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Four basic and meaningful trends are currently developing in the Sino-Soviet bloc. A most important trend is the emergence of diversity within Communist unity. Stalinism was characterized by political and ideological uniformity, centralization, and homogeneity. Today, a far more complicated pattern of relations prevails. A second trend, related to the first, is the weakening of ideological unity and the decline of ideological zeal within the Communist bloc. A third trend involves the energetic development of the economic and political integration of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Soviet Union remains an autarchic economy. Otherwise, efforts are being made to develop specialization in the economic development and production of the various Communist countries. This division of labor contributes to greater interdependence. The Asian states, to date, are not part of this joint economic enterprise. The fourth trend is a general sense of historical momentum reinforced, on dubious intellectual grounds, by Soviet technological, especially space, advances. The West should avoid premature and rash actions of either a provocative or an unnecessarily compromising character. Beyond that, it is in the Western interest to promote stability among those Communist elites already inclined toward moderation and greater radicalism among those which are more militant.

The Communist camp is composed of twelve states: the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania, Mongolia. Jointly, the Communist-ruled states account for about 38 per cent of the world's population, 24.2 per cent of the world's area, and approximately one-third of the world's industrial output. During Stalin's lifetime the Communist bloc operated essentially through a relatively simple subordination of the various units to the dictator's will, generally expressed by indirect methods of police and party control. This somewhat informal organization reflected in part the old dictator's specific political style; in part it was a function of the relatively immature stage of the bloc's development. As a result, the "maturation" of the bloc coincided with the difficult post-Stalin period of transition within the USSR and was marked by major upheavals and tensions. By 1958-1959, however, the crisis had subsided, and a new and more complex image of the bloc became apparent. While the Soviet Union continued to exercise leadership, acknowledged at the November 1957 conference of the Communist parties and buttressed by Soviet international and technological prestige, the camp had developed more elaborate mechanisms and processes of cohesion that also contributed to its unity. Some of them dated back to the Stalinist days, but were now infused with new vitality. Others emerged during the post-Stalin phase.

There are some similarities because both then and now some of the major powers seem to be either slowly responding or misunderstanding the situation, or failing to see the risks in it. But beyond these similarities I think there are also very important differences, namely that 1914 did lead ultimately to world war. I don't think at this stage anything like that is inherent in the otherwise complicated situation that we confront. There could be, in the worst-case scenario, a serious explosion in the Middle East region, and defined more grandly geographically. It could spread eastwards into Afghanistan and eventually affect Central Asia. It could spread northwards to Iraq, towards the Mediterranean and even the Russian Caucasus and so forth. But I don't see a war in any way that is reminiscent of the First World War. Adapted from the source document.