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This article seeks to examine how regional organisations in Africa are responding to the growing call for them to provide alternative approaches and models of economic development in the continent. The study interrogates the role of the African Development Bank (AfDB) as an agent of a changing global governance system and an emerging leader in Africa's development journey. The article begins by reflecting on the debate of a decline in global governance; it looks at Africa within the global economy and examines the organisational structure, contributions and changing role of the AfDB since its inception. It concludes that the AfDB finds itself in a unique position of trust among donors and African states at a time when traditional institutions are becoming less popular. It recommends AfDB adopt a number of reforms needed to help it maximise its impact on the continent

This thesis examines the performance of the African Development Bank Group (AfDB) as advisor to African governments on Economic policy and planning. The thesis focuses on countries within the Economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). Ghana, a member of the ECOWAS countries, is singled out as a case study for the analysis. To perform the analysis, the thesis examines the purpose for the establishment of the AfDB, its mission as well as sources of funding and projects. The AfDB relationship with other multilateral development institutions, specifically the World Bank Group is assessed, in terms of the levels of capitalization and lending windows. To effectively guide what to measure, the Universalia model of organizational Assessment, developed by Professors Charles Lusthaus and Gary Anderson of the Department of Administration and Policy Studies at McGill University, is adopted for this study. Four factors were assessed: effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and financial viability of the AfDB. This thesis concludes that the AfDB is an institution in the process of (re) defining its focus and seeking to establish itself among its member states. The AfDB has been in the shadows of the World Bank Group, the IMF and other multilateral institutions. Overall the AfDB has so far played a limited role in national policy dialogue with low visibility and minor contributions within the West African region. Moreover, in Ghana the AfDB has been criticised for being over-responsive to incumbent governments to the extent that it sometimes becomes inconsistent with the need for a firmer, more fundamental and coordinated stand in policy dialogue. ; M-IR

At the crossroad of Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Morocco is a key partner of our institutions. Morocco is rich in history and tradition, economic and human resources. The emergence of a dynamic and broad-based private sector can become a powerful driver of job creation, social inclusion and economic resilience. This is all the more important in the wake of an unprecedented crisis that has hit the world economy with no exceptions. In 2020, the AfDB, EBRD and EIB together provided more than MAD 18.6 billion (of which more than MAD 4 billion for the AfDB, MAD 7.9 billion for the EBRD, and MAD 6.7 billion for the EIB) in financing for development in Morocco. This report has been jointly prepared by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the European Investment Bank (EIB).

This article seeks to examine how regional organisations in Africa are responding to the growing call for them to provide alternative approaches and models of economic development in the continent. The study interrogates the role of the African Development Bank (AfDB) as an agent of a changing global governance system and an emerging leader in Africa's development journey. The article begins by reflecting on the debate of a decline in global governance; it looks at Africa within the global economy and examines the organisational structure, contributions and changing role of the AfDB since its inception. It concludes that the AfDB finds itself in a unique position of trust among donors and African states at a time when traditional institutions are becoming less popular. It recommends AfDB adopt a number of reforms needed to help it maximise its impact on the continent.

