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Project Hybrid regimes has democratization and non-democratic regimes as its focus. In recent years, research has shown how a number of authoritarian regimes have adopted a blend of democracy and authoritarianism rather than converting outright to full democracy. A country might for instance hold free elections but show little regard for the political and human rights of citizens. Project collaborators are operating on the premise that this type of blended or hybrid regime constitutes a distinct regime type alongside democracies, full authoritarian regimes, or totalitarian governments. They seek to explore the question of whether outside aid from full democracies can aid hybrid regimes in converting into full democracies. While the number of democratic governments around the world has increased in recent years, researchers have noted that hybrid regimes often resist efforts on the part of foreign democratic organizations to aid them toward a process of greater democratization. Citing the case of post-Soviet countries, and the Ukraine, the authors question the widely held perception by researchers that countries possessing a blend of democratic and authoritarian elements are at a transition point on the way to full democratization and that non-democratic elements of their governments merely constitute temporary setbacks. The authors, noting that heads of such regimes resist full democracy because they aren't prepared to accept challenges to their political power, argue for a new for the recognition of a new, lasting hybrid type of government characterized by elements of both democracy and authoritarianism. Adapted from the source document.

How is a hybrid state maintained? Today, several countries undergoing democratic reforms are also backsliding towards greater authoritarianism. This article draws on election data from Macedonia and Albania to show how a country can display elements of democratic improvement and democratic deterioration within the same policy field. The Albanian case shows how the political parties, with an anchoring in legislation, work to make the electoral administration politically dependent. This enables the political parties to exert control over central aspects of the distribution of power. By contrast, the case of Macedonia shows how undemocratic behaviors can become institutionalized and gradually accepted, even as other features of the electoral process undergo improvement. Common to both countries are patterns of patronage that serve to maintain a unique organization of power: the democratic façade is improved, but the undemocratic behavior remains.

Up until 2020 Aleksandr Lukashenka's authoritarian regime had ruled Belarus for 26 years without major challenges. Thus, the popular mobilization that took shape in connection with the August 2020 presidential election came as a surprise. It was not the first time that elections in Belarus were not fair – but it was the first time that large sectors of the population reacted openly. Six months later, Belarusians all over the country were still contesting the falsified results. What contributed to this mobilization and politicization of a previously largely apolitical society? Why does that development represent such a serious threat to the authoritarian system? This study sees the Belarusian presidential election and its aftermath as illustrating the 'politics of uncertainty' of electoral authoritarian regimes. Because of the intrinsic insecurity of authoritarian systems, all regular elections in that context entail risks, which in theory might lead to change. In Belarus, the emergence of latent threats to the regime's legitimacy in the form of social cleavages and an economic crisis, combined with the fundamental dynamics of the 'election game', amplified this instability. The election served as the starting point for a process of transformation that became the most serious threat ever faced by the Lukashenka regime.