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The impacts of climate change on marine resources are well known and demand mitigation and adaptation measures in order to protect the ecosystems. This entails more than simply altering management practices; it requires altering goal setting and managing transitions to new ecosystemic conditions. In the European Union, the main legal tool for protection of the marine environment is the Marine Strategy Framework Directive. Greece, as a member state of the European Union, has transposed the Marine Strategy Framework Directive into its national legal order and has developed legal structures to protect its marine resources from various threats, including climate change.
The present paper aims to present the legal and policy management tools in Greece, relevant to implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and climate change adaptation. For methodological reasons, the paper is divided into two parts: The first part deals with those legal tools that apply to an initial assessment of the environmental quality of Greek marine waters, while the second part analyzes legislative activities pertinent to the design and implementation of programs and measures. The aim of the national legislation is to maintain the ecosystemic integrity of the marine waters of Greece and to preserve the unique characteristics of the aquatic environment with respect to present and future generations. However, the analysis shows that a holistic legal framework demands explicit provisions for climate change impacts, while the existing framework focuses primarily on anthropogenic pressures on the marine environment.

The 2010s was a busy decade for the Northern Sea Route (NSR). It started with the first shipping season to feature the international use of the NSR for commercial purposes, followed by a significant reform of the domestic legal regime, as well as the adoption of the Polar Code. The traffic has gradually picked up, and although the expectations of a significant surge in trans-Arctic navigation have not materialized, the NSR's annual turnover has grown beyond the old records set by the USSR. While the Russian authorities have struggled to find the most optimal means of development of the NSR, the latter has recently been re-marketed as a Polar Silk Road, part of the grand Chinese One Belt One Road initiative. While Russia has been rebuilding its military presence in the Arctic, the French Navy vessel BSAH Rhone unexpectedly navigated through the NSR, inciting strong political, but yet not legal, response. The present article aims to take stock of the last decade, paying primary attention to the Russian State practice in developing, adopting, and enforcing legislation in the NSR. By describing the current status and identifying some of the regulatory trends, the article will draw cautious predictions on the role of the law of the sea in the management of the NSR in the near future.

In Russia, there exist legal norms providing for the protection of indigenous small-numbered peoples' rights. Yet, indigenous small-numbered peoples face multiple challenges when it comes to the implementation of their rights. After a brief presentation of the Russian legislation on the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples, peculiarities of the Russian legal system and impediments to the legal provisions regulating the status of indigenous small-numbered peoples, this article addresses several issues related to the implementation of indigenous small-numbered peoples' rights in Russia today. One of the core issues is the attribution of individual members of indigenous communities to indigenous small-numbered peoples. Such an attribution is still challenging despite the newly adopted amendments to the 30 April 1999 Federal Law N 82-FL: 'On Guarantees of the Rights of Indigenous Small-Numbered Peoples of the Russian Federation'. Another issue is application of the notion 'foreign agent' to individuals and non-commercial organizations. Still another issue is the State's pressure on independent indigenous organizations. The final challenge is the possible impact of amendments to the Constitution approved by popular vote in July 2020 on the rights of indigenous small-numbered peoples.

The Arctic is one of the largest regions on the globe, and is regarded as a vast storehouse of potential resources, including minerals. Both mining and tourism are rapidly growing economic sectors in the region. While the variety of tourism activities supported and offered is extensive, all of these activities are essentially forms of nature-based tourism.
Land-use conflicts between mining and tourism are likely to emerge when a new mine is opened close to a tourist area, because mining activities may dramatically change the landscape, which is essential for tourism. The impact greatly depends on the location of mining facilities, the physical size of the mining project, the mining processes used, logistics and how well the image of the mine and its end product fits in with the image of the tourist destination. While tourism and the mining industry may benefit from each other, the relationship between a mine and tourism is often asymmetrically counterproductive; where such a relationship exists, a need for regulation arises.
In this article, we assess the legal means available for resolving conflicts between the mining and tourism industries and discuss possibilities to improve these means. The two key regulatory instruments for governing such conflicts are land-use planning and mining permit processes. We illustrate the nature of conflicts and various decision-making procedures with reference to the Finnish legal framework and a case study on an ongoing mining project in the town of Kolari.

