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Social Democrats become the biggest party in the Finnish parliamentary election of April 14, followed by the Finns Party. Greens and Left Alliance make significant advances, National Coalition Party maintains its position. Difficult coalition building ahead. The Finns Party probably … Continue reading →

The election victory in the Netherlands for the Party for Freedom fits into a wider picture of European radical-right populism.

After a prolonged period of speculation, conjecture, and anticipation, the contours of a Blue-White coalition poised to challenge the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan's 2024 presidential election began to crystallize late last month.
In a joint press conference following private negotiations, Eric Chu, the chairman of the Kuomintang (KMT), and Ko Wen-je, the 2024 presidential candidate and chairman of the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) unveiled a united front committing to championing the "third wave of democratic reform" in Taiwan, a clear repudiation of the entrenched winner-takes-all "democratic dictatorship" political culture. Encouragingly for coalition supporters, the KMT and TPP have also confirmed their commitment to collaborate in the legislative elections, with a shared objective of breaking the DPP's legislative majority since 2016.
This alliance signifies a robust intent to not only overhaul Taiwan's electoral system but more importantly, also dismantle the nearly decade-long dominance of the DPP over Taiwan's politics.
The journey toward forming the Blue-White Coalition has been tumultuous, marked by clear ideological and political disparities between the KMT and the TPP. Although the glue of a strong shared discontent with the governance of DPP has been holding the KMT and TPP together in the prolonged negotiation of joining forces, the delicate dance of ambition and pragmatism underscores the different realities faced by both parties.
The storied over-a-century-old KMT desires to retake the presidency, reverse its decline of a decade, and channel its deep-rooted legacy to rekindle its past preeminence. Meanwhile, the four-year-young TPP is striving to expand its influence and establish itself as a revolutionary "third force" that enthralls the younger electorate with pledges to disrupt the entrenched KMT-DPP dominance, thereby necessitating some level of strategic neutrality from close cooperation with KMT.
For the young TPP, being able to gain the current popularity is already a remarkable victory; for the KMT, anything short of securing the presidential palace next January would be a failure. As a result, despite both Eric Chu and the KMT presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih have been lobbying for Ko to accept a vice-presidential slot beside Hou, forming a joint president ticket that is led by KMT, with polling continuing to place Ko and Hou neck and neck, Ko is loath to settle for second. For a star politician that is trending upward like Ko, assuming the vice presidency might be valued less than holding on to the "third force" value, which might eventually promise a better chance to win the presidency in future elections.
The situation has led observers to continue casting doubts on the likelihood of a Hou-Ko joint ticket, despite the recent breakthrough of negotiations.
Terry Gou, founder of the world's largest contract electronics maker Foxconn, has been pursuing his campaign despite being marginalized a bit by the recent progress of the Blue-White coalition. Gou's recent submission of over a million petition signatures — triple the threshold of 289,667 signatures for an independent presidential candidacy — signals some positive momentum that Gou possessed.
However, faced with a storm of scrutiny consisting of Foxconn's politically charged tax probe by Beijing — a move seen as China's strategic ploy to express disapproval of Gou's campaign — and the bribery allegations tied to his petitioning process, Terry Gou's resolve to stay in this presidential race is being tested. This situation adds layers of complexity yet flexibility to the potential Blue-White coalition. The difficulty for the KMT and TPP to align in the presidential ticket could pivot the political chessboard toward alternative alliances, such as a Terry Gou endorsement of Ko or Hou after a possible withdrawal from the race. While such scenarios could certainly present a challenge to the DPP candidate Lai Ching-te's presidential bid, the polls suggest they would not be as formidable as a united KMT-TPP ticket with Hou-Ko or Ko-Hou, which according to polls, would achieve an easy victory.
If unable to negotiate a joint ticket before the imminent November 24 candidate registration deadline, KMT, TPP, and Terry Gou would likely not be able to thwart Lai's presidential bid, as he continues to outpace each contender.
In light of these unfolding developments in Taiwan, it becomes imperative for Washington to fully grasp the ramifications of a potential Taiwanese Blue-White coalition government on the delicate dynamics of the Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle. A thorough analysis and strategic foresight are required to determine the most appropriate U.S. policy approach in the event of a coalition government materializing in 2024.
Given the intricate situations in Ukraine and Israel demanding Washington's attention, the prospect of a Blue-White coalition government in Taiwan could provide a welcome respite to Washington, as both parties have demonstrated a clear willingness to jointly improve cross-strait dialogues after the election.
Interestingly, Bonnie Glaser and Joel Wuthnow, eminent U.S. experts on cross-strait relations and China's military affairs, have recently argued that Xi Jinping is not prepared to attack Taiwan due to the political and economic hardships that Xi is facing. Taking cues from their expert analyses, a transition to a Blue-White government in Taiwan in 2024 could indeed also provide a breather for Xi, as it would mitigate the need for Xi to grapple with the challenging decision of military engagement, especially in light of the potential for his adopting a more confrontational stance toward Beijing by Lai Ching-te, a self-claimed "political worker of Taiwan Independence."
Amid the current global turmoil, the emergence of a Blue-White coalition in Taiwan could present a unique opportunity for both Washington and Beijing to steer clear of conflict in the Taiwan Strait at least for the next four years.
However, the most prominent challenge for a possible Blue-White coalition government to regional security lies precisely in the transition period that it would require. The lack of a historical precedent in Taiwan raises questions about the stability of such coalition governance. Besides, if the KMT and TPP cannot even align smoothly in the election period, how can they cooperate well in a coalition government?
In the delicate transition phase, the nascent coalition would need to navigate internal tensions and differing policy priorities, potentially leading to a period of weakened governance. This fragility could inadvertently create openings for Beijing to amplify its influence and infiltration into Taiwanese society, and may well leverage its close ties with the KMT or Ko Wen-je to exploit any discernible fractures that might emerge within the coalition.
In light of these unfolding events, it becomes imperative for Washington to deepen its engagement and understanding of both Ko Wen-je and Hou Yu-ih to come to a more reliable judgment on the prospective mutual trust and ideological alignment of a potential Blue-White coalition. The recent visit by Laura Rosenberger, Chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan, to Taiwan, where she engaged with leading candidates Lai, Ko, and Hou, underscores this necessity. It is reasonable to believe that the potential of a Blue-White coalition would be a topic of discussion in her confidential conversations with Ko and Hou.
Sustaining and intensifying such diplomatic interactions is crucial, as it will reinforce its preparedness for the challenges brought by a Blue-White coalition government. In terms of the ongoing electoral campaign, prudence dictates that Washington should continue to adopt a stance of measured restraint and uphold a balanced posture. This is essential as both potential outcomes — a continuation of the DPP government or the advent of a KMT-TPP coalition — present their distinct sets of pros and cons from the vantage point of U.S. interests in the region.