This post is co-authored by Susanna Berkouwer, Eric Hsu, Edward Miguel, and Catherine Wolfram, based on a study supported by CEGA. This post was originally posted on the Energy for Growth Hub blog.Electrician from Kenya Power | Rod WaddingtonGovernments and foreign aid institutions routinely finance large infrastructure construction projects in developing and emerging markets. In 2015, for example, the Government of Kenya launched the Last Mile Connectivity Project, designed to connect all Kenyan households to electricity by 2022 using financing from the World Bank (WB) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). To complete construction at the approximately 20,000 villages selected for the program, Kenya Power awarded dozens of private sector contracts to procure goods and services. However, distinct processes and regulations applied to villages where construction was financed by the WB and villages where construction was financed by the AfDB. We combined this natural variation with a randomized audit experiment to understand how procurement policies impacted the timing, cost, quantity, and quality of construction on the ground in a new research paper, titled "Donor contracting conditions and public procurement: Causal evidence from Kenyan electrification."Kenya's Last Mile Connectivity Project (LMCP)In a May 2015 Presidential Address, Kenya's president Uhuru Kenyatta launched the LMCP with the goal of connecting "one million new customers to electricity each year." As of 2017, there were around 60,000 electrical transformers across Kenya, which convert high- and medium-voltage power lines (33kV or 11kV) to low voltage (usually 0.415kV) that can be connected to households. The LMCP was to connect all unconnected households within 600 meters of a transformer by extending the local LV network through a process called 'maximization'. Phase I targeted the maximization of 8,520 transformers, with the AfDB financing 5,320 and the WB financing 3,200: Kenya Power assigned these in a largely arbitrary manner. Panel A of Figure 1 shows that AfDB- and WB-funded villages are distributed evenly across Kenya.FIGURE 1: Locations of Last Mile Connectivity Project villages across Kenya. Panel A plots LMCP sites that were funded by the WB and AfDB Phase I across all of Kenya. Panel B zooms in on the sites in the five study counties (Kakamega, Kericho, Kisumu, Nandi, Vihiga). Panel C shows the random assignment to an audit treatment.World Bank and the African Development Bank procedural conditionsThere are two key differences in the procedures used by the WB and the AfDB in this context. First, the AfDB used a bundled contracting style known as 'turn-key', or bundled, contracting (Panel A of Figure 2). Each AfDB turn-key contract comprised the entire construction process of all LMCP transformers in one of ten geographical clusters of counties. This included designing an efficient extension of the LV network to reach all unconnected households at a site, procuring the materials required to complete those designs, and installing materials according to the designs. Together with a metering contract and a consulting contract, Kenya Power awarded 12 LMCP contracts under the AfDB component. The WB, on the other hand, opted for an unbundled approach for the LMCP (Panel B of Figure 2), awarding 35 contracts, including four consulting contracts, eight design contracts, six contracts to procure wooden poles, three for concrete poles, three for conductors, three for cables, two for meters, and finally six contracts for installation.FIGURE 2: Contracting structures. Panel A displays the structure of bundled contracting employed by the AfDB. Panel B displays the structure of unbundled contracting employed by the WB.The second key difference between the funders is that the WB required an additional inspection report after construction. To understand the impact of such an ex-post inspection, we implemented a randomized controlled trial. Panel C of Figure 1 shows which sites were in the control and treatment arms. Members of our research team met with contractors in person to inform them of the randomly selected subset of treatment sites, which we tell them will be audited after construction. Given that the WB procedures already included a round of ex post audits, this additional round of audits should have a larger impact at AfDB sites than at WB sites.Collecting on-the-ground construction and power quality dataTo understand how the procedural differences affect construction outcomes on the ground, we collected data on 380 LMCP villages (shown in Panel B of Figure 1):GPS and engineering quality measurements of transformers, poles, and wires, as well as accessories like struts and stays.Household surveys on connection cost, timing, and experience.Minute-by-minute outage and voltage data quality from 600 households collected using nLine's PowerWatch devices.Original contracts signed between Kenya Power and contractors.Qualitative interviews: with senior leadership at Kenya Power, the WB, and the AfDB.FIGURE 3: Example of a Last Mile Connectivity Project (LMCP) Village. Each LMCP site is centered around a transformer from which low-voltage wiring extends to connect households and businesses to the grid. The gray circle denotes the 600m eligibility radius and the blue circle denotes our 700m surveying threshold.In addition to these primary data, we analyze 2009 Census data, VIIRS nighttime radiance data, land gradient data, and HERE Maps travel data.ResultsWe identified three main results:Households in villages funded by the AfDB are connected to electricity on average 8 months sooner than households in villages funded by the WB. This delay is caused primarily by the increased bureaucratic requirements resulting from the larger number and heterogeneity in WB contracts, as well as poor coordination between the various stages of WB contracting.Second, more poles and household connections were constructed at AfDB sites, driven in part by the WB's stricter adherence to the rule that only households within 600m of the transformer were to be connected.Third, WB processes, while taking longer, do generate tangible benefits: on-the-ground construction quality is 0.6 standard deviations higher at WB sites than AfDB sites, driven largely by the increased presence of pole caps, stays/struts, and grounding wires. While this does not lead to any improvements in voltage quality or power outages, these improvements are likely to improve grid longevity, lowering long-term maintenance and replacement costs.We also found that the additional audit treatment improved construction quality at AfDB sites but not at WB sites, which already saw rigorous ex-post inspections. These results hold across three different outcomes: the audit treatment increases the number of poles constructed at AfDB sites (but not at WB sites), improves average voltage by 5V at AfDB sites (but not at WB sites), and improves household installation quality and electricity usage at AfDB sites (but not at WB sites). Taken together, these results suggest that the additional inspection prescribed by WB procedures has an important effect on construction quality.Evaluating the relative net benefits of the two approaches requires understanding the long- and short-term costs and benefits: the WB procedures delayed the household connection date but reduced long-term maintenance costs when compared with AfDB procedures. We calculate that even a reasonable set of assumptions indicate anywhere from a USD 5.6mn net benefit of AfDB processes to a USD 2.8mn net benefit of WB processes. Neither method is necessarily the best option, and the optimal contracting structure will depend on the project's goals. Governments looking to spur short-term electrification may prefer the bundled method used by AfDB, whereas governments prioritizing longer term trade-offs may want to employ the unbundled method used by WB.Power Quality in Donor-Funded Infrastructure Projects was originally published in CEGA on Medium, where people are continuing the conversation by highlighting and responding to this story.