It is a long known fact that climate change will result in sea level rise and dramatically changed coastlines for a number of coastal States, and the physical consequences of sea level rise are most likely unavoidable for several coastal States due to their geographical location, size and topography. It is highly debatable whether the Law of the Sea Convention is equipped for dealing with the current challenges of sea level rise and maritime limits, and it may be argued that its rule of ambulatory baselines may contribute to loss of territory, relocation of maritime zones, uncertainty and instability.
This article investigates the current status of the law regulating maritime limits which may be affected by sea level rise, and argues that the best solution is to adapt the law within the current legal framework of the Law of the Sea, by undertaking a liberal interpretation of the already existing provisions of the LOSC, instead of invoking the amendment procedures of the LOSC, a new supplementary agreement or creating new customary law. In particular, the article explores the option of re-interpreting the law of baselines in Article 7, offering an adapting measure that mitigates the climate change effects on sea level rise. It is argued that a liberal interpretation of the LOSC can contribute to increased stability and juridical protection of the maritime entitlements for some of the States suffering the consequences of sea level rise.

Negotiations are ongoing to develop an international legally binding instrument (ILBI) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). If adopted, the ILBI will likely apply to parts of the Arctic Ocean where the Arctic Council has played an important role for ocean governance. This begs the question of what role the Arctic Council will play vis-à-vis a future ILBI, which is envisioned to "not undermine existing relevant legal instruments and frameworks and relevant global, regional and sectoral bodies" (UN General Assembly Resolution 72/249). Against this backdrop, this article reflects on the future relationship between the Arctic Council and the ILBI. In so doing, the article initially discusses possible meanings of the notion of not undermining and, more broadly, how the ILBI will likely determine its institutional relationship with relevant bodies for BBNJ. Based on that, the article provides a short overview of the role of the Arctic Council in Arctic Ocean governance and explores whether the Arctic Council would qualify as a relevant regional body that shall not be undermined by the future ILBI.

The duty of states to consult indigenous communities is a well-established legal principle, but its implications for practice remain uncertain. Sweden is finding itself at a particularly critical juncture as it prepares to legislate a duty to consult the Sami people in line with its international obligations. This paper explores the ability of Swedish state actors to implement the duty to consult, based on lessons from an already existing duty set out in Swedish minority law, namely to ensure the effective participation of minorities in land and resource decisions. Presenting novel empirical material on the views of Sami communities and state officials in ministries and agencies, we demonstrate the existence of considerable implementation gaps linked to practice, sectoral legislation, and political discourse. We argue that if state duties are to promote the intended intercultural reconciliation, then new measures are needed to ensure enforcement, e.g. via mechanisms of appeal and rules of nullification. In addition, sectoral resource regulations should be amended to refer to the duties set out in minority law and/or a potential new bill on consultation duty in a consistent manner. In the near-term, the state should ensure that Sami communities are adequately resourced to engage in consultation and should invest in state authorities' own ability to implement, i.e. through competence development, staffing, intersectoral coordination, and independent evaluation. Much could also be gained if state agencies and Sami communities worked together to develop detailed consultation routines for relevant resource sectors.

The article analyses the notes, which were prepared by provisional investigation commissions formed by the Seimas, in which it was suggested that the Seimas should either agree or disagree on the abolition of the immunity of a Member of the Seimas. In the opinion of the author, an analysis of these notes permits to assert that these notes often have essential drawbacks: the notes contain insufficient arguments following which the commission substantiates its proposal that the Seimas should not give its consent to hold a Member of the Seimas criminally liable, to arrest him or restrict he freedom otherwise; at times such notes do not contain any such arguments at all; sometimes the commissions exceed the powers granted to them and undertake functions which are not characteristic of such commissions. The Constitution establishes the immunity of a Member of the Seimas not for the purpose that a Member of the Seimas who committed a crime could avoid criminal liability, but that he would not be held criminally liable in the absence of legal grounds, that he would not be persecuted for political or other similar reasons, and that no influence (which is prohibited by the Constitution) would be exerted on him due to his activity in the capacity of a Member of the Seimas.

The article analyses the notes, which were prepared by provisional investigation commissions formed by the Seimas, in which it was suggested that the Seimas should either agree or disagree on the abolition of the immunity of a Member of the Seimas. In the opinion of the author, an analysis of these notes permits to assert that these notes often have essential drawbacks: the notes contain insufficient arguments following which the commission substantiates its proposal that the Seimas should not give its consent to hold a Member of the Seimas criminally liable, to arrest him or restrict he freedom otherwise; at times such notes do not contain any such arguments at all; sometimes the commissions exceed the powers granted to them and undertake functions which are not characteristic of such commissions. The Constitution establishes the immunity of a Member of the Seimas not for the purpose that a Member of the Seimas who committed a crime could avoid criminal liability, but that he would not be held criminally liable in the absence of legal grounds, that he would not be persecuted for political or other similar reasons, and that no influence (which is prohibited by the Constitution) would be exerted on him due to his activity in the capacity of a Member of the Seimas.