Suchergebnisse

Comments on the article by Michael Cox & Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," in which they claim American policy in 1947 played a leading role in the process that ultimately led to the Cold War. It is noted that most scholars see the reconstruction of West European countries as the main thrust of the Marshall Plan. The notion that the US was doing everything possible short of war to eliminate Communist influence from Eastern Europe is challenged. Cox & Kennedy-Pipe fail to recognize that Stalin's aim was not just to maintain control in Eastern Europe but to take over all of Europe. Their assertion that Soviet leaders would have preferred a more cooperative relationship with the US would only be correct if "cooperation" meant the US giving economic aid to the Soviets with no strings attached. Attention is given to reasons why Stalin took the Marshall Plan talks seriously. It is concluded that it is a mistake to exaggerate the importance of the events of 1947. J. Lindroth

Though virtually ignored in the historiography, Brazil played an intriguing role in the politics & diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis & in US-Cuban relations during the Kennedy administration. In the years after Fidel Castro took power, successive Brazilian governments tried secretly to mediate between Washington & Havana as their mutual confrontation intensified. Newly available US, Brazilian, Cuban, & other sources reveal that this role climaxed during the missile crisis, as John F. Kennedy clandestinely sought to employ Brazil to transmit a message to Castro. In turn, Brazil, which was also promoting a Latin American denuclearization scheme at the United Nations as a possible means of resolving the crisis, sought to broker a formula for US-Cuban reconciliation that would heighten the prestige of its own "independent" policy in the Cold War. Ultimately, these efforts failed, but they shed light on previously hidden aspects of both the missile crisis & the triangular US-Cuban-Brazilian relationship. This is the concluding part of a two-part article. Adapted from the source document.

This article draws on recently declassified documents from the Belgian archives to assess the division within the Belgian diplomatic service about Soviet intentions at the start of the Cold War. The diplomatic corps was divided between those who viewed the Soviet Union favorably and believed that continued close cooperation after the war was both feasible and essential, and those who were wary of Soviet intentions in Eastern Europe and believed that Western democracies would have to be united in opposing Soviet encroachments. Paul-Henri Spaak, the long-time Belgian foreign minister, was initially in the former camp, but events at the close of the war and soon thereafter brought him and Belgian foreign policy much closer to the latter's position. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract. Heat waves (HWs) and cold waves (CWs) can have considerable impact on
people. Mapping risks of extreme temperature at local scale, accounting for
the interactions between hazard, exposure, and vulnerability, remains a
challenging task. In this study, we quantify risks from HWs and CWs for the
Trentino-Alto Adige region of Italy from 1980 to 2018 at high spatial
resolution. We use the Heat Wave Magnitude Index daily (HWMId) and the Cold
Wave Magnitude Index daily (CWMId) as the hazard indicators. To obtain HWs
and CW risk maps we combined the following: (i) occurrence probability maps of the hazard
obtained using the zero-inflated Tweedie distribution (accounting directly
for the absence of events for certain years), (ii) normalized population
density maps, and (iii) normalized vulnerability maps based on eight
socioeconomic indicators. The methodology allowed us to disentangle the
contributions of each component of the risk relative to total change in
risk. We find a statistically significant increase in HW hazard and
exposure, while CW hazard remained stagnant in the analyzed area over the
study period. A decrease in vulnerability to extreme temperature spells is
observed through the region except in the larger cities where vulnerability
increased. HW risk increased in 40 % of the region, with the increase
being greatest in highly populated areas. Stagnant CW hazard and declining
vulnerability result in reduced CW risk levels overall, except for the four
main cities where increased vulnerability and exposure increased risk
levels. These findings can help to steer investments in local risk
mitigation, and this method can potentially be applied to other regions
where there are sufficient detailed data.

Using recently declassified sources from Russian archives, this article discusses the status of the Soviet-controlled eastern zone of Austria during the postwar occupation (1945-1955) as a principal spying ground in Central Europe. The Western occupation powers hired many Austrians to gather information on the deployments of the Soviet Army and the Soviet authorities' exploitation of the "German assets" they had seized at war's end. The Austrians' principal incentive to spy was financial; they were well paid by their Western handlers. Austrian women had love affairs with Soviet soldiers and officers and then served as double agents for the West until the Soviet counterintelligence services caught up with them. From 1947 onward, some 500 Austrians disappeared after being detained by Soviet state security personnel and accused of spying. More than 100 of these Austrians were sentenced to death by Soviet Military Tribunal No. 28990 in Baden from 1950 until Josif Stalin's death in March 1953, and they were then executed in Moscow. In retrospect the mismatch between the actions of these Austrian "spies" and the penalties meted out to them is striking. The Soviet penal system was exported to occupied areas during the Cold War in intelligence "games" against the West, with tragic consequences for "Stalin's last victims.". Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThe demise of the Cold War and greater cooperation among the Security Council's permanent members have created a situation frequently characterized as a New World Order at the United Nations. This study examines whether that characterization can also be applied to the politics of the UN General Assembly. Using descriptive analysis of roll-call votes, the authors find that recent sessions, and in particular the 46th session, witnessed the end of a fairly stable decade of voting blocs in the General Assembly. An indicator of vote changing is developed which documents the rapid movement of the former Warsaw Pact members and Baltic states towards more western European positions. Hierarchical cluster and multidimensional scaling analyses are employed to identify the emerging voting alliances. The results suggest that the accommodation has not been as widespread in the General Assembly and that our longstanding conceptualizations of east/west/north/south polarizations are in need of revision.

