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AbstractResearch into religion and international relations (RIR) has come incredibly far in the decades since 9/11. However, a tension remains in this research program, as neopositivist scholars simultaneously argue religion both has an independent effect on and interacts with international politics. This has raised critiques of religion's importance. Relational work in international relations—inspired by scholars such as Bourdieu, LaTour, and Tilly—provides a means to overcome this obstacle. While some works on RIR have drawn on this tradition, it has yet to be systematized. In this review article, I discuss three recent books that highlight both the limits of the current approach to RIR and the potential to move it forward by drawing on relational analyses. I also provide guidelines for adjusting future work in this research program.

I propose that special interests are particularly influential in international cooperation because they are able to enact pressure on the government already during the negotiations while the issue is not yet salient for the general public. In my formal model, special interests can offer political support to the government in exchange for a discriminatory implementation commitment that benefits them. The government colludes with the special interests if the value of political support exceeds the cost. However, if the government colludes with special interests in country A, the payoff to the government and special interests in country B also decreases because the probability of successful international cooperation decreases. In equilibrium, special interests create a collective-action problem that complicates international cooperation. In addition to providing a new explanation for the power of special interests in international cooperation, the article illuminates how international negotiations and domestic treaty implementation interact. The analysis also reveals a new dimension of flexibility in international cooperation. Adapted from the source document.

Part 1: Hearing June 6, 1979. III,110 S.;; Part 2: Hearing October 1, 1979. III,170 S

In dieser aktuellen und interdisziplinären Analyse der internationalen Antikorruptionsregime werden mit Schwerpunkt Europa ausgewählte staatenübergreifende Bemühungen der letzten Jahre zur Eindämmung der Korruption einer kritischen Bestandsaufnahme unterzogen. Die Beiträge stammen aus der Politikwissenschaft, Rechtswissenschaft, Soziologie, Wirtschaftswissenschaft und von PraktikerInnen.Der Band vereinigt sowohl qualitative als auch quantitative Analysen und berücksichtigt darüber hinaus kulturwissenschaftliche Fragestellungen im Rahmen seiner vier Teile: "The European Dimension", "Political and Legal Instruments", "Culture, Perceptions, and Experiences" sowie "Practitioners' Perspectives".Mit Beiträgen von: Tanja A. Börzel, Donald Bowser, Ben Elers, Angelos Giannakopoulos, Åse B. Grødeland, Leslie Holmes, Georg Huber-Grabenwarter, Anja P. Jakobi, Anne Lugon-Moulin, Bryane Michael, Holger Moroff, Yasemin Pamuk, Diana Schmidt-Pfister, Gefion Schuler, Andreas Stahn, Dirk Tänzler, Michael H. Wiehen und Sebastian Wolf

We analyze institutional solutions to international cooperation when actors have heterogeneous preferences over the desirability of the action and split into supporters and opponents, all of whom can spend resources toward their preferred outcome. We study how actors can communicate their preferences through voting when they are not bound either by their own vote or the outcome of the collective vote. We identify two organizational types with endogenous coercive enforcement and find that neither is unambiguously preferable. Like the solutions to the traditional Prisoners' Dilemma these forms require long shadows of the future to sustain. We then show that cooperation can be sustained through a noncoercive organization where actors delegate execution to an agent. Even though this institution is costlier, it does not require any expertise by the agent and is independent of the shadow of the future, and thus is implementable when the others are not. Copyright © The IO Foundation 2013 Â.