Following the swearing-in of the Pakistan National Assembly's elected representatives, political parties are actively forming alliances as they prepare to decide on the Prime Ministerial post soon.

Poland's ideologically diverse new government is prioritising 'settling accounts' with its right-wing predecessor and elite replacement. But Poles may quickly tire of this if they view it as 'revenge politics', and looking for get-arounds to avoid possible presidential vetoes and constitutional tribunal referrals leaves the new administration open to accusations that they are themselves violating […]

Pedro Sánchez, Spain's incumbent prime minister, was sworn into office for the third time on 17 November 2023. He once again heads a minority coalition government. This time, it includes the prime minister's Socialist Party (PSOE) and Sumar (Sum or Add Up), a new leftwing political platform launched by Yolanda Díaz, the incumbent and continuing labor minister and second deputy prime minister.

The New York Times and the Atlantic report on how the movement to curb exclusionary zoning and build more housing has managed to cut across ideological lines.

One week after threatening the Iranian-backed Houthis for targeting international shipping, the U.S. led coalition has failed to back up its words with deeds. Houthi attacks continue unabated.
The post Houthis continue attacks in Red Sea despite warning from coalition first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.

U.S. efforts to cobble together an international coalition to protect the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea against attacks by the Yemeni Houthi militias who demand an immediate ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war are stoking tensions with European allies.On January 8, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown called his Spanish counterpart Teodoro Lopez Calderon to, according to the official U.S. readout, discuss the "ongoing illegal Houthi attacks on commercial vessels operating in international waters in the Red Sea." Pointedly, Brown "reiterated the U.S. desire to work with all nations who share an interest in upholding the principle of freedom of navigation and ensuring safe passage for global shipping."But according to recent reporting by veteran Spanish journalist Ignacio Cembrero, Washington has been pushing Spain a bit harder. U.S. Navy Secretary Carlos del Toro recently called the Spanish ambassador in Washington Santiago Cabanas to urge his government to join the U.S.-led anti-Houthi coalition, Operation Guardian Prosperity, and, according to Cembrero's reporting, even went so far as issuing a deadline to Madrid to deliver an answer by January 11. So far Madrid has refused to join the U.S.-led coalition and put its soldiers and ships under the command of Pentagon's CENTCOM in the Red Sea. During an announcement of the coalition's formation last month, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said Spain was among the members without, apparently, consulting with the Spanish government, causing considerable irritation in Madrid.To smooth the friction, President Biden called Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez to emphasize the Houthi threat. If his intention was to nudge Madrid closer to the U.S. position, it clearly failed: Spain refused to join the U.S. and a number of allies in the joint statement they issued on January 3 warning the Houthis about the consequences of their continued attacks on the maritime freedom.The Spanish government's position did not go unnoticed in Sana'a: the Houthi vice minister for foreign affairs Hussein Al-Ezzi expressed appreciation for Madrid's "distancing from American and British lies on the freedom of navigation." Cembrero also reported that one unexpected collateral benefit of the Spanish government's stance was the release by Iran, the Houthis' chief external backer, of a Spanish citizen kept in captivity in Tehran for 15 months.Although the Spanish government never explained the precise motives of its refusal to join "Prosperity Guardian," Madrid, while having unequivocally condemned Hamas's attack on Israel, has also been vocal in denouncing Israel's "indiscriminate killings" in Gaza, which even provoked a diplomatic crisis between Spain and Israel. The protection of the maritime freedom in the Red Sea is indeed a legitimate concern: nearly 12% of the global trade and $1 trillion worth of goods each year passes through it. The disruption of this route forces the shipping companies to divert their itineraries which causes delays and adds costs. Yet the Houthis also made it clear that their attacks will end when