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The issue analysed by the author is that of the institution of Presidential immunity pertaining to the President of the Republic of Poland, and operating in such a way that a sitting President cannot be held criminally liable before a common court for acts tantamount to offences. Inclining towards the essence of this solution and its consequences when it comes to respect for constitutional principles of legalism and equality before the law, the author at the same time seeks to assess the completeness of the provisions in effect in Poland, in so doing identifying a lack of clear directives as to how a former President (i.e. one who has left office) is to be held criminally liable. The conclusion reached by the author can be said to boil down to a recognition that the liability of a former President before Poland's Tribunal of State for offences or crimes committed is of an accessory nature where common courts are concerned, with the condition underpinning recognition of the Tribunal's primacy in matters of jurisdiction being the National Assembly's adoption of a Resolution holding a former President liable constitutionally, and potentially at the same time initiating action in respect of given offences. Any lack of such a National Assembly Resolution must give rise to a particular kind of reactivation – in respect of the former President – of jurisdiction in the dispensing of justice by common courts, given the fact that one of the negative procedural premises has ceased to be non-applicable. Thus, unlike in the case of a President still holding office, the cognition of the Tribunal of State in relation to a former President is neither exclusive nor automatic. Such observations have also stimulated work by the author to develop de lege ferenda postulates regarding the subject matter, as set against the wider background of Poland's political and constitutional system.

Rozdział prezentuje teoretyczna analizę relacji zachodzącej między prawem a kontrolą społeczną przedstawiając w jaki sposób prawo jako narzędzie kontroli społecznej określa nastawienia wobec prawa.

The purpose of the article is to analyse the role of the public prosecutor's office as an institution that is specifically embedded in between certain elements of the political system, particularly between the executive and judiciary powers. For this reason, the public prosecutor's office can be regarded, together with courts, as an institution that aims to be actively involved in administering justice and an instrument of the executive power to guarantee internal security and to execute internal functions of the state. The public prosecutor's office, given its specific operation area, is expected to prosecute crimes effectively as well as safeguard the rule of law, which may be threatened by the infringing actions of not only individuals and criminal groups but also of officials and state institutions. Hence, with respect to the accountability of the public prosecutor's office, it should be more independent of the executive power which is subject to political rules. It appears, however, that separating it officially from the executive power does not have to lead automatically to the public prosecutor's office independence of political influence when other direct (the Prime Minister's and the Minister of Justice's authority over the Attorney General) and indirect mechanisms of prosecutors' political dependency (clientelism, politicisation and political bonds of prosecutors with politicians) exist.

The institution of self-defence comprises both provisions of the General Part (art. 36 and 37:self defence and imaginary self defence) and the Special Part (art. 118 and 124: intentional killing,causing grievous bodily harm as a result of exceeding the borders of self defence or using excessivemeasures necessary to catch the perpetrator) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.There are diverse opinions in Ukrainian jurisprudence concerning the problem of how selfdefenceand other circumstances eliminate the illegality of a forbidden act. The aim of this paper isto present the main attitudes to these problems. The approach considering self-defence in the lightof legality is the most popular view. There is also an approach according to which one distinguishesthe prerequisites for self-defence and the elements of such self-defence taking into account elementssuch as: the subject – the aim – the objective side – the subjective control. The socially harmfulattack which justifies the use of self-defence should be analysed using both of these approaches.The features of a legitimate self-defence are: the subject – a private person; the aim – to causeinjuries to the attacker (the direct aim) in order to repel or stop the attack (the indirect aim) in orderto defend legally protected rights and interests of a person, interests of the society or the state (thefinal aim); the object – the attacker, his rights and interests; the objective side – actions casually connectedwith the causing of harm to the attacker, commensurable with the harmfulness of the attackand the state of the defence; subjective control – proper realisation by the subject of the prerequisitesand features of the defence and the will to cause commensurable harm to the attacker.Two types of exceeding the borders of self-defence are distinguished in the paper: exceedingthe borders of acceptable harm and exceeding the borders of adequate harm. Criminal responsibilityfor exceeding the borders of self-defence arises only in cases clearly provided for in art. 118 and 124of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The sanctions in these articles are much more lenient than in thecase of corresponding offences not committed while exceeding of the borders of self-defence (art.115, 119 and 121 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine). ; Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim

"The author intends to present legal socialization - the concept of the sociology of law - which describes attitudes to norms, law and law enforcement institutions. For law to be effective, any individual in a given community needs to internalize a number of values and attitudes. The attitude to law will influence its application; its effectiveness will depend on the perspective adopted by the legal norm addressees who could either accept binding regulations or ignore them. An adequate legal policy helps construe legal norms in a manner to prevent costs of interventions which need to be taken when law is not convergent with social expectations." (author's abstract)