The ANZUS Alliance was a defence arrangement between Australia, New Zealand and the United States that shaped international policy in the aftermath of the Second World War and the early stages of the Cold War. Forged by influential individuals and impacting on global events including the Japanese Peace Treaty, the Korean War and the Suez Crisis, the ANZUS Alliance was a crucial factor in the seismic changes that took place in the second half of the twentieth century. In this compact and accessible study, Andrew Kelly lays out the tensions that underpinned the formation of the Alliance, as each power sought to extract maximum influence and prestige. He examines how the ANZUS powers worked together (or failed to do so) when responding to massive global events including the rise of the People's Republic of China and the waning of the British Empire. Kelly comprehensively explores the reasons why Australia and New Zealand disagreed so regularly about mutual security issues, how US global leadership shaped ANZUS, and the British impact on the trilateral relationship, and outlines how these issues set the foundations for today's world order.

A comment on Michael Cox's & Caroline Kennedy-Pipe's article, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," argues that their attempt to blame the Americans & their allies for the post-WWII division of Europe is not persuasive. Their avoidance of the German question is a glaring omission since a German settlement was vital to a lasting security regime in Europe. Cox & Kennedy-Pipe fail to offer any new evidence from Soviet archives that would support their claim that Stalin was willing to cooperate with the West. In addition, they failure to acknowledge disagreements among US policy makers about almost every aspect of European & German reconstruction means they do not appreciate the complex nature of Washington decision-making & the "subtlety" of Marshall's offer. Their article not only does nothing to advance understandings of the origin of the Cold War but their stance resembles a throwback to the "arch-revisionism" of the 1960s & early 1970s. J. Lindroth

This paper examines the Cold War rhetoric in US–Russia relations by looking at the 2008 Russia–Georgia war as a major breaking point. We investigate the links between media, public opinion and foreign policy. In our content analysis of the coverage in two major US newspapers, we find that the framing of the conflict was anti-Russia, especially in the initial stages of the conflict. In addition, our survey results demonstrate that an increase in the media exposure of US respondents increased the likelihood of blaming Russia exclusively in the conflict. This case study helps us understand how media can be powerful in constructing a certain narrative of an international conflict, which can then affect public perceptions of other countries. We believe that the negative framing of Russia in the US media has had important implications for the already-tenuous relations between the US and Russia by reviving and perpetuating the Cold War mentality for the public as well as for foreign policymakers.

Since the inauspicious events of 2013-2014, Ukraine is in domestic and international turmoil. The Russian annexation of the Crimea was the first major act of its kind since the Second World War. Likewise, the downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 shocked the world. The political consequences remain to this day. In all convolutions, domestic and foreign politicians often appealed to history. Conflicting perceptions of history are an essential element of the so-called 'Ukraine Crisis'. This study demonstrates that political usage of history did not appear out of thin air. Ever since Ukraine became independent in 1991 politicians and historians sought to reinterpret the country's complicated past. Inspired by nationalist ideology they tried to give Ukraine a national 'European history'. To this, adherents of the old Soviet-style of Ukrainian history responded with vigour. Creating a tense political atmosphere wherein both sides polarized Ukrainian society around two extremes. Ukraine is not unique: since 1991, historians and politicians in Europe and Russia have also sought to redefine interpretations of history. While post-Communist Europe wanted to revaluate the meaning of communist and Nazi totalitarian rule, Western Europe sought to protect a narrative that sees Nazi crimes as the blackest page of history. On the other hand, Russia increasingly depends on presenting the Second World War as a great triumph. By contrasting the developments in Ukraine with other European and Russian experiences this study asks difficult but much-needed questions about what history means in our present.

The most morally compromising episodes of Ilya Ehrenburg's career took place at the outset of the Cold War. The wartime alliance between the US & the Soviet Union broke down, leaving the Soviet people increasingly isolated & subject to unrelenting propaganda against Western culture & society. Ilya Ehrenburg played a double game. He became a principal spokesman in the West for the Stalinist regime, defending Soviet policies & promoting the Soviet-inspired Partisans of Peace movement. At the same time, he used his contacts to make Western literature & art more accessible to a Soviet audience. Adapted from the source document.