Promoting development in Africa has faced significant challenges partly because of the continent's peripheral access to global markets as well as its internal geographical limitations on the movement of people, goods, and services. However, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and its "developmental" role has emerged as a practical and tailored approach to Pan-African development, especially in the midst of a growing crisis in global multilateralism. This article argues that the AfDB can be a significant promoter of African development given its unique characteristics, focus areas, and lending style that are different from other multilateral institutions. Using a case-study approach, and by analysing literature on the AfDB, policy papers, and government reports, this study explores the developmental role of the bank and demonstrates its comparative advantage to other multilateral institutions in Africa.

The African Development Bank's (AfDB) Addis Ababa Forum in June 2003 focused on the role of women entrepreneurs in private sector development, poverty reduction, and sustainable growth and development. It provided an opportunity for the AfDB and the International Labour Office (ILO) to join forces using their complementary expertise in support of women-owned businesses in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Zambia. This report is based on the country assessment for Ethiopia, where the ILO has been researching and supporting women's entrepreneurship. Examining such issues as the economic context, micro-fina

Yero Baldeh has over twenty-four years of professional experience, seventeen of which with the African Development Bank. He is currently the Director of the Transition States Coordination Office at the African Development Bank (AfDB), Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. Prior to this, he was the Country Manager for Ghana, Lead Coordinator of the Transition States Coordination Office and Country Manager in Sierra Leone, among other posts. Before he joined the Bank in 2004, Dr Baldeh was the Head of The Gambia Social Development Fund.Amel Hamza has more than thirty years of management and technical experience on gender and related topics, with over a decade of successful track record in the AfDB. She is currently leading the AfDB's roll-out and implementation of the 2021-2025 Gender Strategy. Prior to joining the AfDB, Dr Hamza worked in academia in her home country of Sudan and held different positions in UNICEF and UN Women. She holds a master's degree in Development Studies with specialization in Women and Development from the Institute of Social Studies, from the Netherlands.

In den letzten Jahrzehnten wurde die Förderung von Demokratie und Governance zu einem wichtigen Bestandteil der Außenpolitik westlicher Regierungen und multilateraler Organisationen. Nach und nach wurde die externe Demokratieförderung zu einem breiten Forschungsfeld der Politikwissenschaft und der Transformationsforschung. Während sich ein Großteil der wissenschaftlichen Forschung auf Instrumente und Strategien multilateraler Geberinstitutionen wie Weltbank (WB), Internationaler Währungsfonds (IWF) und Europäische Union (EU) konzentriert, ist die Afrikanische Entwicklungsbankgruppe (AfDB) bisher nur wenig erforscht. Die Studie bietet neue empirische Einblicke in die Umsetzung der politischer und entwicklungspolitischer Entwicklungszusammenarbeit für Marokko als größter Empfänger von bilateraler EU-Hilfe im Rahmen der Europäischen Nachbarschaftspolitik (ENP) und trägt zu einer systematischeren Erforschung der Rolle nicht-westlicher Akteure in der Auslandshilfe bei. Der Autor zeigt zum einen, dass die Ziele der Förderung von Demokratie und guter Regierungsführung miteinander konkurrieren und zum anderen die Politikförderung zunehmend technokratisiert und entpolitisiert wird.