"W maju 2020 roku Profesor Witold Kulesza obchodził 70. rocznicę urodzin. Z tej okazji postanowiliśmy skierować zaproszenie do wybitnych przedstawicieli najważniejszych ośrodków naukowych w Polsce i za granicą, by wspólnie uhonorować Jubilata. Efektem naszej współpracy jest prezentowana księga jubileuszowa, zawierająca pięćdziesiąt artykułów o szerokiej tematyce. Zostały one pogrupowane w obrębie czterech rozdziałów - O sprawiedliwości, O prawie karnym w ogólności, O prawie karnym w szczególności, O kryminologii i polityce kryminalnej - by nawiązać do najistotniejszych wątków dorobku naukowego Jubilata. Wśród nich znajdują się prace z pogranicza prawa karnego oraz filozofii państwa i prawa, a także dotyczące poszczególnych typów przestępstw. Autorzy artykułów zarówno sięgają wstecz, jak i odnoszą się do współcześnie wprowadzonych rozwiązań z zakresu prawa penalnego. Pro dignitate legis et maiestate iustitiae, żywiąc głęboki szacunek wysokie uznanie dla Profesora Witolda Kuleszy, składamy tę księgę Jubilatowi w hołdzie i darze."--

The article analyzes the process of displacing law and its values from political thinking. There are many indications that law and its values are not a point of reference for contemporary politics, which results from the ongoing process of democratization. The coherence of virtues, law and politics, variously approached and variable over time, lasted in European culture for more than a thousand years. The Greek models have been adopted and consolidated by the Romans and Medieval thinkers. The breakthrough is brought by Machiavelli's writings, which radically changed the view of politics, free will, power. The nature of the state ceases to mean providing citizens with a happy life, and it begins to concern security. As a result, law becomes a tool to protect this security effectively. ; Artykuł jest analizą procesu wyparcia prawa i jego wartości z myślenia politycznego. Wiele wskazuje na to, że dla współczesnej polityki prawo i jego wartości nie stanowią punktu odniesienia, za co odpowiada trwający proces demokratyzacji. Koherencja cnót, prawa i polityki, różnie ujmowanych i zmiennych w czasie, trwała w europejskiej kulturze przez ponad tysiąc lat. Greckie wzorce zostały przejęte i ugruntowane przez Rzymian i myślicieli średniowiecznych. Przełomem stało się dopiero pisarstwo Machiavellego, który radykalnie odmienił spojrzenie na politykę, wolną wolę, władzę. Istota państwa przestaje sprowadzać się do zapewnienia obywatelom szczęśliwego życia, a zaczyna dotyczyć bezpieczeństwa. Co za tym idzie prawo staje się narzędziem służącym do tego, by owo bezpieczeństwo skutecznie zabezpieczyć.

The inauguration of Nelson Mandela as South Africa's first democratic president on 10 May 1994 became a symbol of the end of apartheid and the beginning of a new chapter in the country's history. As South African society was deeply divided, the 1993 Interim Constitution expressed the need for reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of its society. The legacy of apartheid was to be addressed based on 'a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization'. Due to its introduction into the Constitution, ubuntu – a philosophy of unity, cooperation, compassion and respect for human dignity, which originated in small African communities – became a source of values for the whole legal system. The goal of the text is to present the ubuntu philosophy and to describe its role in the South African transitional justice process and in selected areas of South African law (criminal law, evictions and defamation). On the whole, South Africapresents a unique case in which both the political transformation and the legal system were strongly shaped by the said philosophical and ethical concepts, which bear close resemblance to the idea of restorative justice. ; Zaprzysiężenie 10 maja 1994 r. Nelsona Mandeli na pierwszego demokratycznie wybranego prezydenta Republiki Południowej Afryki stało się symbolem końca apartheidu i otwarcia nowego etapu w historii tego państwa. Wobec istniejących w społeczeństwie głębokich podziałów przejściowa Konstytucja RPA z 1993 r. wyrażała potrzebę pojednania pomiędzy obywatelami RPA, a także rekonstrukcji wspólnoty. Przezwyciężenie spuścizny apartheidu miało być oparte na potrzebie "zrozumienia, a nie zemsty", "rekompensaty, a nie odwetu" oraz "ubuntu, a nie wiktymizacji". Filozofia ubuntu (wywodząca się z małych afrykańskich wspólnot filozofia jedności, kooperacji, współczucia i respektu dla ludzkiej godności), do której odwołanie zamieszczono w Konstytucji – stała się rezerwuarem wartości dla całego systemu prawa. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie filozofii ubuntu oraz omówienie jej roli w rozliczeniach z przeszłością w Republice Południowej Afryki i w wybranych obszarach południowoafrykańskiego prawa: w prawie karnym, regulacjach dotyczących eksmisji z nielegalnie zajmowanego gruntu oraz w regulacjach przewidujących odpowiedzialność deliktową za zniesławienie. RPA jawi się przy tym jako wyjątkowy kazus, w którym zarówno polityczna transformacja, jak i system prawny kształtowały się pod istotnym wpływem omawianych koncepcji filozoficznych i etycznych, silnie nawiązujących do idei sprawiedliwości naprawczej.