In 2010 the EU decided to change the energy efficiency label for electrical appliances, so that the most effective appliances became more visible to consumers. We apply a Cointegrated Vector-Auto-Regressive (CVAR) model to assess the quantitative impact of this change on monthly sales (2005–2017) in the Danish markets for cold appliances of high and low efficiencies. The data support large effects with the expected signs. In particular, we find that the change increased sales of high-efficiency appliances by 55%, at the announcement, and by a further 42% when implemented. Sales of low-efficiency appliances were not affected by the announcement, but decreased, as a result of the implementation for online sales by 45%. These conclusions derive from the analysis of a well-specified VAR within which we take into account sample dependence, outliers and exogenous level shifts.

This article traces the impact of superpowers' foreign aid on India and Pakistan during the early decades of the Cold War. It shows how the American policy-makers have drawn their initial strategies to bring India under the Western fold and later, when the Indian leadership resisted by adopting the foreign policy non-alignment, charted a new approach to keep it at an adequate distance from the Soviet influence—particularly by exploiting its food insecurity and inability to complete the five-year plans. In contrast, the Soviet Union extended project-aid to India which assisted it to build much required large industrial base and attain self-sufficiency in the long run. By adhering to the non-aligned doctrine, India not only managed a negotiable balance with the superpower politics but also extracted considerable benefits for its overall development. On the other hand, aligned Pakistan had shown least enthusiasm with regard to self-sufficiency and pursued policies imbued with militarism which ended up it as a rent-seeking dependent state.

Building on earlier articles published in the Journal of Cold War Studies by James G. Hershberg and Zoltan Szoke, this article discusses Romania's involvement in the attempts to negotiate a peaceful conclusion to the Vietnam War before and after the Tet Offensive. The literature concerning the Romanian channel (codenamed Packers) is negligible thus far. Part of the reason is that even though official U.S. documentation on Packers has been available for two decades, relevant Romanian documents were only recently declassified by the archive of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The new evidence from the Romanian archives completes the picture of what was, in effect, the last U.S. chance to begin negotiations over Vietnam without compromising the initial U.S. position. The conversations between Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu and Vietnamese Communist leaders on the eve of the Tet Offensive offer a much more detailed inside look at Hanoi's negotiating position in December 1967-January 1968. The Romanian documents also show the crystallization of the Vietnamese position of March 1968 with regard to opening talks and the San Antonio formula. Adapted from the source document.

The article is based on new evidences from the Archive of External Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Russian Federation and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. It deals with the issue of Soviet (non-) participation in the formation of a New International (World) Economic Order (NIEO) after the World War II. It provides a detailed analysis of peculiarities of Soviet position at the conference in Bretton Woods and offers the first reconstruction of the full chronology of key discussions on the Soviet part. The author argues that the temporary refusal to sign the agreements did not mean an ultimate refusal to have economic cooperation with the West. Various Soviet experts continued discussing this topic until the beginning of 1947. The article reveals the new evidence that in 1965 the USSR was again invited to one of the key banks in the global economy. This time it was the Asian Development bank, a transregional organization with global participation. However, the current geopolitical situation in the South-East Asia prevented Moscow from joining the Bretton Woods system through the 'backdoor'. The author comes to the conclusion that even without its participation in official Bretton Woods institutions the Soviet Union influenced the world economy through the Third World countries taking part in designing new institutions of another New International Economic Order of 1960s – 1970s, such as UNCTAD. ; В статье на материале неопубликованных документов двух российских архивов – АВП МИД РФ и РГАНИ – рассматривается проблема участия/неучастия СССР в построении новой системы мирового экономического порядка после Второй мировой войны с участием других ключевых стран Западного мира. Подробно разбираются нюансы советской дипломатии на конференции в Бреттон-Вудсе, впервые выстраивается хронология ключевых дискуссий советской стороны. Автор показывает, что временный отказ СССР подписать Бреттон-Вудские соглашения еще не означал окончательного отказа от экономического сотрудничества с Западом. Советские эксперты обсуждали эту тему вплоть до начала 1947 г. Принципиально новым является тезис о том, что в 1965 г. СССР вновь получил приглашение принять участие уже в Азиатском банке развития – трансрегиональной организации с глобальным участием. Однако геополитическая ситуация в Юго-Восточной Азии не позволила тогда войти через этот банк в систему Бреттон-Вудских институтов «с черного хода». Автор приходит к выводу, что даже не входя в официальные институты Бреттон-Вудса, СССР оказывал влияние на мировую экономику, влияя на страны Третьего мира и участвуя в разработке институтов уже Нового международного экономического порядка 1960-х – 1970-х гг., таких как Конференция ООН по торговле и развитию (ЮНКТАД).