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Aus sowjetischer Sicht + Benutzerkommentar

THIS ARTICLE REPORTS ON A SURVEY OF THE VIEWS OF CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE ELITES ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN POST-COLD WAR EUROPE. THE FINDINGS SUGGEST THAT THERE APPEAR TO BE THREE DISTINCT META-CULTURES DEVELOPING IN THE NEW EUROPE: ONE COMPRISES THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIAN REPUBLICS (FYUG), TOGETHER WITH THE FORMER NON-SOVIET MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT (NSWP) AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO); ANOTHER COMPRISES THE NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED (NNA); AND THE THIRD COMPRISES THE FORMER SOVIET UNION (FSU). THE FYUG-NSWP-NATO CLUSTER APPEARS TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE-FURTHER AWAY FROM COLD WAR REALPOLITIK AND CLOSER TO AN IDEALPOLITIK FRAMEWORK-THAN ARE THE NNA AND FSU. THIS FLEXIBILITY HAS ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED BY THE FYUG-NSWP-NATO CLUSTER'S APPEARING TO BE MORE IN FAVOR OF CHANGE IN EXISTING INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS THAN ARE THE NNA AND FSU. THE ARTICLE CONCLUDES WITH RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT HOW TRACK 1 GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND TRACK 2 NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN BETTER INTEGRATE THEIR PEACEKEEPING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION RESOURCES, ESPECIALLY IN DEALING WITH CURRENT AND FUTURE YUGOSLAVIAS.

After five years of experience with the Helsinki Final Act, the thirty-five signatory countries are about to hold in Madrid a second follow-up conference to assess the record of implementation and consider what new steps might be taken to further the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, hereinafter CSCE. Now is a good time to take stock of where CSCE has been and where it is likely to go in the future. The Helsinki process seeks to address the United States basic foreign policy dilemma: how can two competing and largely antagonistic systems co-exist in a manner that protects United States security and at the same time creates opportunities to increase areas of cooperation. The Final Act itself seeks to address the universal desire of all peoples for basic human rights and freedoms. For this reason, the United States does not conceive of the Helsinki process as a bloc-to-bloc confrontation, although we have no illusions that the problem of the East is at present our central consideration. By taking account of the various wishes and hopes of the signatory nations, the Helsinki process helps to keep open channels of communication on sensitive issues in a way which shows promise of encouraging the improvements the United States seeks. This process, however, can only be kept alive through our commitment to make it work and to use its potential continuously to attain our objectives.

Bargaining relationships in formal international conferences and negotiations may involve structural asymmetries. A comprehensive analysis of these asymmetries in bargaining may be found in a synthesis of literature from formal game theory, structural-manipulative approaches to bargaining, social psychology, and the study of political influence. Propositions based on this literature focus on two factors which are likely to contribute to asymmetrical outcomes in negotiations: unequal costs to the negotiators from the failure to agree, and unequal resources available to employ in bargaining or influence attempts. An analysis of bargaining in the section of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) dealing with the issues of European security gave qualified support to these propositions. Influence over the final text in the CSCE agreement is related to a rough index of losses which would have resulted for individual nations from the failure to reach agreement in the CSCE. In addition, influence over the final text is related to each nation's resources, especially military resources. More significantly, the two superpowers exerted considerable asymmetrical influence over what was not included in the CSCE agreement, thus exercising a substantial veto. Thus, the asymmetrical outcomes within the CSCE negotiations were reflective of both differences in "threat potential," that is, in the losses which actors would receive if no agreement had ensued, as well as differences in resources.

This article reports on a survey of the views of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe elites on peace and security in post-Cold War Europe. The findings suggest that there appear to be three distinct meta-cultures developing in the new Europe: one comprises the former Yugoslavian republics (FYug), together with the former non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact (NSWP) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); another comprises the neutral and nonaligned (NNA); and the third comprises the former Soviet Union (FSU). The FYug-NSWP-NATO cluster appears to be more flexible—further away from Cold War Realpolitik and closer to an Idealpolitik framework—than are the NNA and FSU. This flexibility has also been suggested by the FYug-NSWP-NATO cluster's appearing to be more in favor of change in existing international mechanisms than are the NNA and FSU. The article concludes with recommendations about how Track 1 governments and international governmental organizations and Track 2 nongovernmental organizations can better integrate their peacekeeping and conflict resolution resources, especially in dealing with current and future Yugoslavias.