The purpose of the article is to present the legal situation of a slave under Roman criminal law. The analysis conducted proves that the approach towards slaves changed along with the transformation of the government system of ancient Rome. In the Period of the Republic, criminal liability of slaves evolved in two directions. The dominica potestas was exercised by owners, as well as the collegial body – tresviri capitales. From the Principate period, Roman jurists were convinced that the legal status of a slave and a free person was identical under criminal law. The difference between these offenders was non-exercise of leges criminales with a penalty that would be inadequate for their legal status, or ruling and exercising of more severe penalties against slaves. ; Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie sytuacji prawnej niewolnika na gruncie rzymskiego prawa karnego. Przeprowadzone rozważania dowodzą, że podejście do niewolników ulegało zmianie wraz z ewolucją systemu władzy w starożytnym Rzymie. W okresie republiki odpowiedzialność karna niewolników kształtowała się dwutorowo. Jurysdykcję w ramach dominica potestas wykonywali ich właściciele, a także kolegialny urząd – treviri capitales. Juryści rzymscy, począwszy od epoki pryncypatu, nie mieli żadnych wątpliwości, że status prawny niewolnika i osoby wolnej był na gruncie prawa karnego tożsamy. Różnica dotyczyła niestosowania wobec nich leges criminales z sankcją karną nieadekwatną do ich statusu prawnego czy też orzekania i wykonywania surowszej kary wobec niewolnika.

The breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 30 years ago still has a substantial impact on the post-Yugoslav countries which proclaimed independence. Bearing in mind that the breakup also generated a military conflict, e.g. in Croatia, the restoration of Serbian-Croatian relations remains problematic. One of the challenges is passing a fair judgment on people responsible for war crimes or crimes against humanity. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established for this reason in particular. Ante Gotovina – a Croatian general, was one of those indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in connection with the military operation "Oluja" during which some heinous acts of crime took place. Gotovina played a clear and primary role in this operation, and therefore his actions were the main count of the indictment, firstly, for the prosecution and then for the Trial Chamber of ICTY. However, the sentence of 24 years imprisonment was never carried out following a successful appeal. The Appeals Chamber did not uphold the verdict of the Trial Chamber owing to a serious legal error and, consequently, it acquitted Gotovina of all the charges. This issue became yet another source of Serbian-Croatian conflict in connection with the most important people held responsible for the crimes committed in 1991-1995.

Traditionally, the quality of law is associated with observing certain principles of law making, the so-called principles of good legislation. Such a way of thinking, however, seems to be an over-simplification. Thus, the author indicates that the high-quality of legislation and the principles of good legislation are not the same. Law passed on the basis of good legislation procedures does not automatically result in the high-quality law, in particular, if one makes an assumption that the quality of law depends, above all, on legal certainty being ensured. The reflections presented here express an opinion on the immediate connection between the quality of law and the theory of law. In this perspective, thoughts on the quality of law resulted in an opinion how firmly the process of improvement in law quality is associated with the development of the theory of law. As regards the studies on the quality of law as a measure of legal certainty, three issues are pointed out in the material: 1. the quality of law from the point of view of its formation in reference to certain general social phenomena, 2. the quality of law relating to a person, 3. the quality of law in judicial activities.

The purpose of this article is to attempt to answer the question whether a slave or female slave were criminally responsible for adultery. The Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis promulgated in 18 B.C., belonged to the so-called Augustan marriage legislation, introduced the term adulterium understood as a crime of public law. This law was very widely commented on by Roman jurists. However, the opposite views on the criminal liability of slaves under this statute are noticed in accessible legal sources. In the literature devoted to the Julian Act, this issue has not been sufficiently analyzed. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy niewolnik lub niewolnica ponosili odpowiedzialność karną za adulterium. Uchwalona w 18 r. p.n.e. ustawa Lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis, należąca do tzw. ustawodawstwa małżeńskiego Augusta, wprowadziła pojęcie adulterium pojmowane jako przestępstwo prawa publicznego. Ustawa ta była bardzo szeroko komentowana przez jurystów rzymskich. Jednakże w dostępnych źródłach prawniczych zauważa się rozbieżne poglądy dotyczące odpowiedzialności karnej niewolników na gruncie tej ustawy. W literaturze poświęconej ustawie julijskiej zagadnienie to nie zostało dostatecznie przeanalizowane.