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The World Trade Organization (WTO) has faced harsh criticism from developing nations in recent years. Many developing nations feel that the promises they received when they joined the WTO have not been fulfilled. These nations feel that wealthy, industrialized nations like the United States and the members of the European Union are the only ones that have benefited from the organization. Moreover, they feel that these developed nations have benefited at their expense through the WTO's dispute settlement process. Many improvements to the WTO have been proposed. However, the one that seems the most able to help developing nations, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL), has not received support from either the United States or the European Union. The Advisory Centre was established in 2001 and is the first center for legal aid in the international system. The goal of the Advisory Centre is to provide developing nations with training and legal assistance in WTO matters. The WTO is an intricate system of rights and obligations, supported by a binding dispute settlement mechanism to ensure compliance. Meaningful participation in the WTO requires a good understanding of these rights and obligations and the ability to participate in its dispute settlement mechanism. The ACWL has the potential to benefit every nation that participates in the WTO, not just developing nations. The ACWL legitimizes the WTO as a whole. When parties are equally represented, the entire system is legitimated. Therefore, both the United States and the European Union would ultimately benefit from supporting this organization.

Intro -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1 The Puzzle of Non-participatory Membership -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Research Rationale -- 1.3 Research Questions -- 1.4 Non-participatory Membership -- 1.4.1 Pure Non-participation -- 1.4.2 Strategic Bargaining -- 1.4.3 Free Riding -- 1.5 Research Design -- 1.6 Organization of the Study -- References -- Chapter 2 Cheating, Costs and Litigation at the World Trade Organization -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Premise of Prisoner's Dilemma -- 2.3 A Model of Trade and Dispute Resolution -- 2.4 Empirical Implications of the Model -- 2.5 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 3 To File or Not to File? The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Ordinary Portland Grey Cement -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Justification for the Cases Selected -- 3.3 The Contested Good: Ordinary Portland Grey Cement -- 3.4 Dumping as a Trading Strategy -- 3.5 Dumping at the World Trade Organization -- 3.6 The Anti-Dumping Agreement and Its Ambiguities -- 3.6.1 Like Products: How Alike Should They Be? -- 3.6.2 Finding the Normal Value -- 3.6.3 Determining the Dumping Margin -- 3.6.4 Determining Material Injury -- 3.6.5 Dumping and the Domestic Industry -- 3.6.6 Threat of Material Injury and the Domestic Industry -- 3.7 Conclusion -- References -- Chapter 4 Legal Capacity and Non-participatory Membership -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Membership in WTO Negotiation Groups -- 4.2.1 China-Cement (December 16, 2003) -- 4.2.2 Guatemala-Cement I and II (October 17, 1996 and January 5, 1999) -- 4.2.3 United States-Cement (January 31, 2003) -- 4.3 Membership in Other International Dispute Resolution Organizations -- 4.4 Membership in Regional Dispute Settlement Organizations at the Time of the Dispute -- 4.5 Membership in the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL).