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Corporate takeover is a very important economic activity that generates profound consequences on many classes of market participants. The great financing needs and transaction costs directly change the wealth of both shareholders and creditors. The corporate restructuring induced by the takeover results in a significant impact on the welfare of management, employees, and customers. The reshaped industrial map due to the takeover further influences the competition strategies of other firms. Moreover, the changes in the taxable revenues when the takeover happens across the industry can also affect the tax income to the government. The paramount impact on corporations and the economy highlights the importance of studying the efficiency in corporate takeovers. This dissertation contributes to the discussion on takeover efficiency by exploring three key questions.

The takeover boom that began in the mid-1980s has exhibited many phenomena not previously observed, such as hostile takeovers and takeover defenses, a widespread use of cash as a means of payment for targeted firms, and the acquisitions of companies ranking among the largest in the country. With the aim of more fully understanding the implications of such occurances, contributors to this volume consider a broad range of issues as they analyze mergers and acquisitions and study the takeoveer process itself

The takeover boom that began in the mid-1980s has exhibited many phenomena not previously observed, such as hostile takeovers and takeover defenses, a widespread use of cash as a means of payment for targeted firms, and the acquisitions of companies ranking among the largest in the country. With the aim of more fully understanding the implications of such occurances, contributors to this volume consider a broad range of issues as they analyze mergers and acquisitions and study the takeoveer process itself

This paper tests the relationship between takeovers and poor management performance, known as the market discipline hypothesis. We create a proprietary new Australian dataset for this study by individually researching company reports for executive retention data. We assess takeover targets for pre-bid managerial inefficiency and find evidence that Australian target companies exhibit negative abnormal returns prior to takeover. In particular, we find that disciplinary targets underperform their non-disciplinary counterparts. Our tests take into account the difference between friendly and hostile takeovers, and the industry sector in which the target firm operates.