prominence. The two activities appear incompatible: if what governments do is the result somehow of equilibrium behavior of self‐interested actors, then advising governments is as senseless an activity as advising monopolists to lower prices or advising the San Andreas fault to be quiet. We show why and how advising can sometimes be a sensible activity, even when we hold sophisticated views about how governments operate.