Israel's halts its bombing campaign in Gaza. Indeed, there were no Houthi attacks on the international shipping prior to October 7, 2023.In this context, the Spanish government seems to have calculated that joining the anti-Houthi coalition would rather mean fighting the symptoms, and not the root cause of the worsening conflict in the Middle East, namely, Israel's pursuit of maximalist military goals in Gaza and its seeming attempts to expand the war to Lebanon.By any reasonable estimation, taking the fight to the Houthis would not result in a quick, swift military victory. The movement only emerged stronger after the nine years-long war Saudi Arabia and the Arab coalition it led waged against it, with a lavish military, diplomatic and intelligence support from the U.S., UK and other Western nations. The Iran-backed Houthis have also developed considerable home-made drone and missile capabilities, with a proven capacity to hit Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Israel and Western military assets in the region. No war on the Houthis would, thus, be limited to some surgical strikes. With a predictable failure of such strikes to "neutralize" the militia, there is a high probability of a mission creep that would lead the coalition to attack targets onshore in Yemen, and that, in turn, could lead to an indirect collision with Iran. The Spanish government's reluctance to assume the risks of being embroiled in a likely pointless war against Houthis and their Iranian backers is understandable, particularly given that Madrid also wants a ceasefire in Gaza.While Spain may have been the most explicit in its reluctance to join the U.S.-led coalition against the Houthis, it is by no means the only U.S. ally harboring reservations. Notably, France, the EU's militarily most capable state, refused to join the White House-led January 3 statement. Italy, although signed that statement, is not committing itself to fighting under the U.S. command. Other NATO allies, like Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, only agreed to send token military personnel. In the end, the whole project looks more like a U.S.–UK undertaking than a real coalition of allies and like-minded partners.Instead of causing division and stoking tensions with its allies over the prospects of a highly questionable (to say the least) military operation, the Biden administration should deploy its leverage to get Israel to agree to an immediate ceasefire in Gaza and abandonment of any temptation to expand the war to Lebanon. If the Houthis continue their attacks in the Red Sea after a ceasefire, then the U.S. and its allies will have full legitimacy to strike back. For now, however, alienating allies like Spain and France by pandering to the most extreme Israeli government in history certainly isn't a price worth paying.

As the debate surrounding AI regulation continues, it is crucial for policymakers, industry leaders, and civil society to engage in constructive dialogue and collaboration to develop a nuanced and adaptive regulatory approach that can keep pace with the breakneck speed of AI advancement
The post An AI Healthcare Coalition Suggests a Better Way of Regulating AI appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI.

One year ago, Russia launched an illegal war on Ukraine, committing horrific war crimes against the people of Ukraine. Analyses and memorials abound, and I'm probably not the only person writing about this on the Duck today. I wanted to address a specific aspect of this war, though: why Russia's carefully cultivated ties with far-right […]

Half of the world's languages are endangered. One new prize champions language justice by awarding language activists from across the world the Language Rights Defenders Award.

Houthi forces based in Yemen are engaged in what resembles an unhinged, turbocharged form of piracy in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, where disruption and destruction have supplanted the traditional motivation of material ...

Germany's political landscape is fracturing, and the far-right is on the rise. The established parties need to respond and become more appealing for a broader cohort of voters.

The U.S. announces the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian as Houthi attacks have ground international shipping transiting the Red Sea through the Suez Canal to a halt as multiple shippers are now bypassing the dangerous waterway. It is unclear if the operation will be offensive or defensive in nature.
The post U.S. forms coalition to counter Houthi threat on international shipping; Houthis appear undeterred first appeared on FDD's Long War Journal.