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Career as an International Relations Scholar. - Lebow, Richard Ned 3-17. - Some Thoughts on Richard Ned Lebow's The Politics and Ethics of Identity. - Frost, Mervyn 21-29. - Political Psychology: Deterrence and Conflict. - Stein, Janice Gross 31-34. - Methods and Philosophy of Science: Psychology, Historical Science and Inefficient Causation. - Guzzini, Stefano 35-44. - Social Psychological Micro-foundations for International Relations. - Kornprobst, Markus 45-53. - Lebow's Theory of International Relations. - Müller, Harald 55-65. - Aristos Eikastes-Ned Lebow as a 'Themistoclean' Classicist. - Wendt, Christian 67-74. - Ned Lebow on the Cold War's End, and Aftermath. - English, Robert 75-83. - Thucydides the Constructivist. - Lebow, Richard Ned 87-113. - Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining. - Lebow, Richard Ned 115-144. - Bibliography of Richard Ned Lebow's Publications. - Lebow, Richard Ned 147-158

Security assurances : initial hypotheses / Jeffrey W. Knopf -- The psychology of assurance : an emotional tale / Janice Gross Stein -- The role of security assurances in the nuclear nonproliferation regime / John Simpson -- Libya, nuclear rollback, and the role of negative and positive security assurances / Wyn Q. Bowen -- Security assurances and Iran : assessment and re-conceptualization / Jim Walsh -- Maintaining Japan's non-nuclear identity : the role of U.S. security assurances / Yuki Tatsumi -- Infusing commitment with credibility : the role of security assurances in cementing the U.S.-ROK alliance / Scott Snyder and Joyce Lee -- Assessing the role of security assurances in dealing with North Korea / John S. Park -- The United States and Swedish plans to build the bomb, 1945-1968 / Thomas Jonter -- The "model" of Ukrainian denuclearization / Sherman W. Garnett

Two leaders engaged in international co-operation must each build trust by credibly signalling that they will not exploit the other by defecting at the implementation stage. Previous research does not reveal the difficulty and cost of such international reassurance. The role that costly adjustments by markets play in international reassurance is analysed, showing that fully efficient information revelation can be achieved when market actors under intense competitive pressures undergo sufficiently costly adjustments in expectation of international co-operation. 'Nice' leaders can reveal their true preferences simply by saying they intend to co-operate, because 'mean' leaders are unwilling to mislead market actors into undergoing futile costly adjustments. However, market imperfections prevent full information revelation unless market actors prefer international co-operation to the status quo. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)